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This study explores the varied Citizen Potawatomi responses to federal 
assimilation and land policies from 1861 to 1891.  The professed intention for these laws 
and treaties was to acculturate Native Americans into American society, but there was a 
clear ulterior motive to drastically reduce the land base of tribes in the West.  The 
outcomes of policies that arranged for allotment and citizenship were mixed.  The federal 
government successfully dispossessed the Citizen Potawatomi of large quantities of land 
and virtually every tribal member became a U.S. citizen, but few individuals became 
successful farmers or businessmen.  The government’s efforts also unintentionally 
resulted in fostering a stronger tribal identity and better tribal organization to argue for 
the collective and individual rights of Citizen Potawatomi tribal members.     
As the United States became embroiled in a devastating civil war and thousands 
of Americans flooded west in search of opportunity, the Citizen Potawatomi entered into 
a treaty agreement to allot their lands and become U.S. citizens.  The Citizen Potawatomi 
treaty of 1861 forced tribal members to abandon the practice of holding land in common 
by stipulating that they must accept allotments and become U.S. citizens.  Unintended 
 v 
consequences of the flaws in the government’s plan were the near-complete loss of lands 
allotted to the Citizen Potawatomi, and a muddying of their legal status.  Within a decade 
a large percentage of tribal members were landless and sought a new home in Indian 
Territory.  By 1872 the Citizen Potawatomi better understood how to use non-Indian 
methods to fight for favorable allotments and full enfranchisement in the extralegal 
condition that characterized both their new home and themselves. 
Two decades later, when the federal government opened thousands of acres of 
Citizen Potawatomi lands to non-Indian settlement, tribal members had learned a painful, 
but strengthening lesson.  To salvage a distinct tribal identity and political independence, 
the Citizen Potawatomi took command of their relationship with the federal government 
by demonstrating knowledge of the legislation that defined their legal rights and 
manipulating the inconsistent application of those policies.     
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 1 
Introduction 
Anthony Navarre, Mary Bourbonnais, and George L. Young had very little in 
common.  Navarre was an ambitious and forceful man educated at the Choctaw Academy 
in Scott County, Kentucky.  Mary Bourbonnais was a mother of five children who 
converted to the Society of Friends as an adult and taught the first Sunday school for the 
church on the Potawatomi reservation.  George L. Young was a non-Indian man who 
married a Potawatomi woman, served on the tribe’s Business Committee, and became an 
entrepreneur, running a successful ferry business in Indian Territory.  These three 
individuals had a familial bond because they were all Citizen Potawatomi tribal members 
(even if only by adoption) and they are bound together in history of the Citizen 
Potawatomi because each one was an outspoken advocate for the rights of the tribe.  
Throughout the thirty year scope of this narrative these three individuals and many other 
tribal members put pen to paper to express their concerns and frustrations about the 
treatment of the Citizen Potawatomi by the federal government.1   
This project explores the relationship between those individuals and the United 
States government by analyzing the tribe’s responses to federal assimilation and land 
policies of the late nineteenth century.  I argue that, over time, the Citizen Potawatomi 
learned to leverage their previous experiences dealing with government agents, at all 
levels, to better argue for their rights in Kansas and Indian Territory.  Even though the 
assimilatory processes of allotment and U.S. citizenship ultimately led to mass 
dispossession of the Citizen Potawatomi in both locations, it motivated them to create 
political structures and shape the tribe’s legal status in ways that generated the 
                                                 
1 The Citizen Potawatomi Nation is one of nine present-day, federally recognized tribes of Potawatomi in 
the United States and Canada. This dissertation will explore the origins of this distinct group.  
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opportunity to influence the outcome of the government’s plan for their lives.  The 
Citizen Potawatomi utilized their undefined status as both Native Americans and U.S. 
citizens to challenge the federal government and receive more advantageous allotment 
conditions in Indian Territory. 
In the 1850s and 1860s, the Office of Indian Affairs put a great deal of pressure 
on the Citizen Potawatomi to accept allotments and U.S. citizenship as part of a concerted 
effort to assimilate and dispossess the Native Americans of Kansas.  The Citizen 
Potawatomi eventually agreed to the assimilation effort, in part because they succumbed 
to these pressures, but they also made a conscious decision that it was a valid option for 
their community.  Tribal members had experienced several forced removals in the 
preceding decades and they sought permanence and security.  They wanted the social 
status, economic advantages, political agency, and assurance of protection from further 
encroachment by non-Indian settlers or another removal they believed private land 
ownership and U.S. citizenship would entail.  Essentially, I argue that the politics of 
assimilation policies cannot be separated from lived experiences.  Instead, the decisions 
of the Citizen Potawatomi regarding allotment and U.S. citizenship grew out of the 
political climate, personal experiences, feared consequences, and desires of their daily 
lives.  
AN INDIAN POLICY OF ASSIMILATION 
The assimilation policies of allotment and U.S. citizenship fully developed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, after several other methods of dealing with the so-
called “Indian problem” were judged inadequate.  In the decades before they decided on 
assimilation, reformers worked to shift federal Indian policy from the forced or coerced 
removal of Native Americans from their ancestral territories to a policy centered on the 
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formation of collectively held reservations.  Both of these policies resulted in 
exacerbating a condition of wardship and dependence on federal annuities by most Native 
Americans.   
By the late 1880s, the allotment of individual plots of land was touted as the 
panacea to Indian dependency.  It was conceived with the hope that Native Americans 
could be assimilated into the dominant Euro-American society and become self-sufficient 
farmers, organized in nuclear families rather than tribes, who would cease to be reliant on 
government aid and annuities.  The lack of an official policy governing assimilation for 
twenty-five years after they entered into their allotment and citizenship treaty makes the 
case of the Citizen Potawatomi intriguing.  There must be a careful distinction drawn 
between the years when allotment was the government’s preferred method of dealing 
with Native Americans and when it became the official policy that forced severalty on 
native peoples.  The Citizen Potawatomi became a test case for allotment and citizenship.  
The tribe experienced devastating losses, but later was able to manipulate the unrefined 
system to their benefit.  Allotment and citizenship, as tools of assimilation, were enacted 
on a large scale with the passing of the Dawes Act of 1887.  The Dawes Act, like the 
Potawatomi treaty of 1861, called for the privatization of land ownership, partnered with 
United States citizenship, to create the ideal circumstances for Americanization of 
Indians.  It had certain provisions that made the regulation of the process stronger, 
because of the lessons learned from the experiences of the Citizen Potawatomi and other 
tribes in Kansas. 
The Citizen Potawatomi impetus for taking allotments was less inspired than 
becoming accepted members of Euro-American society.  They were simply looking for 
security and the ability to make a home that would not be taken away.  Land had myriad 
social and cultural meanings for Native Americans, just as it did for dozens of other 
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ethnic and religious groups in America.  For the Potawatomi, removal from the places 
oral tradition dictated they were meant to live, dispossession of the lands where their 
ancestors were buried, and the loss of sites where seasonal ceremonies took place, altered 
their view of land.  It took on a significance that was less historical, spiritual, and 
culturally specific, becoming instead more material, practical, and utilitarian once they 
were moved west.   
They attempted to rebuild their lives on the new reservations and tried to return 
their families to normal life.  They plowed gardens and hunted game in the forests of 
their new homes.  As one removal followed another, however, a return to their past life 
was hard to achieve.  Therefore, it is understandable that the Citizen Potawatomi were 
intrigued by the promises of the 1861 treaty, that the land where they built their homes 
would be treated “in the like manner with the property of other citizens.”2      
Unfortunately, neither the Potawatomi (nor their property) was ever truly treated 
like other citizens of the United States.  They faced unfavorable application of their 1861 
treaty rights, strapped with the burdens of property ownership and U.S. citizenship, 
without the accompanying protections and benefits.  Frederick Hoxie suggests that the 
goals of the federal government’s assimilation policies were rarely met because “Indians 
resist[ed] the process” and “complete acceptance of [Indians] demanded more of the 
nation’s insitutions, social values, and cultural life than the citizenry was willing to 
grant.”3   An alternate goal of the federal government’s commitment to a policy of 
assimilation was to open the Indian’s unalloted land to non-Indian settlers and businesses.  
This supposedly secondary goal often drove the action of these policies.  After less than a 
                                                 
2 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1904), 824–828. 
3 Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (University of 
Nebraska Press, 2001), xix. 
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decade almost all of the Citizen Potawatomi who took allotments and citizenship were 
dispossessed and nearly destitute in Kansas.  Hundreds of them availed themselves of the 
opportunity to move to a reservation in Indian Territory to start anew.   Once there, the 
Citizen Potawatomi used the lessons they learned in Kansas to argue for the most 
favorable terms possible when their lands in the new reservation were allotted. 
As a Citizen Potawatomi Nation tribal member who was raised with the history of 
my family and my tribe, I expected to find a relatively straight-forward tale of Native 
American struggle and perseverance with a clear narrative progression to property 
ownership and U.S. citizenship in Indian Territory.  I hoped that I would discover source 
material that fully explained why the Citizen Potawatomi chose to drastically alter their 
relationship with the federal government by agreeing to the assimilationist policies of the 
1861 treaty and how we came to occupy the lands of our reservation in Indian Territory.  
What I discovered during the research for this project was more complicated than that.  
The Potawatomi did not respond as a single unit to the demands of the federal 
government.  The sheer complexity of the allotment and citizenship process pulled the 
tribe in many disparate directions.  
One cannot talk about Native Americans, or even individual tribes, as a 
homogenous group.  Therefore, one cannot look at Indian policies, as they are applied to 
the Citizen Potawatomi, as having one primary outcome of “beneficial” or “detrimental.”  
While the cultural destruction that often occurred because of assimilation policies was 
terrible, the Citizen Potawatomi realized that they were never likely to have security or 
cultural stability unless they had more control over their land.  This realization influenced 
the decision of some Potawatomi to engage with the federal government’s assimilation 
plans and others to refuse to participate.  Thus, there are as many responses to federal 
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assimilation policies as there are Native Americans who were forced to make the decision 
to accept or reject the government’s efforts.   
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This project focuses on the application and results of assimilation and land 
policies.  All too often scholarship explores the development of these plans in the halls of 
Congress and their legacy in the annals of American history, without looking at the effect 
these plans had on their intended subjects. The issue of the federal government’s role in 
developing and implementing federal Indian policies has been extensively examined and 
is one of the oldest specializations of Native American history.  Scholars of land 
allotment and other assimilation efforts have predominantly approached the issue as a 
political one, focusing on the creation of policy.4   
The classic work on federal Indian policy from the government’s perspective is 
the two-volume The Great Father by Francis Paul Prucha, which examines the actions of 
colonial and national governments toward Native Americans from the seventeenth 
through the twentieth centuries.5  Prucha’s particular focus is on the actions and attitudes 
of the presidents toward Native Americans.  It is a useful resource and offers researchers 
a wealth of information on the climate of U.S./Indian relations over the course of 
American history.  The Native Americans who are subject to these policies, however, are 
mere props in this analysis.  Wilcomb E. Washburn’s Assault on Indian Tribalism 
                                                 
4 For more on the development of U.S. Indian policy, see Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White 
Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (University Press of Kansas, 1991); Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: 
The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Stuart Banner, 
How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded 
Knee (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier 1846-1890, Revised 
(University of New Mexico Press, 2003); William T. Hagan, Taking Indian Lands: The Cherokee (Jerome) 
Commission, 1889-1893 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2011). 
5 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2 vols. 
(Lincoln, 1984);  
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narrows the focus from Prucha’s epic scope to look at allotment under the Dawes Act of 
1887, but it is still a top-down assessment of the policy.  It specifically explores the 
motivations and reasoning behind the allotment law, as well as the national political 
climate that produced it.   
Both of these analyses were useful resources in the course of this study, but they 
focus on the agenda and actions of the federal government and its agents without 
explaining the Native American response.  They consider ideas about Native Americans 
rather than being histories that truly engage their Native American subjects.  They assess 
neither the complexity of Native American reactions to assimilation efforts, nor the 
significant ways land ownership and citizenship (re)shaped power relations between 
allottees and the federal government, non-Indian settlers, or the impact it had on 
relationships of allottees to one another.   
In the last two decades, scholars have better considered the cultural ramifications 
of allotment on Native American communities.6  A particularly strong case study, and 
one of the best models for this project, is Emily Greenwald’s Reconfiguring the 
Reservation.7  Greenwald examines allotment under the Dawes Act for the Nez Perce and 
the Jicarilla Apache, with an emphasis on how both tribes challenged the assimilationist 
goals of the U.S. government by using their choice of allotments as a method of spatial 
expressions of power over their culture and economy.  They chose plots that had cultural 
meaning, such as sacred or ceremonial sites or places where their ancestors were buried 
rather than land that was good for farming.  Like Greenwald’s analysis, my study will 
                                                 
6 For an assessment of specific tribal responses to the policy of allotment see Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the 
Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation (The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2011); James Oberly, The Oneida Indians in the Age of Allotment, 1860-1920, ed. Laurence M. 
Hauptman and L. Gordon McLester, First (University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 179–200.  
7 Emily Greenwald, Reconfiguring the Reservation: The Nez Perces, Jicarilla Apaches, and the Dawes Act 
(University of New Mexico Press, 2002). 
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reveal a complex process in which Native Americans rarely gained the upper hand over 
the government, but they nevertheless exercised initiative and creativity within a system 
of domination. 
Coupling Greenwald’s analysis of tempered resistance with the work of Brad D.E. 
Jarvis in The Brothertown Nation of Indians provides the best roadmap for the challenges 
of this project.8  Jarvis also looks at assimilation efforts within a distinct group.  His work 
is particularly enlightening for this study because he is one of the few historians who 
analyzes a community that took allotments before the Dawes Act and explore the 
complications they faced.9  As was the case with the Citizen Potawatomi, neither the 
Brothertown Nation nor the federal government fully understood how the allotment or 
citizenship process would work for these Indians.  Only a limited number of Native 
Americans came under a policy of allotment before the passage of the Dawes Act, 
therefore these early experiences with allotment have been largely ignored in scholarly 
literature.10   
Approaching the subject of assimilation and land policies as a case-study and 
from a methodological framework of socio-cultural history the Citizen Potawatomi will 
allow me to blend the strengths of both the top-down approach and the more 
contemporary ethnohistory process to create a more holistic picture of what the policies 
meant for these individuals.  These historical monographs proved to be especially helpful 
in determining how I would organize and research this study.  Two other works, 
                                                 
8 Brad D. E. Jarvis, The Brothertown Nation of Indians: Land Ownership and Nationalism in Early 
America, 1740-1840, 1ST ed. (University of Nebraska Press, 2010). 
9 Another monograph that looks as pre-Dawes allotments is Mary Elizabeth Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts, 
and Rednecks: Indian Allotments in Alabama and Mississippi 1830-1860 (University of Oklahoma Press, 
2002). 
10 According to the Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 7,673 allotments had been made 
by the time that the Dawes Act passed in 1887, but in 1861 allotment was rare.  Department of the Interior, 
Report to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1886) 692. 
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however, were particularly influential in shaping my perception and interpretation of the 
Citizen Potawatomi’s role in the process. 
In 1987, historian R. David Edmunds wrote an article for The Chronicles of 
Oklahoma titled, “Indians as Pioneers.”  In the article Edmunds argues that the 
Potawatomi, along with the other Great Lakes tribes, including the Shawnee, Delaware, 
Wyandot, Seneca, and Miami, removed west of the Mississippi River, were pioneers.  
Edmunds is careful to qualify his argument by acknowledging that the Potawatomi were 
not part of the romanticized ideal that has come to be associated with pioneers as “hardy 
men and women who trekked west to open the ‘wilderness’ for the American dream.”11  
Edmunds’ definition of the Potawatomi as pioneers is not this simplistic.  Instead, he 
notes that they were “the first large numbers of ‘settlers’ to move onto the eastern fringes 
of the Great Plains.”12  He further complicates the label by pointing out that they were 
still “eastern tribesmen who were fleeing the political and economic disruption sweeping 
through their old homelands.”13 
Edmunds’ main arguments for asserting that the Potawatomi, and other emigrant 
tribes from the Great Lakes, were pioneers were their “frontier experience[s].”  He notes 
that these tribes moved into Kansas, battled with the indigenous tribes of the region, and 
engaged in varied levels of frontier commerce – just as non-Indian pioneers did.  His 
thesis is thought provoking and explores some fascinating aspects of Potawatomi life in 
Kansas, but it is a reactionary label.  He argues that “just as European pioneers had once 
forced them from their lands in Michigan and Indiana, the Potawatomis emerged as the 
                                                 
11 R. David Edmunds, “Indians as Pioneers: Potawatomis on the Frontier,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 65 
(1987): 340. 
12 Ibid., 342. 
13Ibid. 
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new pioneers who challenged the hegemony of the western tribes.”14  This statement is 
true, but unlike the European pioneers, the Potawatomi were not given a choice.   
Edmunds’ article called for further research on the topic to better understand these 
relationships.  Twenty years later, historian John Bowes answered that call and built upon 
Edmunds’ analysis to assert that these Great Lakes tribes were indeed pioneers, but he 
complicated the label by arguing that they were also exiles, or “a population that needed 
to move beyond the boundaries of the established nation until they could assume a place 
in American society.”15  By embracing both classifications for the native peoples 
removed west of the Mississippi River, Bowes adeptly deconstructs the notion that 
removal was the end of the Potawatomi’s political activism and the beginning of their 
total domination by the American government.16  Instead, he illustrates that many of 
these tribes were able to exploit the federal government’s failed consistency to apply 
removal policies. 
Both of these labels, pioneers and exiles, are applicable to the Potawatomi.  
Analyzing them in this framework complicates this narrative and shows the varied 
responses the Citizen Potawatomi had to assimilation policies.  In the literal sense the 
Potawatomi were pioneers.  They were some of the earliest settlers to farm land west of 
the Mississippi River, with varying levels of success.  They had to do everything they 
could to survive in their new homes, and over time, learned that they had to be as forceful 
and unwavering in their rights to claim contested lands as non-Indian settlers.  As one can 
see from the above cited works, this project will help develop the growing field of tribe-
                                                 
14 Ibid., 345. 
15 John P. Bowes, Exiles and Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 4. 
16 For more on the shifting balance of power between Indian nations and the federal government see 
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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specific studies about the application of Indian policies, aid in filling a void in the 
historiography of allotment before it became the official policy of the federal 
government, and complicate the narrative of Native American’s roles in the settling of the 
West.   
The works referenced above will serve as guides in my endeavor to place the 
Citizen Potawatomi’s experience within a social, political, and legal context of rapidly 
changing U.S./Native American relations of the late nineteenth century.  As an 
ethnohistory this dissertation will look at how the Citizen Potawatomi saw themselves 
and their relationship to the government through their responses to assimilation and land 
policies.  As a work of scholarship about Indian policy, there will be a critical analysis of 
how the Citizen Potawatomi’s experience influenced the development of a monolithic 
allotment policy.   
ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
I have arranged this study into three loosely divided sections.  Chapter 1 is a 
chronological history of the Potawatomi that covers almost a millennium.  I chose to 
create a broad spectrum history to open this study because it is important to understand 
the tribe’s historic cultural practices and social structures, along with their past 
relationships with the U.S. government (as well as with each other) if one is to 
understand why they made the decisions they did in the late nineteenth century.   
Chapters 2 and 3 are companion chapters that roughly cover the years following 
the Citizen Potawatomi allotment and citizenship treaty, from 1861 to 1869.  Chapter 2 
specifically looks at the history of Kansas during this period and analyzes what was 
happening politically, as well as how and why the laws and Indian policies applied to the 
Native Americans in this region operated the way they did.  It considers the local effects 
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of broader reaching events like the Civil War and the Homestead Act, because “American 
Indians [sic] did not live in isolation from events that comprised the narrative of 
American history.”17  By exploring how regional interests shaped the implementation of 
federal policies in specific areas we can better understand the breakdown between the 
stated goals of those policies and the outcomes.   
Chapter 3 examines the Citizen Potawatomi’s lived experience with their 
allotment and citizenship treaty of 1861.  The OIA’s intention was to assimilate the 
Citizen Potawatomi by assigning them to private plots of land, that they were to farm, 
and making them citizens of the United States, thereby subject to federal and state laws.  
A second goal was to bring as much of the land as possible under the control of non-
Indian settlers and businesses.  Through a series of circumstances, including poor 
planning and the desire for personal gain, none of these goals were met with any 
substantial success.  Within eight years of their allotment and citizenship treaty most of 
the Citizen Potawatomi were landless and searching for a chance to start over. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are also paired.  The chronological scope of these chapters 
begins in 1869, when the Citizen Potawatomi made the journey to Indian Territory to 
select a new reservation after their dispossession in Kansas.  I continue the narrative to 
1891, when the Citizen Potawatomi reservation was opened to non-Indian settlement 
through a land run.  Chapter 4, again, provides a larger history of the region under 
consideration to illustrate how the circumstances and conditions of Indian Territory 
shaped the policies the OIA applied to the Citizen Potawatomi and other Native 
Americans.  Indian Territory was home to more than a dozen tribes during this period, 
and fell outside of the laws of the U.S. because it was not legally an organized territory.  
                                                 
17 Bowes, Exiles and Pioneers, 3. 
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Both of these circumstances complicated the process of applying assimilation and land 
policies.  The final chapter looks at the details of policies that were specific to the Citizen 
Potawatomi and more broadly applied, to discover how they impacted the Citizen 
Potawatomi.  It considers the experiences of the tribe with allotment and citizenship in 
Kansas to argue that the Citizen Potawatomi learned use the weaknesses of these policies, 
along with their unclear legal status, to benefit their cause. 
Examining the history of the Citizen Potawatomi responses to displacement, 
dispossession, citizenship and allotment results in a project that encompasses elements of 
ethnohistory, Indian policy history, legal history, and socio-cultural history; thereby 
falling under the ubiquitous heading of “new Indian history.”  As a result, my analysis 
will address a few central questions of these genres.  What was the nature of the power 
relationship between the federal government and the Citizen Potawatomi and how did it 
change throughout the scope of this study?  What was involved in individual Indians’ 
decisions to accept federal assimilation policies like allotment and citizenship, or to resist 
them?  How was property ownership and US citizenship used by both the Citizen 
Potawatomi and the federal government to advance their own agendas and how did each 
group’s understanding of these concepts change over time, especially as they were 
confronted with the benefits and shortcomings of each policy?  Did Citizen Potawatomi 
socio-cultural elements, such as conceptualizations of land, removal experiences, past 
relationships with the government, form of tribal governance, and ideologies of 
independence and self-sufficiency influence their response to federal policies? 
A few key terms utilized throughout this study require a brief definition.  When 
discussing the relationship between the Citizen Potawatomi and the actors in the United 
States government who had a role in Indian relations I try to be as specific as possible.  I 
will note that the action was taken on the part of the Office of Indian Affairs, the 
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Secretary of the Interior, the Indian agent, etc.  This is not always possible, because 
general Indian policy was often shaped by the President, members of Congress, and other 
interested parties.  When it is more ambiguous who is driving the action or decisions 
about policies I will generally use the term federal government. 
When referencing the peoples who inhabited North America before the arrival of 
Europeans and were indigenous to the regions under consideration, I use Native 
American, indigenous peoples, and Indian interchangeably.  Whenever possible I use the 
proper name for individual tribes – Citizen Potawatomi, Prairie Band Potawatomi, 
Absentee Shawnee, Seminole – to respect that these tribes have identities as separate 
nations.  In referring to the people who participated in the dispossession and removal of 
Indian peoples I primarily use the term non-Indian to recognize that many groups, 
including American citizens, immigrants, freedmen and other participated in this activity.  
When it is appropriate I also use the term American as a descriptor.  
Though the federal government intended to dissolve the tribal structure, agency, 
and land tenure of the Citizen Potawatomi, the inconsistent application of assimilatory 
methods rendered them failures.  Over the course of three decades, the Citizen 
Potawatomi worked together to guarantee the best possible results for their tribe.  By 
examining the fundamentals of the Citizen Potawatomi experience, this project will 
reveal the nuances of a complicated story of negotiation, adaptation, and survival.   
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Chapter 1:  A Face of Brotherhood or a Face of Death 
In 1838 Governor David Wallace of Indiana assigned the task of removing the 
state’s remaining Potawatomi population to General John Tipton and Colonel Abel C. 
Pepper.  Settlers were flooding into the area and the Governor feared the conflicts and 
violence he believed was inevitable if Native American nations lived alongside a more 
“civilized” American population.  In early September, General Tipton called for a council 
at Menominee’s village near Twin Lakes to discuss the issue of removal with tribal 
leaders.  For years hundreds of families resisted removals west arranged by treaties 
signed in 1834 and 1836 between the United States and their Potawatomi kinsmen.
18
  
When the Potawatomi arrived at the village chapel, Menominee, Black Wolf, and Pee-
pin-ah-waw and other leaders were bound as prisoners.
19
  The rest of the tribal members 
present learned that they would be removed to new lands in the West in a few days.  
Under the monitoring of military guards they were not given the opportunity to gather 
personal belongings or adequately prepare for the daunting journey.  The volunteer 
militia of roughly one hundred men accompanying General Tipton scoured the 
surrounding forests, indiscriminately gathering every Indian they found within a few 
dozen miles from the camp.  
                                                 
18 More than a dozen individual land cession treaties were signed in those years.  They are commonly 
referred to as the Whiskey Treaties because alcohol was supplied to certain individuals to induce them to 
sign away the land rights for their entire village.  Others were signed by Potawatomi who wanted to 
distance themselves from the onslaught of Euro-American settlers and needed little persuasion.  
Menominee and leaders close to him signed a treaty on October 26, 1832 ceding certain portions of their 
land in exchange for twenty-two sections of land for them to remain on and live in Indiana.  He never 
signed a treaty promising to remove from the state.  Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:428–
472. 
19 Department of the Interior. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1838) 437. [Hereafter cited as RCIA.]  Spelling is taken from the Potawatomi 
treaty signed on August 5, 1836 at the Yellow River found in Kappler, II:462–463. 
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On the morning of September 4, 1838, a band of 859 Potawatomi, with their 
leaders restrained in the back of a wagon, set out on a forced march from their homeland 
in northern Indiana for a small reserve in present-day Kansas.
20
  To minimize the 
temptation for the Potawatomi to try to escape and return home militia members burned 
both fields and houses as the dejected members of the wagon train departed.  The journey 
was a 660-mile trek for which the Potawatomi were not prepared and through terrain to 
which they were not accustomed.  The heat was oppressive and water was often scarce.  
They had only a few hundred horses to carry people and supplies, and promised 
additional wagons did not arrive before their departure; so, even the weak and elderly 
were forced to walk.  The pace and conditions of the march debilitated the health of the 
travelers.  A day rarely passed that a member of the party did not die, usually a child, 
forcing their bereft and exhausted families to leave the bodies behind in hastily dug 
graves.  In the end more than forty people died during what the Potawatomi came to call 
the Trail of Death.  On November 4, exactly two months after they set out for the 
reservation in the West, the ragged group arrived in Kansas.
21
 
This opening account of the Trail of Death, the best documented Potawatomi 
removal, tells only a fraction of the story of the tribe’s removal from its ancestral home in 
the woodlands of the Great Lakes.
22 
 The history of Potawatomi displacement is filled 
                                                 
20 Present-day Kansas was part of a larger territory known as the Indian Territory at the time.  This area 
was carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.   
21 Roughly six hundred and fifty people arrived in Kansas of the more than eight hundred that left Indiana.  
About forty died and the rest deserted.  Irving McKee, The Trail of Death: Letters of Benjamin Marie Petit 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1941), 106; Dwight L. Smith, ed., “A Continuation of the Journal 
of an Emigrating Party of Potawatomi Indians, 1838, and Ten William Polke Manuscripts,” Indiana 
Magazine of History 44, no. 4 (December 1, 1948): 393–408.; a more antiquated account can be found in 
Otho Winger, The Potawatomi Indians, Reprint (The Elgin Press, 1961), 43–54. 
22 The experiences on the Trail of Death are well documented in the travel diary of Fr. Benjamin Petit, a 
priest who lived with and ministered to the Potawatomi in Indiana.  At the last minute he was granted 
permission from Bishop Bruté to accompany the Potawatomi to Kansas to tend to the spiritual needs of the 
Catholics among them. McKee, The Trail of Death: Letters of Benjamin Marie Petit; George Winter, The 
Journals and Paintings of George Winter, 1837-1839 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1948). 
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with awe inspiring stories of triumph and infuriating accounts of tragedy.  They 
constantly faced pressure to adapt to the customs of Euro-American settlers or simply 
disappear in the face of encroaching “civilization.”   
There is no single, master narrative of Potawatomi removal.  Unlike the well-
documented Cherokee Trail of Tears (which occurred the same year as the Potawatomi 
Trail of Death) and removals of other southeastern tribes, the military rarely coordinated 
Potawatomi removals and they never included thousands of tribal members.
23
  Instead, 
the peoples known collectively as the Potawatomi endured dozens of removals, each 
predicated by circumstances unique to each village or geographic area.  Some removals 
only consisted of a few dozen family members, and others of several villages. 
The removals of the 1830s - 1850s were important catalysts in the historical 
narrative of the Potawatomi history that followed.  The strain placed on tribal members as 
a result of their displacement led to three decades of chaos, uncertainty, and struggle for 
survival that shaped the existence of the Citizen Potawatomi in Kansas and Indian 
Territory from the 1860s to the 1890s.  The tribe’s history during these years is 
dominated by a narrative of tribal members’ attempts to rebuild their lives after leaving 
behind their homeland.  Understanding the circumstances by which they came to live in 
unfamiliar western surroundings helps one appreciate the varied responses of separate 
Potawatomi groups to federal pressures to make political and personal decisions about the 
futures of their families and their community. 
                                                 
23 Colonel Abel C. Pepper, subagent for Indiana, was first assigned to organize the removal of Indians from 
the territory in 1833.  That year almost 250 Potawatomi were gathered at Logansport.  Most of them fled 
before he could pressure them to remove to the West, but almost seventy individuals crossed the 
Mississippi River.  McKee, The Trail of Death: Letters of Benjamin Marie Petit, 18. The literature on the 
Cherokee Trial of Tears is extensive.  A few of these works include John Ehle, Trail of Tears: The Rise and 
Fall of the Cherokee Nation (Anchor Books Doubleday, 1988); Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, The 
Cherokee Removal: A Brief History With Documents (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005) and Theda Perdue and 
Michael Green, The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears, Reprint (Penguin Books, 2008). 
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PRE-CONTACT LIFEWAYS 
The Potawatomi, or Bodewadmi, were part of an immense group of Algonquian-
speaking peoples who migrated inland from the eastern shores of North America to settle 
throughout the Great Lakes before the arrival of Europeans.  This group is traditionally 
known as the Neshnabek, a branch of an historic confederacy that also included the 
Ojibwe and the Odawa.
24
  The Neshnabek confederacy is referred to as the Three Fires 
Council; each group played a unique role in service to the alliance.  The Ojibwe, the 
eldest brother, were the Keepers of the Faith and Medicines.  Their role in the alliance 
was to watch over the teachings of the Midewewin Lodge, a spiritual society, and carry 
sacred knowledge through the generations.  The Odawa, the middle brother, were the 
Keepers of the Trade and the alliances that made trade possible.  They were responsible 
for coordinating food and supplies needed by the communities.  The Potawatomi, the 
Keepers of the Fire, were the youngest brother; they were responsible for tending the 
council fire of the Neshnabek confederacy.   
Fire holds myriad meanings for Neshnabek people and is at the center of almost 
all social, cultural and spiritual events.  Lighting a fire symbolically began a council and 
it continued burning until the business of the meeting was concluded.  It also burns the 
tobacco and other medicines that send the prayers of the Neshnabek to the Creator.  It 
was these spiritual beliefs and practices that served as the backbone of the confederacy.  
The three Neshnabe groups also had similar lifeways that supported their robust military 
and commercial alliances.
25
   
                                                 
24 These tribes are also known as the Chippewa and the Ottawa respectively.  
25 Gary Mitchell, Stories of the Potawatomi People from the Early Days to Modern Times (Shawnee, OK, 
1996), 8; R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis - Keepers of the Fire (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1980), 3–4; Joseph F. Murphy, Potawatomi of the West: Origins of the Citizen Band (University of 
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Oral tradition told over a millennium explains that the Neshnabek were 
intermittently visited by seven prophets.  These prophets spoke of coming events the 
Neshnabek would have to overcome – these prophesies are referred to as the Seven 
Fires.
26
  The first three prophets foretold of the people’s necessary migration from the 
northeastern shores of North America, or Turtle Island, south and west into the 
woodlands of the Great Lakes region lest they face destruction.  It was prophesied that 
cultural loss would be inevitable along the way, but a boy would be born who would lead 
the people back to traditional ways.  The prophets told the Neshnabek that their search for 
a homeland would come to an end when they found a place where food grew on the 
water.  When they arrived on the shores of the Great Lakes and encountered wild rice, 
which grows in the water along the shores, the Neshnabek knew the prophets had spoken 
the truth and they had arrived at their destined home.  Along this journey the larger 
Neshnabek tribe separated into the three distinct groups we now recognize as the Ojibwe, 
Odawa, and Potawatomi, but the spirit of the alliance continued.  Each group settled into 
their new surroundings and reestablished ancient survival practices, social norms, and 
sacred practices.   
The Potawatomi survived primarily by hunting and gathering, but limited 
agriculture was also practiced.  The Potawatomi hunted and trapped according to the 
seasons, procuring food from a variety of game, including deer and elk, and small 
                                                                                                                                                 
Michigan Library, 1988). According to Murphy the early Jesuit missionary, Jean Claude Allouez, first 
documented the translation of Potawatomi and used it in reference to the Potawatomi and their neighbors in 
1670.  The earliest written accounts of Potawatomi/European contact were left by missionaries.  For a 
broader account of missionary activity in the Great Lakes see Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and 
French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2002); Reuben Gold Thwaites, The Jesuit Relations And Allied Documents: Travels And 
Explorations Of The Jesuit Missionaries In New France, 1610-1791, Reprint (Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 
2007); and Gilbert Joseph Garraghan, Jesuits of the Middle United States, 3 vols., First Edition (Loyola 
Press, 1984).  
26 The text of the Seven Fires prophesies are my retelling of the narrative as it was told to me.  
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mammals.  Fishing was practiced year round and the Potawatomi were well known for 
their proficiency at spear fishing, night fishing (in which a torch was attached to the 
canoe) and ice fishing.  The semi-sedentary lifestyle of the Potawatomi was aided by 
harvesting wild rice, the cultivation of a host of domesticated crops, including beans, 
corn, and squash (known as the Three Sisters), as well as gathering wild berries, nuts, and 
vegetables.
27
  
The Potawatomi functioned within a social structure that included a strong 
communal lifestyle in which individuals were bound together through ties of kinship, 
custom, and mutual necessity.
28
  Communities built their villages around clan systems 
and extended families.  Villages were small and scattered in the winter, so that hunting 
parties could adequately provide food for everyone.  Their transient lifestyle meant that 
the Potawatomi lived in different areas from one season to the next.  In their summer 
villages, the Potawatomi built wigwams made of birch and cedar.  The frames were 
durable and only required replacement or repair of the bark covering from one year to the 
next.  In the winter they often lived in a nswe’ogen (three poles), a conical structure 
covered in bark, that could be easily moved to follow herds.
29
  Several villages, or bands, 
                                                 
27 R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: Keepers of the Fire (University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 15–
16; Robert E. Ritzenthaler and Pat Ritzenthaler, The Woodland Indians of the Western Great Lakes 
(Waveland Printing, Inc., 1991) 19-28.  In addition to supplementing their diet, berries were used in 
Potawatomi spiritual practices.  
28 It would be inaccurate to describe the Potawatomi at this point as a “tribe” by the modern use of the 
word, which Joanne Barker describes as Native groups that “possess federal recognition status and all 
commensurate rights under the law, including the right to self-government, sovereign immunity, and tax 
exemption” Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity, 1st ed. (Duke 
University Press, 2011), 27.  The anthropological definition of a tribe would apply.  In these terms a tribe is 
described as a broad category in the classification of sociopolitical systems with general characteristics of:  
unilineal kinship, use of subsistence horticulture or pastoralism, lack of a means for formal political 
succession, relative egalitarianism, and pan-tribal sodalities. Ted C. Lewellen, The Anthropology of 
Globalization: Cultural Anthropology Enters the 21st Century (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 207. 
29 George Bryce, A Short History of the Canadian People (S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1887), 
100–101; Heidi Bohaker, “Nindoodemag: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern 
Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701,” William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2006): 25-26. 
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within a region came together in the spring and summer when food was more abundant 
for important ceremonies and seasonal events, like maple syrup tapping, berry festivals, 
and rites of passage.
30
   
Traditionally, individual communities were led by village approved councils and 
headmen whose power stemmed from their relationship with, and influence over, the 
people.  Leaders who wielded authority enjoyed the privilege because people respected 
their opinions enough to heed their advice.  The ideal headman possessed characteristics 
such as: prowess in battle, oratory skills, and generosity to family and neighbors.  
Leaders used this authority and power for moral suasion to create alliances and build 
relationships with councils and headmen of other Potawatomi communities and 
neighboring tribes.  Numerous village leaders, as well as individuals from religious and 
warrior societies, often comprised village and regional councils.  The tribal community 
appointed ceremonial chiefs to conduct important annual and occasion-specific rites.  
This was not a permanent position – the village could appoint a new leader, usually from 
a religious society, from one year to the next.
31
   
By the early seventeenth century the Potawatomi lived as far north as upper 
Wisconsin and south into present-day Indiana.  Colonists and government officials began 
to distinguish distinct groups of Potawatomi by regional descriptors such as:  Potawatomi 
of the Prairie or Woods, or more specifically, Potawatomi of the St. Joseph or Wabash 
                                                 
30 W. Vernon Kinietz, The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (University of Michigan Press, 
1965), 314.  A band is a relatively small and loosely organized kin-ordered group that inhabits a common 
territory and that may split periodically into smaller family groups that are politically and economically 
independent.  William A. Haviland et al., Cultural Anthropology: The Human Challenge (Cengage 
Learning, 2010), 284. 
31 Mitchell, 15-17; White, The Middle Ground, 16–17.  For an early twentieth century ethnological 
description of Prairie (and to some degree Woodland) Potawatomi social structure see Alanson Buck 
Skinner, The Mascoutens of Prairie Potawatomi Indians: Social Life and Ceremonies (Greenwood Press 
Reprint, 1970).  Skinner does assert that at some point in pre-contact history tribal chieftainship 
predominantly came from within the Fish or Bear clan, other sources claim the Loon and Crane clans.   
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rivers.
32
  Villages and bands of Potawatomi appropriated skills, habits, and social 
customs from their neighbors and adapted to new surroundings.  Groups developed 
distinct socio-cultural habits in each band, or even village, making the concept of a meta-
tribal identity secondary to that of the region or immediate community.  These groups 
continued to come together for seasonal events, like hunting, as well as special occasions, 
like war or councils. 
 
Figure 1: Potawatomi villages in the 1830s, by name of leaders. (Courtesy of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center.) 
                                                 
32 Thomas G. Conway, “Potawatomi Politics,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (1908-1984) 
65, no. 4 (December 1, 1972): 398–399; Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties.  The geographic 
descriptions of Potawatomi villages are detailed in the treaties. 
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 In the late seventeenth century, eastern tribes such as the Iroquois, moved west in 
search of new territory and to escape the advance of European settlers.  The tribes from 
the East fought over territorial boundaries with tribes who had lived in the Great Lakes 
region for generations, further scattering the already dispersed communities.  This 
diaspora, fluid migratory patterns, and appropriation, often minimized the apparent 
differences in appearance and lifestyle between the Potawatomi and their Ho-Chunk, 
Odawa, or Miami neighbors.
33
  It is also plausible that if an early explorer or trader 
encountered numerous Potawatomi villages it was not immediately apparent to them that 
the groups were part of the same tribal affiliation.  Likewise, linguistic differences may 
have been indistinguishable to foreign ears, since several tribes in the region spoke 
Algonquian dialects, contributing to an unclear separation for outsiders.
34
 
THE ARRIVAL OF EUROPEANS AND CHANGING POTAWATOMI SOCIETY 
After their arrival in the Great Lakes region between 1200 and 1500 C.E., the 
Neshnabek were visited by two more prophets who foretold the coming of a light-skinned 
race in the time of the Fourth Fire.
35
 They promised that if the light-skinned people came 
with a face of brotherhood a period of growth and sharing old and new traditions would 
follow, leading to the development of a mighty nation.  If they came with a face of death 
and carrying weapons, however, a period of great suffering for the Neshnabek people, 
and all the people of Turtle Island, would follow.  The prophets warned that the face of 
brotherhood and face of death look very similar, and urged the Neshnabek to be wary of 
the newcomers.     
                                                 
33 The Ho-Chunk are also known as Winnebago.  
34For more on the conflict between the Iroquois and Great Lakes tribes see White, The Middle Ground, 1–
49. 
35 Edmunds, The Potawatomis - Keepers of the Fire, 3. 
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The light-skinned race did come, but it was not clear which face the Europeans 
wore.  The first mention of the Potawatomi came from a report written by French 
explorer Samuel de Champlain in 1615 from Lake Huron.
36
  The Potawatomi first 
experienced direct European contact a few decades later when Jean Nicolet, a French 
trader and adventurer, arrived on the shores of Green Bay in 1634 seeking a water 
passage to Asia.  Soon after Nicolet made contact more Frenchmen arrived including 
other trappers, explorers, and Catholic missionaries.
37
 For a while it seemed that the new 
arrivals came in peace and that prosperity would follow.  The French carried goods, 
including steel knives, axes, copper kettles and firearms, into the interior in exchange for 
furs trapped and prepared by Neshnabek men and women.
38
  These items made daily life 
easier for the indigenous peoples with whom they traded, and they eventually also 
allowed the Native communities that possessed them to dominate their neighbors, 
creating and exacerbating tension and fostering violence.
39
   
From the end of the seventeenth century through the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the Potawatomi met and negotiated with French traders and trappers as equals, 
leading to a generally agreeable relationship.  As a result of this perceived equality, both 
                                                 
36French traders Pierre-Espirit Radisson and Medart Chouart de Groseillers were the first traders to live 
among the Potawatomi.  For a more extensive examination of Potawatomi history in the colonial and early 
republic periods see Edmunds, The Potawatomis - Keepers of the Fire.; Murphy, Potawatomi of the 
West;John P. Bowes, Exiles and Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); For a discussion of  Native Americans, including the Potawatomi, in the colonial 
Great Lakes region see Jennifer S.H. Brown et al., New Peoples: Being & Becoming Métis in North 
America (Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and 
Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
37 James A. Clifton, Potawatomi (Chelsea House Pub (T), 1994), 20–23.  Nicolet’s exploration trip was 
recounted by Father LeJuene in Edna Kenton, ed., The Jesuit Relations And Allied Documents: Travels And 
Explorations Of The Jesuit Missionaries In North America 1610-1791 (Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2006), 
47–48. 
38 James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-
1965, REV (University Of Iowa Press, 1998), 3. 
39 Carol H. Behrman, The Indian Wars (Twenty-First Century Books, 2004), 20; Armstrong Starkey, 
European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 20. 
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groups were open to cultural adaptation and to the influences of the other.  Unlike early 
English settlers, most French arrivals to North America (especially those traveling into 
the interior) were trappers and adventurers who did not seek to establish ideologically 
restrictive communities structured around European religious and social customs.  They 
came for opportunity and profit, which required the active assistance and cooperation of 
trustworthy Native Americans to help acquire furs.  Becoming an accepted member of the 
native community was good for business.
40
 
Evidence of the close relationships between the French and the Potawatomi is 
seen in the large number of French surnames and métis children in the tribe as a result of 
intermarriage between French men and Potawatomi women.
41
  These unions initiated a 
cultural exchange that could be called assimilation, but what the Potawatomi and French 
likely viewed as accommodation, or adopting new sets of behavior into their culture to 
strengthen it and take advantage of new trade opportunities.  The accommodation of 
societal differences went both ways. 
Trappers and traders were not the only Europeans to see great opportunity among 
the peoples of the Great Lakes.  Missionaries journeyed from France and other European 
                                                 
40 Susan Sleeper-Smith refers to the interaction between Frenchmen and Indians of the Great Lakes region 
as “a laboratory of social experimentation” and generally draws on the thesis of Richard White’s The 
Middle Ground that both Indians and French traders evolved in their relationships with one another.  They 
first regarded one another as foreign and “Other,” eventually coming together to create new meanings and 
understandings as a way to coexist and flourish.  The relationship eventually became one in which Native 
Americans were forced to bend to the will of Europeans and Americans.  Native Americans became more 
dependent on technology and goods provided by Europeans for dominance over neighboring villages and 
tribes, and even their basic survival.  As a result they were pushed into a role of outsider or alien in their 
own homelands allowing European empires and the American government to take more control.  For 
several decades, however, the game was played on a field the Potawatomi and other Native Americans 
recognized as their own. Sleeper-Smith, By Susan Sleeper-Smith - Indian Women and French Men, 2; 
White, The Middle Ground. 
41 Susan Sleeper-Smith notes in Indian Woman and French Men, that though there was extensive 
intermarriage with French fur traders and conversion to Catholicism on the part of Indian women, they did 
not turn into French housewives.  They insisted on keeping their traditional division of work in which 
agriculture was the responsibility of females. 
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countries into the land of the Neshnabek with the express purpose of converting the 
Native American population to Christianity.  The arrival of these missionaries was also 
foretold by a prophet who visited the Neshnabek.  He warned that in the time of the Fifth 
Fire individuals would come who assured glory and salvation if the people would accept 
the newcomers’ ways and abandon the teachings of their ancestors.  The prophet 
cautioned that if the people accepted the new teachings and forsook ancient traditions the 
Fifth Fire would scorch the people for many generations because missionaries’ promises 
were false.    
The first missionaries to establish themselves among the Potawatomi were Jesuits, 
who arrived in 1634.  The Potawatomi practice of living in autonomous villages meant 
that missionaries met with varying degrees of success at conversion.  Despite the 
instruction of the prophet, some villages abounded with residents open to the teachings of 
Christianity while others totally rejected the newcomers and their message.  The vast 
majority of Potawatomi who converted to Christianity seemed to heed the warnings about 
the Fifth Fire by adopting the primary tenants of the faith and blending it with traditional 
Potawatomi spiritual practices.  The Jesuits were followed by priest, monks and nuns of 
various orders as well as missionaries of numerous Protestant denominations.  Each 
group believed it crucial to save the souls of North America’s native population and each 
year they traveled deeper into the interior proselytizing and seeking converts.      
By the early nineteenth century dozens of Catholic missions dotted the landscape 
of the Great Lakes region.
42
  Hundreds of missionaries were scattered throughout trading 
posts and communities.  They had particularly strong missions in the areas around what is 
                                                 
42 Chrysostom Verwyst, Missionary Labors of Fathers Marquette, Menard and Allouez, in the Lake 
Superior Region (Hoffmann Brothers, 1886). 
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now Chicago and Detroit.
43
  The Catholic Church, while dominant in the region, did not 
go unchallenged in the battle for the souls of the native population.  Baptist missionaries 
like Isaac McCoy, who opened Carey Mission in 1820 to service the Michigan 
Potawatomi near the St. Joseph River, and Methodists, who operated a seminary in 
Spring Arbor, Michigan in the 1830s, were also influential.
44
  Many of these missionaries 
played key roles in the treaty negotiations that every Potawatomi village faced during this 
period.  Some, like McCoy, favored removal and fought for the distancing of their 
Potawatomi flock from what he considered the corrupting influences of non-Indian 
frontier culture.
45
  Other Potawatomi villages, like that of Leopold Pokagon, used their 
conversion and relationship with the local Catholic parish to negotiate agreements saving 
them from removal to west of the Mississippi River.
46
  
                                                 
43 Gilbert Joseph Garraghan, Jesuits of the Middle United States, First ed. (Loyola Press, 1984), 423.  Some 
of these missions include St. Francis Xavier and a mission on the St. Joseph River, both founded by Father 
Claude Allouez. 
44 For more on these missions see Isaac McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions: Embracing Remarks 
on the Former and Present Condition of the Aboriginal Tribes : Their Settlement Within the Indian 
Territory, and Their Future Prospects (W.M. Morrison, 1840); Timothy S. Smith, Missionary Abomination 
Unmasked: Or, A View of Carey Mission Containing an Unmasking of the Missionary Abominations 
Practiced Among the Indians of St. Joseph County at the Celebrated Missionary Establishment Known as 
Carey Mission Under the Supervision of the Rev. Isaac McCoy (Windle Printing Co., 1946). 
45Isaac McCoy fought for the creation of an “Indian Territory” west of the Mississippi River from the 
1820s until the time of his death in 1846.  He blamed non-Indian frontiersmen and merchants (primarily 
whiskey sellers) for negatively influencing the Indians he worked and lived among.  McCoy did not believe 
all white people were bad influences, just the “immoral” ones that he believed prevailed in the territories of 
the Old Northwest.  In 1825 petitioned Columbian College to accept some of the native youth that lived at 
his mission so that they could be educated and influenced by non-Indian culture and return to teach the rest 
of their community, McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 266–270.  For more on Isaac McCoy and 
his vision for removing eastern tribes to the West see Isaac McCoy, The Annual Register of Indian Affairs: 
In the Western (or Indian) Territory, 1835-1838, 2nd ed. (Particular Baptist Press, 2000) and George A. 
Schultz, An Indian Canaan: Isaac McCoy and the Vision of an Indian State (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1972). 
46 James A. Clifton, The Pokagons, 1683-1983: Catholic Potawatomi Indians of the St. Joseph River 
Valley (University Press of America, 1984).  Fr. Benjamin Petit was also against the removal of the 
Potawatomi from their ancestral homes.  He asked his bishop for permission to travel to Washington to 
argue their case to OIA officials and the President.  When he was denied he loaned village leaders money 
for their travel expenses.  McKee, The Trail of Death: Letters of Benjamin Marie Petit, 38. 
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Not all Potawatomi welcomed these newcomers.  Even those who appreciated or 
sought out the services of missionaries saw their accustomed relationships with 
Europeans grow more complex and strained in the eighteenth century as the number of 
traders, missionaries and colonists increased and their goals shifted from trade to long-
term settlement on lands the Potawatomi and other Great Lakes tribes called home.  
European traders supplied whiskey, and spread infectious diseases, like smallpox, 
destroying the lives of increasing numbers of Native Americans.
47
  It became clear that 
many light-skinned newcomers did not come as friends and the destruction foretold in the 
Fourth Fire threatened. 
Over time, the arrival of Europeans allowed new alliances and lucrative avenues 
of trade to develop, yet it also caused new conflicts over territory and resources, resulting 
in a diaspora by the native population to avoid the detrimental conditions that 
accompanied political and social instability.
48
  The foundations for Potawatomi social 
structure were changed forever.  Consensus traditionally governed Potawatomi village 
life – a system that worked as long as individuals who dissented were allowed to leave, 
new villages were free to form, and tribal leaders who disappointed the community could 
be cast aside.  Infighting, destruction of old alliances, and significant constraints on 
movement greatly hindered these options and turmoil ensued.   
Tensions also escalated between the Potawatomi, their Indian neighbors, and 
settlers once European colonial forces began fighting one another for territorial control 
and pressuring native communities to choose sides.  The Potawatomi and their 
Neshnabek brethren were accomplished warriors.  As such, colonial military forces 
                                                 
47 Mitchell, Stories of the Potawatomi People from the Early Days to Modern Times, 25–26.; Clifton, 
Potawatomi, 93. 
48Clifton, Potawatomi, 35–36.  
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sought them out as mercenaries and reached out to village leaders to form alliances.
49
  
These village leaders consistently made decisions about alliances based on the potential 
advantages each colonial entity could provide them and their kinsmen.  At this period in 
history the advantage an ally could provide the leaders in their regional struggle to gain 
territory and dominance over ancient and new enemies was the most important for 
survival.  Therefore, access to metal tools, firearms, and other provisions was critical in 
negotiating these relationships.
50
  Alliances formed at the regional or even village level 
because of the independent nature of Potawatomi society.  The practice of regional or 
village-level decision making continued into the era of removal treaties and once the 
Potawatomi were living west of the Mississippi River.  
The friendship of one village with a European power offered no assurance that 
other Potawatomi villages would not partner with opposing colonial forces.  The 
Potawatomi fought almost exclusively on the side of the French in the Beaver War of the 
mid-seventeenth century that pitted the British-backed nations of the Iroquois 
Confederacy against the French-allied Algonquian tribes of the Great Lakes over 
questions of territory.  They also sided with the French in Fox Wars of the early 
eighteenth century over trade routes and in the French and Indian War.  During the 
American Revolution some Potawatomi villages sided with the British because they were 
valued trading partners, while others sided with the revolutionaries because they believed 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 93,101. 
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it would benefit them in their fight to maintain territory.  Many saw it in their best interest 
to remain neutral.
51
 
AMERICA’S POLICY OF INDIAN REMOVAL 
Throughout early American history, European colonies generally dealt with 
Native American tribes as separate nations with some legal title or claim to ownership of 
their lands, though they did not recognize absolute ownership.  As a result, most 
government officials agreed that title could not be extinguished without voluntary cession 
by members of the tribes.  Each European colonial power had its own policy for dealing 
with Indian nations.  Regardless of the details of their Indian policy, virtually all colonial 
governments viewed Native Americans through a lens of ethnocentrism and placed upon 
them a stereotype of the noble or ignoble savage.
52
 Things did not improve under the 
United States government.   
After the American Revolution the U.S. government worked to gain large land 
cessions from tribes.  As unorganized lands became colonies, territories, and eventually 
states, the Native American inhabitants who refused to conform to new laws clashed with 
settlers and civil authorities.
53
  While acknowledging Native Americans’ unique 
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condition as prior inhabitants of North America, political and cultural elites continued to 
insist that North America’s original inhabitants could not be “civilized” and were doomed 
to extinction as American civilization flourished and expanded.
54
 
In 1806 the War Department created the new position of Superintendent of Indian 
Trade to manage national non-military Indian issues, primarily commerce and 
diplomacy.
55
  Almost two decades later, in 1824, the Office of Indian Affairs [OIA] was 
created by War Secretary John C. Calhoun to give more attention to distinct regions.
56
  
OIA officials, and the general public, adopted the mentality that all Native Americans 
should be removed west of the Mississippi River.
57
  Advocates for removal argued that 
Indians and settlers would have better lives if the Native population was removed, 
opening new territory for American expansion and distancing the Indians from the 
corrupting influences of Euro-American society.  Removal had strong support among 
politicians in states of the Old Northwest and with missionaries, like Isaac McCoy, who 
felt he was fighting a losing battle with whiskey peddlers and other frontier vices.
58
  
McCoy argued that tribes could not prosper in the east where they were pressed by non-
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Indian neighbors, “the will of whom [they were] subject.”  In the West, he argued, tribes 
could “mutually assist each other in their advances in civilization.  Enjoying the prospects 
of a permanent home, and encouraged by their numerical strength, they would naturally 
feel something of national character, and would aspire to an equality with their white 
neighbours.”59  In 1828, McCoy tried to persuade the Potawatomi to voluntarily remove 
to lands in present-day Kansas or Oklahoma by taking them on an exploratory trip to the 
region.
60
  The small party of Potawatomi leaders was not impressed by the landscape or 
resources on the plains and resisted further efforts to remove them from the Great Lakes 
for the next four years.   
When Congress passed Andrew Jackson’s Removal Act in 1830, public and 
political opinion weighed heavily against any Eastern tribes staying in its home.
61
  
Increased tensions between Indians and settlers in the Great Lakes region, requests by 
officials from the OIA, and the outbreak of conflicts like the Black Hawk War in 1832 
reinforced the urgency of removal.  As a result of these pressures, Congress and the 
President passed additional legislation appropriating twenty thousand dollars for the 
explicit purpose of negotiating treaties to terminate Potawatomi tribal land titles in 
Indiana, Illinois, and the Territory of Michigan.
62
  In 1832, individual Potawatomi bands 
signed a number of treaties with the government ceding large amounts of land, but these 
treaties failed to secure the Indians’ removal from the area.  Instead, tribal leaders insisted 
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on small reservations within the ceded lands, ensured the retention of hunting and fishing 
rights on the land, and insisted on payments of goods and cash for property lost in recent 
skirmishes.
63
  In the months following these treaties non-Indian settlers swarmed the 
recently ceded lands and tension between Natives and newcomers escalated. 
The next year, in 1833, Potawatomi from the St. Joseph River, some from 
northern Indiana, and the Potawatomi of the Prairie, along with headmen and chiefs from 
the Ojibwe and Odawa tribes who lived along the coast of the Great Lakes, collectively 
referred to as the United Nation or United Band in government reports, signed the Treaty 
of Chicago on September 26 and 27.
64
  The Treaty of Chicago proved to be a watershed 
agreement in the dealings between the Potawatomi and the U.S. government.  Prior to 
this treaty, land cessions were relatively small and included land set aside as private 
reserves for certain signatories.  The Treaty of Chicago, however, ensured a substantial 
land cession of roughly five million acres that were inhabited by all three groups around 
the Great Lakes and the removal of a majority of Potawatomi to lands west of the 
Mississippi River.  Signatory bands were given five million acres along the banks of the 
Missouri River in what became Iowa and Missouri in exchange.  To compensate for the 
loss of their homeland, the Treaty of Chicago promised the Potawatomi annual payments 
of $14,000 for a period of twenty years.  Additionally, they were to receive $150,000 for 
improvements and services, $100,000 in trade goods, as well as $70,000 for the education 
of their children.
65
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The treaty stipulated that the Potawatomi would relocate to a reserve near Council 
Bluffs, Iowa “as soon as conveniently can be done.”66  At the wishes of the Potawatomi, 
and as a result of the ambivalence of government agents, a majority of the Potawatomi 
initially removed as a result of this treaty settled on the Platte Purchase instead, a piece of 
land in present-day Missouri that was physically nearer to their ancestral homes.  Over 
the next three years small groups of Potawatomi led by headmen like Wabaunsee and 
influential men, including Billy Caldwell and Alexander Robinson, trickled into Missouri 
as they were rounded up and told of their fate.  They resided on the Platte Purchase from 
1833 to 1837.
67
   
The stop in Missouri turned out to be only temporary.  Indian agents and non-
Indian settlers in the region pressured the Potawatomi to remove from the fertile lands 
along the Missouri River.  As a result, in 1837 the tribe was hastily evicted from the 
Platte Purchase territory and it was annexed to the state of Missouri on March 28 by 
presidential proclamation.
68
  Most of the Potawatomi from the Platte, supported by Agent 
Edwin James, went north to Iowa territory, to the site of the original reserve delineated 
for them in the Treaty of Chicago.   Parties with an interest in where the Potawatomi were 
settled included:  tribal members, Indian agents, missionaries, and officials from the OIA.  
Each party, both Indians and non-Indians, had a vested interest in settling the Potawatomi 
in the place of their choosing; nonetheless, they could not reach a consensus before the 
move.  Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy, for example, felt strongly that the Potawatomi 
should be consolidated on the upper Osage River in present-day Kansas, a place from 
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which he claimed “they would not have occasion to remove.”69  Indian Agent Edwin 
James supported a move to Council Bluffs since it was the area agreed upon in the Treaty 
of Chicago.
70
  As a result of this disunity some Potawatomi, including Wabaunsee’s 
villagers, went to Council Bluffs and others, like Topinbee and his St. Joseph River 
Potawatomi, to a sub-agency on the Osage River in Kansas.  In some cases extended 
families ended up residing on different reservations.  
Though the Treaty of Chicago secured the largest single cession of Potawatomi 
land, the stories of the bands that entered into that agreement only tell a portion of the 
tribe’s removal experiences.  Several hundred Potawatomi lived in Indiana and other 
areas outside the territory ceded by the 1833 Treaty of Chicago. Some agreed to remove 
under later treaties and others negotiated with the federal government to stay in their 
homeland.  The 859 Potawatomi removed on the Trail of Death in 1838 fell into this 
category, as did dozens of dispersed villages in the Great Lakes region.
71 
    
Some Potawatomi villages removed without hesitation.  Others eluded the 
government and survived in small groups on their ancestral homelands for several more 
years.  Still others never removed from the Great Lakes region.  These groups negotiated 
with state and federal officials to stay, like the residents of Pokagon’s village, or they ran 
away or were absorbed into neighboring tribes.  The OIA usually contracted with private 
citizens to serve as conductors hired to transport scattered Indian communities to their 
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new lands.
72
  One such removal occurred in Wisconsin in 1851.  It offers insight into a 
typical Potawatomi removal experience.   
Wisconsin was admitted to the Union in 1848, and just as in Missouri, settlers 
flooded the region looking for cheap and abundant land.  The unclear status of Indian 
property rights at that time led many settlers to believe that Indians, who had rights to the 
land by virtue of previous occupation, lost those rights once the territory became a state.  
The non-Indian residents of Wisconsin were eager to be rid of the “nuisance” in their 
state.
73
  Wisconsin, occupied by the Potawatomi and a few Menominee and Ho-Chunk 
villages, fell within the boundaries of the land ceded in the 1833 Treaty of Chicago.  As a 
result, the OIA hired Alexis Coquillard to serve as conductor for the removal.  A trader 
from South Bend, Indiana, Coquillard had worked with Indian people since the 1820s 
before “conducting” the removal of over 500 Potawatomi to the Osage River in 1840.74    
Coquillard quickly set about gathering hundreds of scattered Potawatomi living in 
the area, encouraging villagers to move by promising them food and provisions.  The task 
was not easy and he knew that many would not go without significant pressure, even 
though most Indians in the area were destitute and near starvation because of the loss of 
their hunting land to encroaching American settlers.  There were many tribes in the area, 
and Coquillard struggled to sort out which villages were subject to the Treaty of Chicago.  
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Even when he determined a group was Potawatomi, many of the individuals within that 
group would claim they were not members of the bands that signed the treaty and were 
therefore not obligated to move.  There was little he could do to argue because the 
villages that fell under the conditions of the treaty were living in bands of fifty or sixty 
individuals scattered about the region.  To further complicate the matter, local traders 
who feared losing their Indian customers reportedly supplied the Potawatomi with 
whiskey and bolstered their opposition to removal.
75
    
By the summer of 1851 Coquillard had gathered over six hundred Indians, most 
of whom were Potawatomi, and the group set out for Kansas on July 28.
76
  A local 
newspaper showed little sympathy and presented the dismal scene of the Indian’s 
removal as inevitable, reporting that, “It is melancholy to meditate upon the sure 
extinction of the Aboriginal inhabitants of America.  Still such is indisputably the fact, 
that the last remnant of this race will, in a few years, become extinct.”77   Unlike the 
circumstances of the Trail of Death, the conductor paid $2,600 for wagons and horses to 
carry these Potawatomi to Kansas.  The first half of the trip passed with little difficulty 
and only a few deaths.  The second half of the trip proved to be more challenging for the 
Potawatomi and their conductor.  Upon crossing the Des Moines River, the party 
encountered whiskey sellers who supplied the beleaguered emigrants with alcohol.  
Coquillard had to break up some of the trader’s property to induce the Potawatomi to 
continue on their journey.  Cholera struck soon after they crossed the Missouri River, and 
about two hundred fell ill.  More than a dozen in the party died.  Panic struck and the 
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group scattered across the countryside.  Surviving stragglers trickled into the Kansas 
River reservation throughout September.
78
   
The 1851 removal of the Wisconsin Potawatomi represents the typical experience 
for thousands of Potawatomi.
79
  The effort to remove them met with some resistance, 
though not a prolonged or violent struggle.  Once the Potawatomi were gathered the 
journey was poorly organized, under supplied, and plagued with trouble and delays.  It 
did, however, achieve the desired result – at least the result desired by the federal 
government –  it removed the Native Americans from land sought by settlers.80  This 
removal and others experienced by the Potawatomi were part of a longer pattern of Indian 
dispossession that continued to develop over time.  
LIFE WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER 
The land reserved by treaty for the Potawatomi west of the Mississippi River was 
not the promised land of abundance.  They were neither free from the constant presence 
of American settlers, traders, and whisky peddlers, nor allowed to live life unrestricted by 
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the oversight and limitations of the OIA.  Adding to the already daunting challenges of 
starting over in a new place, the Potawatomi also found that the climate, wildlife, soil 
conditions, and other elements that influenced their daily lives were different from those 
of the Great Lakes.  Wild rice did not grow on the central plains and, besides deer, most 
of the large game they hunted in the winter did not migrate that far south.
81
  Even more 
damaging for the Potawatomi communities established in Council Bluffs, Iowa and on 
the Osage River in Kansas, was that the struggles that plagued their existence for 
generations before removal continued on their new reserves. 
Two small groups of Potawatomi arrived at Council Bluffs by Missouri River 
steamboats in 1837.  The main body of the group arrived soon after and the last parties to 
arrive came in 1838. From their earliest days on the reservation in Council Bluffs, the 
Potawatomi faced pressure to move farther west and settle with their kinsmen on the 
Osage River in Kansas.  A letter written in 1840 from Secretary of War, J.R. Poinsett, 
noted that removal of the Potawatomi from Council Bluffs to Kansas was “anxiously 
desired by the department to prevent disturbances which must be expected from collision 
with our citizens, now rapidly filling up that part of the country which the Indians at 
present occupy.”82  Despite the Secretary’s professed concern for the Potawatomi and 
anxiety about potential “disturbances” the government did little to make the Indians’ life 
in Iowa easy.  Instead, to ensure the Potawatomi did not establish a long-term settlement 
                                                 
81 For more on the Woodland Indian response to the prairie environment see Joseph T. Manzo, “Native 
Americans Euro-Americans: Some Shared Attitudes toward Life in the Prairies,” American Studies 23, no. 
2 (1982): 39–48. 
82 RCIA, 1840, 33.  The number of Indians listed at the Council Bluffs sub-agency prior to 1840 was 2,734. 
Leader, “Forgotten Promises: A History of the Council Bluffs Subagency, 1837-1847,” 128. 
 40 
in Iowa the government delayed funding for certain services, like education and 
agriculture, and built only a few structures.
83
      
According to reports from missionaries and Indian agents, drunkenness was 
rampant among the Potawatomi at Council Bluffs.  Even though it was illegal to sell 
alcohol to Native Americans, whiskey peddlers transported barrels to Iowa by steamships 
on the Missouri River.  In May of 1839, Father DeSmet, a Jesuit living and working with 
the Potawatomi, recorded that “thirty gallons of whisky, brandy, rum and alcohol” was 
brought into the reservation, and as a result “[i]n all directions, men, women and children 
were seen tottering and falling.”  A letter DeSmet wrote that same summer laments that 
fourteen brutal murders had already taken place within the sub-agency as a result of 
drunken violence.
84
 
The government never established a school on the reservation, since they hoped 
the Potawatomi would move to Kansas soon, and parents at Council Bluffs were hesitant 
to send their children away to be educated.
85
  The Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. 
Louis, Joshua Pilcher, complained in 1840 that he could not find any boys from his 
agency to attend the Choctaw Academy in Kentucky.  As a result, almost no formal 
education occurred for the children at Council Bluffs for the near-decade they were in 
Iowa. 
Some of the earliest Potawatomi to arrive on the Osage River sub-agency came in 
1837, the same year their kinsmen removed to Council Bluffs.  They were members of 
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the “United Nation” who relocated from their temporary home in Missouri.  The reason 
some Potawatomi went west to the Osage River Agency from the Platte Purchase, rather 
than moving north to Council Bluffs, was alluded when the Potawatomi headman Queh-
que-tah who petitioned President Andrew Jackson in 1835 protesting removal to Iowa.  
He argued that, “[w]e have been told that the white people want the land on the Platte.  If 
we were to settle on the Missouri River above them [Council Bluffs], perhaps they would 
wish to extend their settlements there also.”86  The recent history of the Potawatomi, and 
what they experienced and witnessed happening to Indians around them for years, 
suggested that settlers desired Indian land simply because it was inhabited by Indians.  
Spite may have been a real motivation for some settlers to desire Indian land.  For most, 
however, successful Indian land tenure provided proof that land was fertile and could 
support a family.87  Queh-que-tah’s assertion is also evidence that many Potawatomi 
feared that the government would subject them to continuous removals as settlers pushed 
west. 
The Osage River reservation was surrounded on three sides by other Indian 
reservations; the Delaware were to the south, the Miami were on the east, and the Peoria 
and Kaskaskia, Odawa, Ojibwe, and Sauk and Fox of the Mississippi were on the north.
88
  
The Potawatomi at the sub-agency quickly divided into two main groups.  The people 
who removed from the St. Joseph River Valley region (including people from Topinbee’s 
village) settled at Pottawatomie Creek, one of the main tributaries of the upper Osage 
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River.
89
  The Potawatomi of the Wabash River (including individuals from Menominee 
and Black Wolf’s villages) settled roughly fifteen miles south of Pottawatomie Creek on 
a small piece of land between the forks of Big Sugar Creek.  The creek got its moniker 
from the many sugar maple trees that lined it.  The Potawatomi from the United Band, 
who moved from the Platte Purchase in Missouri to Kansas, were scattered among both 
settlements, and some were living with family and friends at the nearby Kickapoo and 
Fort Leavenworth agency.
90
    
Unlike their kinsmen in Council Bluffs, the Potawatomi in Kansas were greeted 
by a small, but enthusiastic, community of missionaries who encouraged them to 
establish roots immediately.  In 1838, Father Christian Hoecken, a Jesuit who had worked 
among the Kickapoo for a few years, met the band of Potawatomi on the Trail of Death 
as they entered Kansas.  He informed them that he intended to quit his work with the 
Kickapoo and settle down with the Potawatomi on the Osage River.
91
  The Jesuits 
oversaw the building of a church soon after their arrival; it was funded by the $300 
annual subsidy appropriated from the federal government’s “Civilization Fund.”92  The 
Osage River sub-agency also had boys’ schools run by Jesuits, as well as Baptist and 
                                                 
89 Garraghan, 194. The upper Osage River is also referred to as the Marais des Cygnes River. 
90 RCIA of 1840, 230. The total number of Potawatomi listed at the Osage River sub-agency in 1840 was 
2,153 – reportedly the total from five separate removals.  The first documented party to arrive came in 1834 
(or earlier) and were part of the United Band of Potawatomi who removed under the 1832 Treaty of 
Chicago.  There were 441 of them recorded by government officials.  By July of 1837, when the next count 
was taken, there were 658 Potawatomi at the sub-agency.  Two smaller emigrations of 160 and 50 people 
occurred over the next year.  In 1838 the roughly 650 Potawatomi that were part of the Trail of Death 
arrived, followed by a group of 526 in 1840.  All of the Potawatomi at the Osage River sub-agency who 
arrived after 1837 came from Indiana and Michigan.   
91 Garraghan, Jesuits of the Middle United States, 186. The Jesuits’ mission at Sugar Creek was part of a 
restoration of Catholic instruction in the lives of the Potawatomi after a lapse of several years.  Their last 
mission among the Potawatomi had been at the Jesuit Miami-Potawatomi Mission on the St. Joseph River 
in Michigan. 
92 Ibid., 196.  The money had originally been promised to Father Petit’s Potawatomi mission on the Yellow 
River in Indiana, but was transferred to the Sugar Creek mission when his congregation was removed there 
in 1838. 
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Methodist missionaries.  The girls’ education was undertaken by nuns from the Society of 
the Sacred Heart who opened a boarding school on the reservation in the summer of 
1841.
93
  In the late 1840s the Potawatomi living at Sugar Creek set about creating a code 
of law and conduct (most likely with the ardent support and encouragement of their 
Indian agent and missionaries) that included the election of constables, the construction 
of a jail, and strict punishments for anyone caught bringing liquor onto the reservation.
94
  
By 1846, the federal government sought to consolidate a single Potawatomi 
reservation in a place they thought the Indians would be out of the way.  As happened in 
Missouri and Wisconsin, Iowa’s non-Indian population was growing and it gained 
statehood in 1846.  The federal government increased pressure on the Potawatomi at 
Council Bluffs to leave the newly organized state and move west.
95
  Their Indian agents 
hoped the Council Bluffs people would join their kinsmen at the Osage River 
Reservation, but their leaders refused.  They argued that they did not like the sparsely 
forested land around the Osage River.  The removed Indians had already been forced to 
adapt to a landscape that was drastically different than their densely forested Great Lakes 
homeland.  It is not surprising that the availability of resources like water and timber 
became important when considering a new reservation.  It is also likely that the headmen 
from Council Bluffs did not want to move onto the reservation on the Osage River 
because they feared that they would not have as much influence as the Potawatomi who 
had lived there for years and established relationships with the influential missionaries.  
A significant percentage of the Potawatomi living on the Osage River Reservation were 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 202–207.  RCIA, 1842, 118-119.  
94 Ibid., 218.  Under the clan system that structured Potawatomi society before removal there were strict 
rules and guidelines for order and social justice.  For more on these methods see Skinner, The Mascoutens 
of Prairie Potawatomi Indians.    
95 A Native American population that was too large was a reason to deny statehood.  It was used as 
evidence of primitivism. 
 44 
Christians who the missionaries supported by writing letters on the Indian’s behalf to 
Indian agents and other government officials when conflicts arose.  The Council Bluffs 
Potawatomi, contrarily, had relatively few Christians and little rapport with the 
missionaries.  Jesuits even abandoned their mission in Council Bluffs by 1841, reportedly 
because of persistent drunkenness among the Potawatomi and the general “unpromising” 
field of labor.
96
  Settling on a reservation that was new to everyone would allow for more 
equality. 
  To expedite the removal process, OIA officials selected an available plot of land 
along the Kansas River for the combined Potawatomi communities against the wishes of 
the Osage River Potawatomi.
97
  The Council Bluffs group was the first to agree to this 
new reserve, led by headmen Joseph Lafromboise, Perish LeClair, and Half Day.
98
  There 
were dissenters at Council Bluffs.  Sub-agent Mitchell noted that some of the Potawatomi 
travelled from Iowa to Kansas to examine the proposed territory and found it wanting.  
They brought back an unfavorable  description of land conditions, and at the time of the 
agent’s report some of these people had “gone back to Milwaukie” rather than remove to 
the Kansas River.
99
   The Osage River Potawatomi were more hesitant.  They first called 
a general council to discuss the issue and invited Father Verreydt to offer his advice.  He 
insisted that the decision lay with the Potawatomi, but did offer his opinion that they 
should agree to the arrangement.  He argued that the land they currently inhabited was 
poor in quality, too near non-Indians and noted their need for a larger annuity and 
                                                 
96 Gilbert J. Garraghan, The Jesuits of the Middle United States, The American Press, 1938, 594. 
97 The 900 square mile tract of land that became the Potawatomi reservation was ceded to the United States 
by Kansas Indians in a treaty signed January 14, 1846.  Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:557–
560. 
98 Harvey to Medill, November 2, 1847.  Records of the St. Louis Superintendency of Indian Affairs. 
99 RCIA, 1847, 151. 
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supplies – all of which the treaty promised to remedy.100  After a great deal of debate the 
Osage River Potawatomi decided to sign the treaty and move north.  In June of 1846, 
both the Council Bluffs and Osage River Potawatomi agreed to the terms of the removal 
treaties, signed on June 5 and June 17 respectively, and began making arrangements for 
the migration to their new reserve.
101
   
 
Figure 2:  Map of Potawatomi removals. (Courtesy of Citizen Potawatomi Nation  
Cultural Heritage Center.)  
                                                 
100 Catholic Mirror (Baltimore), November 9, 1850.  Like the Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy, Indian 
agents often felt that the frontiersmen living in close proximity to Native Americans were a bad influence 
and would try to exploit them.   
101 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:558. By the terms of Article IV of the 1846 treaty, the 
Potawatomi paid a total of $87,000 for their reserve on the Kansas River.  This amount was deducted from 
the $450,000 value placed on their former lands in Iowa and Kansas. 
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The OIA was eager for the two groups to settle together for many reasons.  The 
admission of Iowa to the Union was the most pressing, but government officials also 
argued that the move made logistical sense, because it was easier to conduct business 
with one group than two.  Some of the individuals living on the Platte Purchase moved to 
Council Bluffs in 1837 and others moved to the Osage River.  This division meant that 
when it was time to make annuity payments the official overseeing the process had to 
visit both reservations or organize travel for representatives from one reserve to come to 
the other.
102
   The OIA also did not want to negotiate with two groups in any future treaty 
discussions.  The preamble of the 1846 treaty articulates the U.S. government’s 
interpretation of what joining the two bands on one reservation meant.  It states: 
 
“Whereas the various bands of the Pottowautomie Indians, known as the 
Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottowautomies, the Pottowautomies of the Prairie the 
Pottowautomies of the Wabash, and the Pottowautomies of Indiana, have, 
subsequent to the year 1828, entered into separate and distinct treaties with the 
United States, by which they have been separated and located in different 
countries, and difficulties have arisen as to the proper distribution of the 
stipulations under various treaties, and being the same people by kindred, by 
feeling, and by language, and having, in former periods, lived on and owned their 
lands in common; and being desirous to unite in one common country, and again 
become one people, and receive their annuities and other benefits in common, and 
to abolish all minor distinctions of bands by which they have heretofore been 
divided, and are anxious to be known only as the Pottowautomie Nation, thereby, 
reinstating the national character.”103 
The treaty’s description of events is misleading.  While it is cast as a “helpful” gesture by 
the OIA, the unification of the bands was a matter of autonomy for the Potawatomi and a 
practical matter for the federal government.  Each group listed in the opening lines of this 
                                                 
102 Leader, “Forgotten Promises: A History of the Council Bluffs Sub-agency, 1837-1847,” 117.  Even 
though OIA were trying to convince the Potawatomi at Council Bluffs to move to Kansas Territory 
officials made the 1837 annuity payment Council Bluffs because it was easier to reach than the Osage 
River Reservation.    
103 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:557. 
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excerpt was a distinct band of Potawatomi that did share a common language, spirituality, 
lifeway, and often lineage; but, they had not all lived together before the treaties and they 
did not previously have a “national character” to reinstate.  It was the United States 
government that wanted to streamline them into the “Pottowautomie Nation” that would 
require only one reservation, a single Indian agent, and a simplified annuity payment 
process.  
Before the treaty, the Potawatomi who lived on the Osage River Reservation in 
Kansas, specifically at Sugar Creek, were increasingly referred to as “Mission Band” 
Potawatomi in correspondence and government records.  Though they were not a unified 
group before arriving in Kansas, the settlement was primarily comprised of Potawatomi 
removed from villages in northern Indiana and southern Michigan.  Catholic and Baptist 
missionaries had long-established strongholds that influenced the daily lives of 
Potawatomi in that region.  The Potawatomi from the Osage River were labeled “Mission 
Band” whether they were Christian converts or not.  The missionary presence meant 
steady traffic of non-Indian visitors and business people into the communities.  The group 
of Potawatomi that became known as the “Prairie Band” overwhelmingly came from 
Council Bluffs and removed from villages in Illinois and southern Wisconsin.  These 
divisions were not perfect.
104
  As previously mentioned, the autonomous nature of these 
dispersed Potawatomi villages resulted in the development of varied social practices and 
accepted norms from one region, or even village, to the next.   
If one looks at the Mission and Prairie Potawatomi from an anthropological 
perspective at this period in their history, one can generalize about their differences.  
More of the Mission Potawatomi were Christian converts, they practiced a more intensive 
                                                 
104 I will refer to the two factions as the Mission Band and Prairie Band in future chapters even though 
membership in each group was fluid. 
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form of agriculture that was supported by missionaries, and many took advantage of the 
schools missionaries established near them.  A number of the Prairie Potawatomi, on the 
other hand, scorned the teachings of Christian missionaries, still acquired a great deal of 
their sustenance from hunting, and lacked the option of sending their children to school, 
because one was never built at Council Bluffs.
105
  It would be erroneous, however, to 
over-simplify the situation and claim that the Mission Band were Christian converts who 
adopted Euro-American society and the Prairie Band were traditionalist who shunned the 
influence of their non-Indian neighbors.  Falling into this convenient dichotomy 
disregards significant nuances and misses the fluidity that fostered complicated 
relationships between the two groups and federal government in the years around the 
treaty of 1861.  Thus, while the government’s insistence that the groups became the 
Potawatomi Nation in 1846 was largely a misnomer, it is also misleading to suggest they 
did not see themselves as kinsmen with common interests and concerns.     
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William Medill, noted in his 1848 annual report 
that it was rare to see Indians remove from their “old homes” as peacefully and without 
disorder as the Potawatomi had.
106
  While the government attributed the orderly removal 
to the new “Indian system” it is more likely that the Potawatomi put up little fight 
because they did not think of southern Kansas or Iowa as “old homes.”107  The 
government had forced them to remove from their real homelands the decade before and 
they had only lived in the western territories for a few years.  Their experiences also told 
                                                 
105 RCIA, 1847, 150. 
106 RCIA, 1848, 448.  
107 “Indian system” was a term used in government correspondence to reference the reservation system and 
other methods used by the OIA to regulate Native Americans.  Many of these modes of control were new in 
the 1840’s and greatly expanded in the 1860s. Prucha, The Great Father, 462–478. 
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them that resistance to removal could be costly.  Most removed from their reserve within 
the time allotted by the treaty.
108
   
Hastening the move was the unrest and disorder that plagued the communities at 
Council Bluffs and the Osage River in the months between the treaty and the journeys to 
the new reservation.  Both agents reported that very few Potawatomi planted crops, since 
it was undetermined where they would be at harvest time.
109
  Drunkenness and violence 
also increased.  In the fall of 1847, Osage River sub-agent, Alfred J. Vaughan, reported to 
Superintendent Thomas Harvey that “9 Pottowatomies and 3 Miamies have fallen by the 
knife, and some 4 or 5 have died from the effects of intemperance.”110   
Though the Potawatomi at Sugar Creek did not put forward a great deal of 
resistance about leaving their settlement, the process of moving them north was not 
without trials. Several Potawatomi from Sugar Creek began their journey in November of 
1847.  They set fire to the mission buildings as they left so that they would not be 
desecrated by secular use.  Though their designated reserve was only ninety miles away, 
the band traveled only seventeen miles before setting up a camp for a prolonged stay on 
Mission Creek.  In the spring of 1848 a small group from the Mission Creek camp 
ventured farther and set up a satellite camp on a nearby stream called the Wakarusa.
111
  
The missionaries and Potawatomi at Mission Creek, out of necessity, undertook projects 
to accommodate the population that was increasing each month as more and more 
                                                 
108 Some left and went to live among friends or relatives from other tribes instead of moving to their newly 
assigned reservation.   
109 RCIA, 1847, 146-151. 
110 Ibid., 148. 
111 The village of Wakarusa was described in Fr. Maurice Gailland’s 1848 account of the area as “a village 
containing over 100 lodges, surrounded by fields and gardens.”  Catholic Mirror (Baltimore), November 
16, 1850. 
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stragglers from Sugar Creek ventured north.  By the spring of 1848 they built temporary 
mission buildings and ploughed fields for crops. 
Because it was not on the demarcated new reservation, everyone knew the 
settlement on Mission Creek was temporary.  Throughout the winter of 1847 and spring 
of 1848, Fr. Verreydt, superior of the Catholic Potawatomi Mission, and various 
Potawatomi embarked on scouting missions north, in search of a suitable spot for a 
permanent settlement and mission site.  In June of 1848, the site for St. Mary’s, one mile 
north of the Kansas River, was chosen.
112 
  
THE KANSAS RIVER RESERVATION 
Despite the federal government’s claim that placing the disparate Potawatomi 
bands on a single reservation would “restore and concentrate said tribes to a state so 
desirable and necessary for the happiness of their people,” for the Potawatomi, life on the 
Kansas River carried on much as it had on their separate reservations.
113
  Reports from 
OIA officials and missionaries for the rest of the 1840s and all of the 1850s tell a 
consistent narrative, echoing criticisms and insights from one year to the next.  According 
to these accounts the Potawatomi showed few signs of advancing to assimilation in 
American society, and what “progress” they did exhibit was achieved solely by the 
Mission Band and not the Prairie Band.  The agents lamented that whiskey sellers and 
undesirable non-native Americans were a constant plague on the reservation and 
                                                 
112 Until 1854, annual reports sent in from Fr. J. B. Duerinck, Superintendent of the St. Mary’s 
Pottawatomie Mission Manual Labor School, were addressed from Nebraska Territory.  After the Kansas-
Nebraska Act of 1854 they were addressed from Kansas Territory.   
113 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:557. The Kansas River is known interchangeably as the 
Kaw River as was the Kansas tribe.  The name changed as French and American inhabitants of the region 
phonetically interpreted what the tribe called itself.  Many chose to refer to the river as Kaw and the tribe as 
Kansas.  John Rydjord, Indian Place-Names: Their Origin, Evolution, and Meanings, collected in Kansas 
from the Siouan, Algonquian, Shoshonean, Caddoan, Iroquoian, and Other Tongues (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1968) 23.  
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throughout the Indian Territory during this period, and there was never enough money or 
man-power to adequately encourage the “civilization” of the Potawatomi.114  
By all accounts, moving thousands of Native Americans from almost a dozen 
tribes onto the central plains, already home to several powerful Indian nations, had its 
challenges.
115
  Territorial conflicts, over-hunting, strife between traditional adversaries 
and a lack of resources fostered regular conflict among tribes.  In 1853 the Potawatomi 
came to the aid of their Pawnee neighbors who were involved in a skirmish with the 
“mountain Indians” (presumably the Sioux).  After half a day of fighting the Sioux 
retreated and the Potawatomi returned to their village with twenty or thirty scalps.  Much 
to the chagrin of their agent, who reported that the Potawatomi fought in self-defense, the 
victorious warriors danced over their spoils for a month.
116
  A year later, in 1854, the 
Potawatomi sided with the Sac & Fox in a battle against the Comanche, Kiowa and 
Apache.  At the end of that ordeal twenty-six lay dead among the Comanche and their 
supporters, while the losses for the Sac & Fox and Potawatomi were “very 
inconsiderable.”117  The belligerent state of affairs between tribes is understandable when 
one considers the conditions each group faced.  In his report for the Central 
Superintendency, David D. Mitchell noted that “[v]ast quantities of their game (their only 
means of subsistence) have been destroyed.  Their limited forests have been laid waste, 
and loathsome diseases (unknown in their primitive state) scattered among them.  This is 
greatly to be deplored; but there is, at present, no remedy.”118   
                                                 
114 RCIA, 1847-1859. 
115 For more on Native Americans in Kansas Territory see H. Craig Miner and Williams Unrau, The End of 
Indian Kansas: A Study in Cultural Revolution, 1854-1871 (University Press of Kansas, 1990), 1–24. 
116 RCIA, 1853, 82-83 
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Before their removal from the Great Lakes, the Potawatomi regularly engaged in 
warfare with neighboring tribes, colonial forces, and eventually American soldiers and 
militias.  Under the supervision of an Indian agent and missionaries in Kansas, however, 
violent skirmishes and conflict were not normal occurrences for most of the Potawatomi.  
On the new reservation the Potawatomi continued their tradition of settling in small 
villages centered on extended family groups.  Many of the Council Bluffs Potawatomi 
established homes near the Big and Little Soldier creeks in the northeast section of the 
reservation, while the majority of the Osage River group settled almost thirty miles south, 
along the banks of the Kansas River.  Communities in the southern section developed 
around sources of water and landmarks, including Silver Lake, the Vermillion River, and 
St. Mary’s Mission.   
Two schools that operated at the Osage River Reservation reopened and serviced 
the youth on the Kansas River.  Missionaries established both institutions in the south 
near the Christian converts from the Osage River.  This group had a history of working 
with the missionaries and sending their children to school.  The Catholic Manual Labor 
School consistently received praise from the Indian agents and the Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs.  They had a steady stream of students, very little sickness, and were 
relatively successful at providing enough for themselves.  The Baptist Manual Labor 
School, however, was constantly plagued with illness and repeatedly reported as not up to 
par by OIA officials.
119
   
While the Potawatomi struggled to live up to the standards of acculturation and 
progress set by Indian agents and missionaries, they did slowly increase the number of 
acres under cultivation and started some businesses.  By 1857 the Kansas River 
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Reservation supported a wagon maker and his assistant and two full-time blacksmiths 
who were regularly busy.  These positions were funded by the OIA and generally filled 
by non-Indians.  A few tribal members also succeeded at business; Lucius Darling, Hiram 
Weld, and Joseph Ogee operated ferries on the Kansas River near Uniontown; Charles 
Beaubien, Joseph Savelle, Joseph Napoleon Bourassa and Lewis Vieux also operated 
ferries, and Jude W. Bourassa ran a profitable grist mill.
120
 
From 1847 to 1861 the condition of the Potawatomi in Kansas can be summarized 
as follows:  as a people they survived, but they did not thrive and they largely adapted to 
a sedentary lifestyle, but they did not assimilate to the degree desired by the federal 
government.  Most were resigned to their fate of living on a government-assigned 
reservation for the rest of their lives and simply wanted to be left in peace and in one 
place.  Federal officials also had to accept that removing Indians to Kansas did not solve 
any problems; it just moved them across the Mississippi River.  The opinions of many in 
the OIA at this time are conveyed by the sentiments of Superintendent Alexander 
Cummings.  In 1856 he reported that “[t]he remnants of the once large tribes of Indians 
that resided east of the Mississippi have been forced, by the pressure of civilization, step 
by step across the continent to their last homes and graves in the Territory of Kansas; 
beyond this point they cannot well be driven, as there is no longer any outlet for them.”121  
There had to be an alternative means of approaching U.S./Native American relations.  In 
1861 some of the Potawatomi entered into the experiment of allotment and U.S. 
citizenship with the hope that it would finally be the answer. 
 
                                                 
120 Edmunds, “Indians as Pioneers: Potawatomis on the Frontier,” 349.  RCIA, 1857, 174. 
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Chapter 2:  A Certain Time and Place:  
The Larger History that Created the Potawatomi Treaty of 1861 
 
Property has been taken by whites, which was notoriously the property of an 
Indian.  I have applied in behalf of the Indian to the United States court for 
redress, and been told, ‘the offence not having been committed upon an Indian 
reserve, the United States court has no jurisdiction.’  Applying then to the state 
courts, it was determined that, inasmuch as the Indian was not a citizen of the 
United States, or of the State of Kansas, he had no right in the courts of the State 
to redress his grievances.  However unjust or unwarranted such a decision, the 
fact and difficulty remains.122 
- Dr. Luther Palmer 
In the mid-nineteenth century, America was the site of great geographic 
expansion, social change, and political chaos.  Many of the seminal events that occurred 
during this era directly impacted the residents of Kansas and its development as a state.  
Author Deborah Goodrich Bisel wrote in her 2012 book, The Civil War in Kansas, that 
upon examination of American history during this era it became apparent that, “all 
historic roads lead to Kansas…[f]rom Bleeding Kansas to the Civil War and the Plains 
Indian wars, there is no more compelling time in our nation’s history, and Kansas was the 
center of it.”123  This assertion could be contested; however, Kansas was the stage for 
many watershed moments in the narrative of American history.  As the United States 
rapidly acquired and developed new territories in the West, settlers, innovators, and 
entrepreneurs seized the opportunity for growth and profit.  Emigrants traversed overland 
                                                 
122RCIA, 1867, 305.  Dr. Luther Palmer was a non-Indian physician assigned to the Potawatomi 
reservation.  He included the above statement in his annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  
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commentary to his audience.  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs was at the center of shaping an Indian 
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123 Debra Goodrich Bisel, The Civil War in Kansas: Ten Years of Turmoil (The History Press, 2012), 14. 
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trails to lands along the Pacific coast and railroad companies scrambled to buy land and 
build track through Kansas to support and spur the expansion.  Sectional tensions over 
issues of states’ rights and slavery that simmered for years erupted into a violent civil war 
that levied a heavy toll of death and destruction, which impacted the country for decades.  
All of these events directly affected the lives of the Potawatomi and other Native 
Americans residing in Kansas.  
For the indigenous population throughout the mid- and far-West, the period was 
equally tumultuous, because the chaos of the era translated into significant changes to the 
federal government’s Indian policies from removal to one of assimilation.  The 
implications of the new assimilation policies of allotment and U.S. citizenship, even once 
enacted, were unclear to both the Potawatomi and federal officials.  The dubious nature 
of these policies demonstrates why it is difficult to write a straightforward narrative 
history of either U.S. Indian policy or Potawatomi history during this period.     
From the 1830s through the 1870s the OIA largely committed to policies of 
removing Native Americans from their homelands in the East and creating reservations to 
contain them beyond the Mississippi River.  After only a few decades it became apparent 
that reservations did not solve the federal government’s Indian problem, they simply 
moved it west.  In the middle of the century the government decided to test a new 
approach to the “Indian question” with the Potawatomi and a few other tribes in 
Kansas.124  In 1861, the Potawatomi entered into a treaty agreement with the federal 
government that initiated the process for acquiring fee-simple land allotments and U.S. 
                                                 
124 The “Indian question” is a term that has been popularly adopted to refer to the federal government’s 
Indian policy and the way they choose to interact with Native Americans.  In 1874, former Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Francis Amasa Walker wrote a book titled The Indian Question, which criticized his 
successors.  Francis Amasa Walker, The Indian Question (J.R. Osgood and Company, 1874).  Among the 
tribes who traditionally lived in Kansas or were removed to the region like the Potawatomi were the 
Delaware, Kansa, Kickapoo, Miami, Osage, Odawa, Pawnee, Sac and Fox, Shawnee, Wyandot, and others. 
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citizenship for almost two-thirds of its members.  This group, which became known as 
the Citizen Potawatomi, was among the first tribes to enter into a treaty agreement that 
included both conditions.125  The decade that followed brought both successes and great 
challenges as the Citizen Potawatomi struggled to navigate their evolving status as Native 
Americans, U.S. citizens, land owners and dispossessed people. 
This chapter examines why this shift in Indian policy began, in earnest, in Kansas 
and why the transition to assimilation via land ownership and citizenship occurred in the 
1850s and 1860s.  Examining the national and local developments of this period helps 
explain the OIA’s change in Indian policy from removal and the creation of reservations 
to the assimilation of Indian peoples.  Westward expansion by emigrants bound for gold 
mines and other opportunities on the West coast and pioneers desperate to claim a 
homestead on the Great Plains meant that the practice of non-Indian encroachment onto 
Indian lands continued after the tribes had been removed from their homelands.  The 
development of the railroad system encouraged dispossession to occur at an accelerated 
pace, and a decade of violence between Bleeding Kansas and the beginning of the Civil 
War meant that U.S. Indian policy changes occurred at an exceptionally chaotic time in 
U.S. history.  Treaties with tribes originally from Kansas and others who were moved 
there, along with legislation like the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Homestead Act, 
helped achieve the federal government’s objective of opening millions of acres that 
comprised the reservations to non-Indian settlement.  The unprecedented dispossession 
                                                 
125 In 1839 Congress approved an act that allotted land in fee-simple and extended U.S. citizenship to the 
Brothertown Indian group in Wisconsin.  This Indian community, made up of Pequot, Mohican, Oneida, 
and Stockbridge, was the first to enter into this kind of relationship with the federal government.  After 
allotting the Brothertown Indians, the federal government assigned private land parcels (without the 
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and violence that occurred from 1850-1860 led to requisite changes in the federal 
government’s Indian policy.   
The Citizen Potawatomi 1861 Allotment and Citizenship Treaty was part of the 
larger effort to dismantle Native American land tenure in Kansas.  The treaty was one of 
the first to include clauses for fee-simple allotment and U.S. citizenship.  To fully 
appreciate its significance one must consider the gravity of the government’s assumption 
that they could easily dissolve tribal identity and culturally remake Native Americans into 
landowning citizens who were willing to leave centuries’ old traditions behind with the 
stroke of a pen.  The final pages of this chapter will explore the complications and 
contradictions implicit in the concepts of landownership and U.S. citizenship for Native 
Americans at this point in history.  In the midst of turbulent decades that brought 
sweeping changes like mass emigration, railroad expansion, and the Civil War to the 
West, the new U.S. Indian policies were not only poorly planned and hastily executed; 
they were also wrought with short-sightedness and unrealistic expectations.  Secretary of 
the Interior, Jacob Thompson, commented on the federal government’s plan to allot 
private parcels of land as a way to help the Native Americans of Kansas “attain the level 
of his neighbors,” lamenting that “[u]nhappily for the success of this scheme, an 
unprecedented tide of emigration pressed into Kansas and Nebraska.”126  Ostensibly 
crafted to fulfill the pressing desires of the federal government and non-Indians before 
the needs of the Native Americans subject to them, such policies represented an attempt 
to reconfigure Potawatomi life and culture through citizenship.  Such changes were not as 
totalizing as the government hoped.   
                                                 
126 J. Thompson, "Report of the Secretary of the Interior," December 3, 1857, Sen. Exec. Docs., 35 Cong., 
1 Sess., Vol. 2, Doc. 11, pp. 63. 
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A FRONTIER FOR SETTLERS, BUT A HOME FOR THE POTAWATOMI 
The people of Kansas, both Indian and non-Indian, were at the center of many 
landmark political and social battles in the nineteenth century, largely a consequence of 
geography.  Kansas and the other states and territories at the heart of the continent lay 
along the entry point to the West in the 1850s.  Chicago and St. Louis were well 
established by this time and evolving into bustling metropolises.127  Population growth 
and developing urbanization in the Old Northwest meant that the expanses of the central 
plains were the gateway to opportunity for enterprising Anglo-Americans who were 
willing to take a chance on resettlement as well as recent immigrants from abroad.128  
Thrust into the middle of this emerging culture of resettlement was the region’s oldest 
inhabitants and its newest arrivals: the indigenous peoples of the plains and the tens of 
thousands of Native Americans moved west of the Mississippi River in the 1830s and 
1840s.129 
In 1846, the United States acquired the territory in the Pacific Northwest from 
Great Britain through the Oregon Treaty.  Two years later, in 1848, the federal 
government negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico, annexing the 
region that became California, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Colorado.  The addition of these uncharted lands enticed thousands of land-hungry 
settlers to leave their homes in the East for opportunity in these newly obtained 
                                                 
127 For more about the history of Chicago and St. Louis in this period see William Cronon, Nature’s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, 1st Edition (W. W. Norton & Company, 1992); and J. Frederick 
Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West (The History Press, 2011).  In 1963 construction 
began on St. Louis’ Gateway Arch, a monument to westward expansion and dubbed as the Gateway to the 
West.  St. Louis was also on the border of the Louisiana Purchase and was the starting point for Lewis and 
Clark’s expedition in 1804.  
128 The land comprising the Old Northwest included the territory between the Great Lakes, the Mississippi 
River, and the Ohio River.  
129 Approximately 10,000 Native Americans were moved from their homes in the East to reservations in 
eastern Kansas.  RCIA, 1855, 575-576. 
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territories.  Just a few years after the Potawatomi moved onto their reservation on the 
Kansas River, miners discovered gold in California.  The chance to strike it rich further 
spurred migration.  The flood of non-Indians to the same region proved to be a significant 
burden to the tribes’ efforts to establish new settlements.  Within a few years thousands 
of additional prospectors, emigrants, and thrill-seekers tore through the country on their 
journey west by way of the California and Oregon Trails.130  The most commonly used 
routes ran along the Kansas River, cutting through the middle of the newly established 
Potawatomi reservation.  The proximity of Fort Leavenworth to the reservation, 
approximately sixty miles northeast, also increased the traffic through their territory.  The 
fort was the last organizing point and major supply station for wagon trains of emigrants 
setting out for the newly acquired western lands.131  These travelers dreamed of gold, 
land, success, and the promise of a new beginning – all of which were seemingly 
available to anyone willing to make the dangerous journey across the vast unknown of 
the American West.   
Emigrating parties had a sense of entitlement to any provisions they found along 
the way and took them to aid their travels, and they stole Potawatomi property as a result.  
The Potawatomi desperately needed the sparse timber on the reservation to build houses, 
stores, schools and churches; but, parties of emigrant often chopped down and burned or 
carted off the resources with no intention of compensating the Indians or consideration of 
tribal ownership.132  Even more devastating for the Potawatomi were the outbreaks of 
diseases like typhoid and cholera on the reservation.  The illnesses contaminated the 
                                                 
130 Some estimates put the number of emigrants who traveled the Oregon Trail between 1840 and 1860 at 
more than 300,000.  Edmunds, “Indians as Pioneers: Potawatomis on the Frontier,” 342. 
131 Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607–1890: A Political, Social, 
and Military History (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 289. 
132 In 1861 the Delaware’s agent reported that between 1854 and 1861 non-Indians in the area stole 
$48,750 worth of timber and $32,227 in other property from the tribe.  Thomas Sykes to House Committee 
on Indian Affairs, February 1, 1861, Record of the United States House of Representatives. 
 60 
water supply and proved to be a constant plague to residents.133  The flood of outsiders 
resulted in a constant assault on the health, privacy, well-being, and infrastructure of the 
Potawatomi Nation.134   
More troublesome than emigrating parties were settlers who decided against 
continuing west.  The arable lands and adequate sources of water found on the plains of 
Kansas compelled many to stay for the possibility of a different opportunity – owning, 
farming, and raising livestock on their own piece of land.135  Each year numerous settlers 
and traders came to eastern Kansas and squatted on tracts that appealed to them even 
though none of the land in the region was legally available for public purchase or 
settlement because of reservation boundaries and treaty agreements between the federal 
government and tribes removed from the East.  The legal restrictions on the land did not 
concern territorial officials who should have enforced the laws or the individuals who 
wanted to make their homes on Indian land.  Kansas was prime reality, crucial in the plan 
to build a transcontinental railroad, and a pawn in the national struggle over the issue of 
slavery.  Caught in the turmoil of westward expansion, questions of Indian treaty rights 
quickly became less significant than the establishment of non-Indian settlements.  The 
largest and most aggressive entities in the push West during this period were the railroad 
corporations from the East.  
                                                 
133 The Kansas River reservation experienced a serious outbreak of cholera in the summer of 1849.  
Residents of a trading post on the reservation, Uniontown, burned it to the ground in an effort to stem the 
tide of the outbreak and the settlement was abandoned all together in 1855.   
134 The availability of timber was one of the reasons the Potawatomi chose the area north of the Kansas 
River for their reservation.  The relatively sparse woodlands in the central plains, in comparison with the 
Potawatomi  homelands in the Great Lakes, were a difficult enough adjustment.  The relationships between 
resident Indians and non-Indian emigrants were not all contentious; they were often based on trade.  Some 
Potawatomi businessmen and farmers benefitted from travelers who needed to restock supplies and were 
willing to sell their livestock as part of the deal.  For more about the relationships between emigrants and 
tribes on the Great Plains see Michael L. Tate, Indians and Emigrants: Encounters on the Overland Trails 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). 
135 As noted in Chapter 1, the mere presence of Native Americans on a tract of land made it more 
appealing because it was proof that it could support a family.  
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RAILROADS, ALLOTMENT, AND THE CIVIL WAR  
The population boom in the West and the expectation that settlers would continue 
to emigrate produced a justification for a mode of reliable, and relatively cheap, 
transportation across the continent.  Overland trails were fraught with hazards and travel 
across them was slow and expensive.  Railroad magnates from the East recognized the 
opportunity to expand their industry and began building track at a furious pace beginning 
in the 1850s.  Historian Richard White argues that the transcontinental railroad was built 
before it was necessary, track was over build, and the entire system was grossly 
mismanaged.  He offers that “if the country had not built the transcontinental railroads, it 
might not have needed them until much later, when it could have built them more 
cheaply, more efficiently, and with fewer social and political costs.”136   
Regardless of the necessity for a transcontinental railroad, in 1862, Congress 
passed the Pacific Railroad Act, allowing the railroad companies to create a connection 
between the industrial urban centers of the East with fledgling communities in the West.  
Teams of laborers completed the task in 1869 when a railroad executive drove the final 
spike into the track at Promontory Summit, Utah.137  Ferocious competition in the 
railroad industry resulted in a flurry of track building during this era.  The number of 
miles of railroad track in the West increased ten-fold from 1,276 in 1850 to 11,400 in 
1860, and then doubled to 24,587 by 1870.  By 1870 there was almost as much railroad 
                                                 
136 Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America, 1St Edition 
(W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 517. 
137 Ibid., 1–38.  Though the actual track of the intercontinental railroad ran just north of Kansas in modern-
day Nebraska, the act aided railroad construction in general by providing extensive land grants in the 
western United States. 
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track in the West as there was in the rest of the country combined, and it was virtually all 
laid in just twenty years.138   
Federal officials helped prepare for railroad construction long before laborers 
entered Kansas to build track.  The OIA parceled out all of eastern Kansas as reservations 
for tribes removed from the East.  In theory, it was not available for exploitation by non-
Indians.  The federal government was just as eager to connect the new states and 
territories in the West to the rest of the nation as the railroad executives were to bridge 
the two markets.139  To make that land available for railroad construction, in 1854 the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs arranged land cession treaties with several tribes that 
included clauses allowing the railroad executives to build on former Indian lands and still 
make a profit for their companies.140  Rather than asking the railroad companies to 
purchase lands that they planned to build track on outright, the treaties provided for a 
simple right-of-way.  This caveat meant that the railroads were only required to pay “just 
compensation” for damages incurred by Indian lands in relation to railroad construction 
on the respective reservations.  Restrictions and guidelines for track construction were 
not included in the treaties, so the railroad companies could hypothetically plan to build 
wherever they saw fit.141  As corporations planned to build the transcontinental railroad, 
the federal government designed a plan to remake U.S. Indian policy. 
                                                 
138 Chauncey Mitchell Depew, One Hundred Years of American Commerce, 1795-1895: A History of 
American Commerce by One Hundred Americans, with a Chronological Table of the Important Events of 
American Commerce and Invention Within the Past One Hundred Years (D.O. Haynes, 1895), 111. 
139 Land grants were also given to states to build canals, improve rivers, and other forms of infrastructure 
that could improve life for residents living on and isolated frontier.  Paul Wallace Gates, Fifty Million 
Acres: Conflicts Over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 4. 
140 The Oto and Missouri, Delaware, Shawnee, Iowa, Sauk and Fox, Miami, Kaskaskia, Wyandot, and 
Kickapoo entered into large cession treaties.  The Potawatomi were not included in this series of treaties. 
141 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:617,623, 630, 633, 635, 646. 
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Throughout the 1850s the federal government began developing a plan to make 
assimilation the next stage of its ever-evolving Indian policy.  Negotiating allotment 
treaties with the removed tribes now residing on the central plains was part of that plan 
and would result in mass “surplus” acreage.  Railroad promoters realized that with a little 
pressure they could acquire significant tracts of these surplus Indian lands.  They could 
also exploit the natural resources on those acres, like timber and minerals, for their own 
benefit and profit, or they could sell the land at a higher price to settlers once the track 
was complete.142   
By 1861 a planned route for a rail line through Kansas was in place and a few 
tribes, including the Potawatomi, entered into new agreements that gave permission for 
select railroad companies to purchase large quantities of unallotted tribal land.143  The 
details of the treaties varied slightly (the particulars of the Potawatomi agreement are 
explored in the next chapter), but all of them guaranteed the railroad received far more 
land than required to build the track.  Each agreement provided that the railroads could 
use the acreage and take resources from the reservation necessary to complete 
construction.  Since the expansion of the American economy and society was the 
underlying goal of the treaty, the government stipulated that the railroad companies were 
required to open the unused acres for sale to non-Indian settlers.  While the railroad 
system worked to physically bind the Union together, other issues were creating a schism 
that nearly tore the country apart. 
In the years before the Civil War, the national crisis over the expansion of slavery 
into the West raged in Kansas and produced incredibly bloody fights.  In 1854 the 
                                                 
142 H. Craig Miner and William Unrau, The End of Indian Kansas: A Study in Cultural Revolution, 1854-
1871 (University Press of Kansas, 1990), 26. 
143 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:803–807, 824–828, 835–839.  The Delaware, 
Potawatomi, and Kickapoo all entered into treaties with railroad clauses. 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act organized the central plains into two territories and effectively 
repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820.  The act admitted Nebraska as a free 
territory and Kansas as a territory “with or without slavery, as their Constitution may 
prescribe at the time of their admission.”144  Applying popular sovereignty to the question 
of slavery made the new Kansas Territory the battleground for violent confrontations 
between anti-slavery free-staters and pro-slavery settlers.  Members of each ideological 
faction moved to the territory in an attempt to ensure that the opposition did not gain the 
upper hand.  The series of skirmishes that occurred between supporters of each cause 
over the next five years were so violent the conflicts became known as Bleeding 
Kansas.145     
There were several instances of fighting in eastern Kansas, especially in the east 
central region of the territory where the Potawatomi resided until 1846.  In May of 1856, 
John Brown and a small militia of anti-slavery supporters who called themselves the 
Pottawatomie Rifles, attacked a pro-slavery settlement north of Pottawatomie Creek, 
killing five settlers.  The attack became known as the Pottawatomie Massacre gaining its 
moniker from its location.146  A few months later pro-slavery militia killed one of 
Brown’s sons, Frederick, during the Battle of Osawatomie, which also occurred within 
the boundaries of the previous Potawatomi reserve and was less than eighty miles from 
where the Potawatomi lived at the time.147  When war officially broke out in 1861, many 
                                                 
144 An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, 1854. 
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of the tribes in Kansas including the Potawatomi officially remained neutral; but at least 
seventy-one Potawatomi men chose to take up arms with the Union.  Many of those who 
enlisted died on the battlefield, in hospitals, or in southern prisons.148
 
  
The Potawatomi were superior warriors who engaged in battles with neighboring 
tribes long before the arrival of Europeans and forged military alliances with and against 
colonial powers after, so they were not strangers to war and violence.  The fighting of 
Bleeding Kansas and the Civil War, however, was different for the Potawatomi than all 
of the wars in their past.  They were no longer in their ancestral lands fighting for their 
homes and way of life.  The Indian agent confined them to the reservation.  The fighting 
and violence was happening all around them, and there was little they could do about it, 
except to take up arms.  The Potawatomi who chose to do so supported the Union.   
The Potawatomi signed their allotment and citizenship treaty in November of 
1861, seven months after the official declaration of war and eleven months after the 
admission of Kansas as a free state.  The pre-treaty negotiations and discussions between 
the OIA, other government officials, and the Potawatomi regarding the allotment of the 
reservation took place in a year filled with unprecedented national violence and turmoil, 
as well as the transition of Kansas’ territorial government to a state one.  These critical 
experiences and the threat of further violence or removal secured Potawatomi support of 
the Union over the Confederacy.  It was safer to side with a government with whom they 
had negotiated than with one they had not.  It also shaped the Potawatomi response to 
pressure from the OIA to enter into an allotment and citizenship treaty. 
                                                 
148 RCIA, 1865, 376.  Citizen Potawatomi known to have fought in the Civil War include Richard 
Bertrand, Francis Bergeron, Joseph Bourassa, Theodore Bourassa, Wesley Lewis, Francis Lafromboise, 
Mitchell Lafromboise, Alexander Rodd, Pe-Nosh, Wah We Ah Kmuk, and George B. Vanarsdale.  Civil 
War Collection, Citizen Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center Archives, Shawnee, OK. 
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Both the creation of the transcontinental railroad and the outbreak of the Civil 
War impacted the lives of almost every American, including the Potawatomi.  These 
national changes caused the termination of Kansas as “Indian Territory” in name and the 
invasion by non-Indians of a land that was supposed to be a new home for Native 
Americans removed from the East.  The majority of the West was now open to non-
Indian settlement and there was little desire to uphold the promises made to the tribes 
about their land tenure.  
FROM INDIAN TERRITORY TO STATEHOOD: LEGISLATING THE NON-INDIAN 
SETTLEMENT OF KANSAS  
“The Best Place to Get a Farm is on the line of the Kansas Pacific R’y” read the 
headline of a broadside advertising five million acres of land for sale in Kansas.  The 
poster insisted that “The climate is very mild. The Winters are short.  The Water is pure 
and good, and the Grasses are exceedingly nutrious.  Fortunes are being made in Cattle 
and Sheep raising.”149  This advertisement is a single example of a larger campaign to 
promote Kansas as a land of abundance and opportunity for potential settlers.  Praise like 
this from politicians, executives, and boosters did not reveal the fact that when Kansas 
first opened for settlement in May of 1854, not one acre of land was available for sale to 
the public because the tribes removed from the East still comprised almost the entire 
eastern third of the territory where different groups lived on land that was “reserved” for 
them.150  In the years that followed the opening of Kansas to non-Indian settlement, 
legislators and officials in the OIA passed laws and created policies that historian Paul 
Wallace Gates called “the most complex and confusing array of policies affecting the 
distribution of the public lands and the transfer to white ownership of Indian land-rights 
                                                 
149 Kansas Pacific Homesteads. Broadside, n.d. (Newberry Library). 
150 Gates, Fifty Million Acres, 3. 
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that has ever emerged in the continental United States.”151  Despite these complications, 
mass emigration to the West and a general land hunger drove almost 100,000 people to 
seek opportunity on the vast plains of Kansas territory between 1854 and 1860.   
Both incoming settlers and territorial officials felt that tribal ownership of 
millions of acres created a significant hindrance to the potential prosperity of these 
settlers, as well as an obstruction to opportunities for commercial development and 
political enfranchisement of the region.  The General Land Office, which had jurisdiction 
over lands in the public domain, and the OIA, which was responsible for tribal lands, 
oversaw land-grab policies.  Both offices significantly reduced tribal land tenure in 
Kansas by forcing large numbers of the resettled and native Indian population to move.  
In the 1850s and 1860s some portion of every tribe in the state entered into a treaty with 
the government that reduced their land tenure, either through cession or allotment. 
Arranging these treaties with tribes in the West did not occur with any regularity 
until President Franklin Pierce appointed George W. Manypenny as Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs in 1853.152  Following the increasingly popular belief that private 
landownership would move Native Americans toward civilization, Commissioner 
Manypenny arranged a series of treaties with the tribes in Kansas to take land allotments 
and sell off the “surplus” acreage.  The legal foundation for land cessions in Kansas came 
from a provision added to an appropriations bill passed in 1853.  It authorized the 
president to negotiate treaties with tribes in the unorganized territories of Kansas and 
Nebraska “for the purpose of securing the assent of said tribes to the settlement of the 
citizens of the United States upon lands claimed by said Indians, and for the purpose of 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 Only eighteen treaties were negotiated with Indian tribes between 1840-1849.  Of those, only two were 
with tribes from the West, the Navaho and Utah.  Manypenny negotiated eighteen treaties in 1854 alone.  
Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties.  George Manypenny served as Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
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extinguishing the title of said Indian in whole or in part to said lands.”153  The bill gave 
no specifics about where the Indians would go if they did agree to a treaty for all of their 
lands, but the government obviously wished to secure the option to remove them if it 
chose to do so in the future.  Clearly, the important issue was to secure land for the 
settlement of Americans, not Native Americans.  What to do with the Native Americans 
moved to Kansas within the last three decades was a secondary issue.  Like most land 
negotiations with Native Americans, Commissioner Manypenny’s treaties took as much 
land from the tribes as possible.   
In 1854 and 1855 Commissioner Manypenny arranged land cession treaties with 
the Oto and Missouri, Delaware, Shawnee, Iowa, Sauk and Fox, Kaskaskia, Wyandot, 
Miami, and Kickapoo.154  All of the treaties had similar components: stipulations for 
large land cessions, a survey of the land so that the new owners could list the ceded land 
for public auction, provisions for payment for the lands, and an option for the tribes to 
take personal land allotments if they ever wanted.155  These treaties opened 
approximately thirteen million acres of surplus land for purchase by the United States.  
There was no suggestion of full-scale removal of tribes from Kansas in these documents, 
so when the lands were put on the market for settlers and land speculators they took up 
residence among the tribes.    
Commissioner Manypenny aggressively pursued these large land cessions from 
tribes soon after his appointment to prepare for the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Passed by 
                                                 
153 An Act Making Appropriations for the Current and Contingent Expenses of the Indian Department, and 
for Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian Tribes, for the Year Ending June Thirtieth, One 
Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-four, 1853, 238–239.  The bill appropriated $50,000 for these 
negotiations. 
154 The Potawatomi were not included in this round of treaties.  The Wyandot were the only tribe that also 
had a treaty provision for U.S. citizenship. 
155 Land allotments were not a requirement as part of these treaties; they were simply to arrange the cession 
of land.  The OIA did not have a policy for allotment developed at this time, but they did not want to deter 
a tribe that chose to allot their land. 
 69 
Congress in May of 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act organized the region into distinct 
territories and reduced the area of Indian Territory to a fraction of its previous acreage.156  
Settlers flooded into the new territories, some just to settle, while others had political 
motives.  As described above, the debates behind the Kansas-Nebraska Act were based 
on contentious issues like popular sovereignty and the extension of the railroads.  The 
outcome of both questions had a direct tie to Native American permanence in Kansas.  
The organization of the territories also signaled the demise of promises made to 
tribes in treaties dating from 1825 to 1846, which assured them that Kansas would be 
their home “as long as the grass grew or water run.”157  The government’s decision to 
open Kansas Territory to settlers on May 30, 1854, before many of the cession treaties 
with tribes were complete and before any of them were ratified, resulted in confusion 
about what lands were available and which areas were still in the hands of the tribe.  The 
ambiguous boundaries allowed non-Indian intrusion on Indian lands.  
A year after the Kansas-Nebraska Act, on November 3, 1855, Potawatomi Indian 
agent George Clarke reported that he could do nothing to expel hundreds of squatters 
who illegally took up residence on the Potawatomi reservation because there was no legal 
guideline for the process.158  Before the territory was organized the federal government 
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had sole jurisdiction.  Per Section Nineteen of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Indian 
reservations in Kansas were not to be “included in the territorial limits or jurisdiction of 
any State or Territory; but all such territories shall be excepted out of the boundaries, and 
constitute no part of the Territory of Kansas.”159  This clause meant that, after the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, the territory had checkerboard federal and territorial purview.  
Jurisdictional restrictions meant that the Indian agents could not call on local law 
enforcement; instead they needed the aid of the United States Army to police the 
reservations.  Violent skirmishes of Bleeding Kansas between pro-slavery and free-state 
factions kept Army personnel in the territory busy in the seven years between the 
establishment of Kansas Territory and the Civil War, so requests for troops rarely met 
with action.  In this sense, the violent expressions of tensions over slavery may have 
delayed the violent expressions of tensions surrounding Indian dispossession. 
In 1857 the Secretary of the Interior admitted that the rushed opening of Kansas 
Territory was an error and noted that, “the result has been disasterous.  Trespassed upon 
everywhere, his timber spoiled, himself threatened with personal violence, feeling unable 
to cope with the superior race that surrounded and pressed upon him, the Indian 
proprietor has become disheartened.  Many of them have abandoned their reserves, and 
still more desire to sell.”160  Despite the federal government and OIA’s knowledge that 
cession treaties and opening land to settlers was usually destructive to the lives of Native 
Americans, they still arranged a similar treaty with the Potawatomi four years later. 
After seven years as a territory, Kansas was admitted as a state in January of 
1861.  The only stated criterion for admission to the Union at that time was a population 
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large enough to allow a delegate to the House of Representatives.  In 1860 Kansas’ 
population was approximately 107,000.  Over the next ten years it grew 240 percent to 
364,339.161  A great majority of this population emigrated to the area because of the 
Homestead Act, passed by Congress in May of 1862.  The Homestead Act opened federal 
lands in the West, for little or no cost, to applicants who met a few basic requirements, 
including:  they had to swear that they never took up arms against the United States, they 
had to be 21 years of age or the head of a household (included newly freed slaves and 
women), and they had to reside on the plot for five years and improve the land in some 
way.162  Though Kansas was dissolved as an Indian Territory in name, in 1854, it was 
still a place with a significant ratio of Indian to non-Indian residents until overwhelming 
numbers of settlers were enticed to move to the state as a result of the Homestead Act.  
Following that the Native American population was considerably outnumbered. 
Though the intention is not clear, Congress did not permit for large areas of land 
in Kansas to be disposed of by the conditions of public land policies, like the Homestead 
Act.  Reservation lands in the eastern part of the state were never part of the public 
domain, so they were, therefore, not subject to policies related to preemption and 
homesteading.  Per the 1854 treaties with individual tribes, unallotted Indian lands were 
supposed to transfer to the United States to be held in trust.  Under special clauses written 
into a few treaties, like the one with the Potawatomi, land was frequently transferred 
directly to individuals or companies (like the railroads) rather than the United States.163 
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163 Paul Wallace Gates, “A Fragment of Kansas Land History: The Disposal of the Christian Indian Tract,” 
Kansas Historical Quarterly 6, no. 3 (August 1937): 227. 
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Congress never created a uniform policy for the disposition of Indian lands in 
Kansas.  Some settlers purchased tracts directly from the federal government, railroad 
companies purchased other parcels from tribes and then sold to settlers, and many 
acquired their plots through the Homestead Act.  The diffused process allowed 
speculators and settlers to gain possession of these tracts with greater ease than they 
would if there were a single policy with strict guidelines in place. 
COMPLICATING THE CONCEPT OF INDIANS AS LANDOWNERS AND CITIZENS   
Transferring land from the possession of tribes and individual Native Americans 
to non-Indians was only one element in the federal government’s answer to the “Indian 
question.”  Assimilation, as a professed goal for Native Americans, was very new in the 
1860s and not yet developed into a full-scale Indian policy.  Private landownership or 
U.S. citizenship were the two methods of assimilation eventually imposed on almost all 
Native Americans by the end of the nineteenth century, but when the Citizen Potawatomi 
entered into a treaty that included clauses for both conditions there was almost no 
precedent.164  It is important to take a step back from the specifics of one tribe’s 
experience to first consider the audacity and short-sightedness of applying private 
landownership and U.S. citizenship to a native group in the midst of dynamic events of 
the mid-nineteenth century that often worked in direct opposition to the professed goals 
of the policy.  
The intentions of the federal government are well-represented in a report from 
Secretary of the Interior, Jacob Thompson, in 1857.  In the report he lamented that Native 
Americans had reached a critical point in their history because, despite removal, the 
“westward march of emigration” had overtaken them and was starting to put pressure on 
                                                 
164 The application and outcomes distinct to the Citizen Potawatomi treaty of 1861 will be examined in the 
following chapter.   
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the removed Indians.  He conceded that removing all of the Indians further west was 
“impracticable” because the country around the Rocky Mountains and in the Southwest 
did not have enough resources to support all of them.  Instead, he professed, the Indians 
in Kansas had to “make a stand and struggle for existence, or his doom is sealed.”  
Thompson’s proposed method for Indian survival was Jeffersonian in nature – they had 
to assimilate.165  He reported that “if he [the Indian] cannot adopt the habits, and rise to 
the level of his white neighbor, he must pass away.”  There were no further suggestions 
about how the Native Americans in Kansas should go about doing this, but the Secretary 
did warn that “the necessity of devising some policy which shall meet the emergency 
presses itself upon the government at this time with peculiar force.”166  Like Jefferson’s 
ideas, the goal of assimilation was cast as a noble one because it could save a “dying 
race.”  The process proved to be difficult to administer, however, and usually unwelcome 
in practice.   
The first step the federal government took to assimilate the Native Americans of 
Kansas was to break up the reservations by pushing for allotment of private plots.  The 
notion of Indians as private landowners was not new in the 1850s and 1860s.167  
Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the federal government 
included special clauses for private plots of land, usually for prominent village leaders, 
when they drafted treaties calling for large land cessions east of the Mississippi River.  
Treaty negotiators used cession agreements with special conditions for leaders to make, 
or keep, peace between settlers and Native American communities before removal 
                                                 
165 Thomas Jefferson regarded Native Americans as physiologically equal to white people and called for 
their assimilation into white society.  For more on Jefferson’s Indian policy see Wallace, Jefferson and the 
Indians. 
166 J. Thompson, "Report of the Secretary of the Interior," December 3, 1857, Sen. Exec. Docs., 35 Cong., 
1 Sess., Vol. 2, Doc. 11, pp. 63. 
167 By 1871, when Congress ceased making treaties with tribes, approximately seventy treaties included 
provisions for allotment of land to individual Indians.  Fixico, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 89. 
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became a common Indian policy.  An earlier generation of government officials hoped 
that the village leaders who gained private allotments would make the cession agreements 
and convince members of their community to honor the terms of the agreement by 
abandoning the land.  Dozens of individual Potawatomi were included in such 
arrangements in treaties throughout the nineteenth century.168   
There was growing support for a more extensive policy of allotment at high levels 
in the federal government by the mid-1800s.  In the first decades of the nineteenth 
century Secretary of War William Crawford, President James Monroe, and Secretary of 
War James C. Calhoun all voiced support for the practice.169  By the late nineteenth 
century, government officials working in Indian affairs professed that allotment preceded 
assimilation into American society, which was the penultimate answer to the “Indian 
Question.”170  Many western settlers were also in favor of granting Indians U.S. 
citizenship because the nullification of “wardship” status meant less government 
involvement in their states and territories.171  
Not surprisingly, the federal government’s reasons for supporting allotment were 
not altruistic.  They hoped to assimilate Native Americans into mainstream Euro-
American society by stripping them of collectively owned land, discouraging engagement 
                                                 
168 A significant difference between these early allotment agreements and the conditions of allotment in the 
Potawatomi treaty of 1861is the exclusion of fee simple agreements.  They did not own their land with 
titles like non-Indians. 
169 Fixico, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 87. 
170 Elwell Stephen Otis, The Indian Question (Sheldon and Company, 1878).  In his book Otis, a 
Lieutenant Colonel, argued that the benevolent policies the U.S. government had in place for Native 
American tribes was actually more destructive than productive because it bred dependence.  He wanted the 
Office of Indian Affairs moved back to the War Department.  In response to Otis’ work former 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny wrote Our Indian Wards.  In it he argued that the 
Indians of North America were forced to fight American settlers because they were being forced out of 
their homelands.  Rather than a military response, he supported the OIA should retain control and that 
Native Americans should have access to the U.S. legal system.  George Washington Manypenny, Our 
Indian Wards (R. Clarke, 1880).  
171 Hoxie, A Final Promise, 211–214. 
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in traditional subsistence and economic practices, and urging them to engage in Euro-
American cultural institutions like Christianity and subsistence through farming.172  By 
making Native Americans self-supporting citizens the government hoped they could end 
annuities and aid programs, solving the problem of Indian dependence permanently.  
Opening surplus lands for the booming railroad industry and thousands of non-Indian 
settlers was another reason federal officials targeted the Potawatomi and other tribes in 
Kansas for allotment. 
United States citizenship was another method of assimilation placed upon the 
Potawatomi and other tribes in Kansas during this period.  Citizenship was a 
controversial political topic in the nineteenth century.  The decades after the Civil War 
saw increased challenges to define the obligations and rights of U.S. citizenship and to 
extend those privileges to millions of individuals living in America.  Freed slaves, 
immigrants, and women all increasingly challenged the status quo of exclusive 
democratic participation in America during this period, and so did Native Americans.  
United States citizenship was suggested as one of the necessary milestones on the path to 
full assimilation for Native Americans, but no details about how they were to become 
citizens emerged.  Even those who supported the policy had reservation.  In his 1864 
report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole, commented on application of 
U.S. citizenship to the Citizen Potawatomi by warning that “unless the strictest scrutiny 
of the qualifications of applicants is made by the courts, very many who are unqualified 
for so radical a change in their political relations may, through the influence of designing 
                                                 
172 For more on the Native American response to allotment see Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family.  
Government officials did seek the guidance and opinions of academics like ethnologists John Wesley 
Powell and Alice Fletcher, who both supported assimilation as a policy and allotment as an acceptable 
means to assimilation.  Hoxie, A Final Promise, 20–29. 
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whites, be induced to take upon themselves the duties of citizenship, and in the end be 
found wholly incompetent to discharge the same.”173  
Several historical monographs, including Frederick Hoxie’s A Final Promise and 
Kim Cary Warren’s The Quest for Citizenship, provide well-researched and thoughtful 
assessments of the path to citizenship for Native Americans, but these works (and most of 
the existing scholarship) examine the issue after the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, 
when a significant percentage of Native Americans were, or would soon become, 
citizens.174  The Citizen Potawatomi and other tribes in Kansas lived through the 
uncertainties of U.S. citizenship for Native Americans for more than two decades before 
the Dawes Act. 
In 1868 Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, giving the federal 
government responsibility for guaranteeing equal rights under the law to all Americans.  
The amendment defined national citizenship for first time as extending to “all persons 
born or naturalized in the U.S.,” but it specifically excluded “Indians not taxed.”175  The 
language used to exclude Indians from this new amendment is evidence that the federal 
government did not know how to approach U.S. citizenship for Native American.  They 
could not exclude all Indians because they had entered into treaties with several tribes 
that included citizenship clauses, which specifically stated that their property would be 
“subject to levy, taxation, and sale, in like manner with the property of other citizens.”176  
Also, the future of Indian policy was moving toward allotment and eventual citizenship 
for all Native Americans.   
                                                 
173 Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs. Commissioner William P. Dole to Secretary of the 
Interior J.P Usher, 1864, 35. 
174 Hoxie, A Final Promise and Kim Cary Warren, The Quest for Citizenship: African American and 
Native American Education in Kansas, 1880-1935 (University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
175 U.S. Constitution, amend. 14, sec. 1 and 2. 
176 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:825. 
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A proposed benefit of U.S. citizenship for Native Americans was the forced 
abandonment of their tribal citizenship, which would theoretically distance them from 
their tribal identity and move them along the path to assimilation.  As U.S. citizens, 
Indians would fall under the purview of federal and territorial laws, holding them to a 
common standard with non-Indians and extending to the individual Indian the protection 
of the courts.  The dissolution of tribes was achieved with greater ease in theory than in 
practice.   
One of the problems was that the allotment and citizenship treaties did not negate 
previous treaties, so the OIA still had to deal with tribes as distinct groups with prior 
treaty agreements unique to each tribe.  There were decades of legal gray areas for most 
Native Americans.177  Like the freed slaves who became American citizens in 1868 under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a combination of policy and prejudice prohibited most 
Native Americans from full participation in American democracy, even if they were 
technically U.S. citizens.  For example, some nineteenth-century legislators and 
reformers did not believe that allottees should have full control of their land like other 
U.S. citizens.  Opponents contended that Native Americans were not responsible enough 
to own land privately or to properly exploit or capitalize the natural resources of the 
region.178  In 1860, Superintendent A.M. Robinson wrote to Commissioner Mix that 
allotment treaties should be made with the Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Omaha, and other 
tribes because the land would “remain an uncultivated waste so long as held by the 
Indians, depriving the Territory of all the benefits which would result from their 
                                                 
177 To further complicate matters, until the Standing Bear v. Crook case from 1879 Native Americans had 
no rights associated with the writ of habeas corpus and were not “persons within the means of the law.”  
United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Federal Cases, 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891). 
178 Miner and Unrau, The End of Indian Kansas, 25–53.   
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settlement and cultivation.”179 Lawmakers agreed that further desolation was plausible if 
they gave allottees too much freedom; thus, in almost all cases patents were not given at 
the instance of allotment.  The Potawatomi treaty of 1861 stipulated that only the 
President of the United States could convey fee-simple titles when he was satisfied that 
male adults who were heads of families were “sufficiently intelligent and prudent to 
control their affairs and interests.”180  
Treaty drafters rationalized including stipulations for delayed titles because it 
would safeguard Native Americans from their bad judgment as well as opportunistic non-
Indian settlers and traders.  Even with the restriction of fee-titles to those approved by the 
President, many of the Potawatomi and other native allottees were dispossessed of their 
land within a decade.  The OIA learned a lesson from the rapid land loss of the Citizen 
Potawatomi, so when Congress created the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 they 
decided that the government would hold the patents to allotted lands in trust for a period 
of at least twenty-five years.181  The trust period was meant to ensure that Native 
Americans had an opportunity to get established as landowners before they could sell or 
transfer their land to another person. 
In his 1870 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Potawatomi Agent Joel 
H. Morris claimed that the Citizen Potawatomi were “free to enjoy all the rights and 
immunities accorded to other citizens of the United States.”182  This statement was 
wholly untrue for the Citizen Potawatomi and all of the other Native Americans who 
entered into treaty agreements with citizenship clauses.  Despite their newly acquired 
title, members of the Citizen Potawatomi, for example, were not fully enfranchised 
                                                 
179 RCIA, 1860, 80-81. 
180 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:824–825. 
181 An Act to Provide for Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations, 1887. 
182 RCIA, 1870, 275. 
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citizens of the United States or the state of Kansas.  They became American citizens who 
bore the burdens of that classification, such as taxation, without enjoying the protections 
or privileges of citizenship.  To exacerbate the situation, they were Indians who were 
often denied the rights and assistance granted to other Indian tribes.  In many ways the 
band had de jure rather than de facto citizenship.  Official government communications 
even referred to them as “quasi-citizen.”183   
CONCLUSION  
By 1880 the Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz, clearly adopted assimilation as 
his primary goal for Indian policy under his tenure.  He wrote that assimilation was “the 
most essential step in the solution of the Indian problem.  It will inspire the Indians with 
the feeling of assurance as to the permanency of their ownership of the lands they occupy 
and cultivate; it will give them a clear and legal standing as landed proprietors in the 
courts of law; it will secure to them for the first time fixed homes under the protection of 
the same law under which white men own theirs.”184  Secretary Schurz’s wrote those 
words almost twenty years after the government’s first concerted effort to assimilate the 
Potawatomi and other Native Americans in Kansas.  Unfortunately, the Potawatomi did 
not reap any of the promised benefits of the assimilation policies of allotment or U.S. 
citizenship.   
 
                                                 
183 Department of the Interior, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, in response to resolution of 
February 14, 1891, information relative to instructions touching allotments of land on the Pottawatomie 
Reservation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891) 10.  Frederick Hoxie notes that, 
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184 Fixico, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 87. 
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Chapter 3:  The Genesis of the Citizen Potawatomi:  
The Treaty of 1861 and its Aftermath  
 
On November 15, 1861, eight designated “chiefs” and more than seventy other 
men and women of the Potawatomi Nation met with federal agents to sign a treaty that 
would forever alter their community’s relationship with the U.S. government and their 
fellow Potawatomi.
185
  The 1861 treaty stipulated that tribal members decide whether 
they were among the “numbers of those desiring lands in severalty” or part of the faction 
who wished to continue holding their lands in common.  The treaty promised that the 
allottees would have private plots that were “set apart for the perpetual and exclusive use 
and benefit of such assignees and their heirs,” but to have that privilege they must “cease 
to be members of said tribe, and shall become citizens of the United States; and thereafter 
the lands so patented to them shall be subject to levy, taxation, and sale, in the like 
manner with the property of other citizens.”186  Those who chose allotment and U.S. 
citizenship became the Citizen Band of the Potawatomi Nation. 
                                                 
185 The word “chief” appears in the treaty next to the names Shaw-guee, We-we-say, Jos. Lafromboise, 
Mu-zhe, Mkome-da, Pauce-je-yah, Wah-sah-to, and Shaw-we (spelling from treaty).  A chief was a 
designation applied by the government officials conducting the treaty negotiations.  It indicated that the 
men listed were to receive the largest land allotments allowed; it does not necessarily indicate an equivalent 
status within their own community.   
In 1846 the Potawatomi from Council Bluffs and the Osage River signed a treaty in which it was stated that 
they would become the “Pottowautomie Nation.”  I will use that term when referencing the Potawatomi on 
the Kansas River reservation as a whole. 
The treaty was ratified on April 15, 1862, five months after it was signed. 
186 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:824–825. Seventy-seven tribal members made their mark 
and nine members signed their name to the treaty, including men from prominent families with mixed 
Indian and European heritage, such as the Lafromboise, Burnett, Beaubien, Ogee, Bertrand, and Bourassa.  
The name “Citizen Band” did not come into prominent use until after the 1861 treaty was signed, granting 
them eventual U.S. citizenship.  They continued to be called the Mission Band or sometimes the 
Sectionized Band  in official correspondence.  For the sake of clarity the name Mission Band will be used if 
referring to a time before the treaty and Citizen Band will be used for commentary on events after the 
treaty.  
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In 1861 there were 2,170 Potawatomi living on the 576,000 acre reservation in 
Kansas, most had endured two or more removals in the previous thirty years.
187
  Of this 
number 1,400 ultimately chose to take land allotments and the rest chose to continue 
holding their land communally on a reservation reduced to eleven square miles.
188
  The 
two years following the signing of the treaty seemed to unfold as the government hoped.  
Many individuals made efforts to claim their allotments and advance toward citizenship, 
including improving their land by building houses and tilling new fields.  Agent Ross 
reported in September 1862 that “within the last nine months there has been erected on 
the reservation, by individual members of the tribe, between sixty and eighty log 
dwelling-houses, and hundreds of acres have been reclaimed from their native state and 
made to teem with the products of the husbandman.”  By the end of the year there were 
roughly two thousand acres under cultivation.
189
 
The government’s proclaimed goal for allotment was the assimilation of Native 
Americans into American society, but there was little doubt from everyone involved that 
the OIA’s ulterior motive was to drastically reduce the land base of tribes in the West.190  
                                                 
187 Ibid. 
188 Gary Mitchell, Stories of the Potawatomi People from the Early Days to Modern Times (Shawnee, OK: 
privately printed, 1996) 39-40.  The vast majority of the Potawatomi who signed the treaty of 1861 were of 
the band who had resided at the Osage River Reservation, but some Council Bluffs Potawatomi signed and 
became Citizen Potawatomi, including Joseph Lafromboise, Pierre LeClaire, and Madore Beaubien.  James 
A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965, 
(University Of Iowa Press, 1998), 352.  The size of the Prairie Potawatomi’s diminished reservation was 
calculated for 680 band members, 200 of which were recognized as living in Wisconsin at the time.  
189 RCIA, 1862, 119.  To attain citizenship band members had to get the recommendation of their Indian 
agent, so taking their allotments and making efforts to establish a successful farm or business was central to 
proving that they were ready for the responsibility of self-sufficiency. 
190 Edmund Jefferson Danziger, Great Lakes Indian Accommodation and Resistance During the Early 
Reservation Years, 1850-1900 (University of Michigan Press, 2009).  Danziger’s work examines how 
Great Lakes tribes worked against the federal government’s assimilation efforts.  In 1854-1855 
Commissioner George W. Manypenny negotiated cession treaties with the Delaware, Shawnee, Iowa, Sauk 
& Fox, Kickapoo, Miami, Wyandot, and Odawa in Kansas for a total of more than thirteen million acres. 
Clifton, The Prairie People, 349.  Kappler, 614-618, 618-626, 628-631, 631-633, 634-636, 641-646, 677-
681, 725-731. Of these treaties, a stipulation for U.S. citizenship was only included in the treaty with the 
Wyandot.  
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It was not apparent until months, or even years later that, while they succeeded at 
dispossessing tribal members, flaws and weaknesses in the treaty would make the 
government’s plan to make landowners and citizens out of the Potawatomi a failure.  
Specifically, the deficient planning for rapidly turning hundreds of Native Americans in 
one region into successful farmers, the OIA’s failure to ensure the order of events 
presented in the treaty were followed, and inadequate consideration of what U.S. 
citizenship for Native Americans entailed.  To aggravate the challenging conditions the 
Citizen Potawatomi faced in the 1860s (both before and after the treaty), the rapidly 
changing political and social environment of Kansas, and increasing demands for their 
land soon pushed the band’s existence in the state to a tipping point.  As the central plains 
became entangled in the chaotic web of nineteenth-century American history, so too did 
the Potawatomi.   
A ROAD NOT WANTED 
In 1861, the OIA told the Potawatomi Nation they could take allotments and 
accept U.S. citizenship, or they could sell all of their lands to the railroads and move 
again.  OIA officials urged, and even threatened, to allot the land for years, so the 
government’s insistence on a new treaty met with varying degrees of willingness by the 
Potawatomi on the reservation in northeast Kansas.  Some Potawatomi welcomed the 
notion of private land ownership and the legal restrictions titles would place on emigrants 
and squatters who encroached on their property.  A handful of tribal members ran 
successful businesses and carried out significant improvements to their homes and fields 
in their fifteen years on the reservation.  Louis Vieux quickly prospered as a successful 
farmer and part owner of a mill once the tribe removed to the Kansas River reservation.  
He established a home on the banks of the Vermillion River, which intersected the famed 
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Oregon Trail, and made a comfortable living providing services for emigrants throughout 
the 1850s and 1860s.  He ran a toll bridge over the river, sold supplies, like grain and 
fresh horses, to the travelers, and purchased items they decided not to carry with them on 
their journey.
191
  Many of the entrepreneurial individuals like Louis Vieux appreciated 
what they believed allotments and citizenship could provide them – permanence and 
protection.  Others on the reservation did not want to further engage in negotiations with 
the U.S. government.  They wanted to be left alone and see past agreements made with 
the federal government honored.  Therein lay the central tension between Indian peoples 
and U.S. Indian policies that would persist into the twentieth century. 
Regardless of what the Potawatomi wanted at the time, all of the Potawatomi 
were subject to the will and whim of the OIA.  Allotment and citizenship were not 
without strings.  They were part of a larger “Indian policy” that was consistently 
evolving.  Assimilation was the ultimate goal of the larger policy – a concept that was 
vague enough to be used as a weapon against any tribe found wanting.
192
  Essentially, no 
Indian, in favor of allotments or against, knew whether their acceptance of the 
government’s wishes would save them from further removal. 
Just as it had in Iowa years earlier, Kansas statehood loomed, making government 
officials and non-Indian residents tired of failed negotiations with the Potawatomi and the 
lumbering bureaucracy of Indian policy.
193
  They wanted Potawatomi lands made 
                                                 
191 William Smith, “The Oregon Trail Through Pottawatomie County,” Collections of the Kansas State 
Historical Society XVII (1928 1926): 19–21. 
192 Many academics have written about the methods the federal government used to assault tribalism. For 
examples, see David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School 
Experience 1875-1928 (University Press of Kansas, 1997; Brenda J. Child, Boarding School Seasons: 
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Assault on Indian Tribalism: The General Allotment Law (Krieger Publishing Company, 1986).  
193 The Potawatomi’s expulsion from Iowa after statehood was discussed in chapter 1. 
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available for settlement by non-Indians and sale to the railroads as quickly as possible.  
The OIA knew from their correspondence with the Potawatomi’s Indian agents, and some 
tribal members, that the majority of the Mission Band was open to the idea of taking land 
allotments and that most of the Prairie Band would not sit down to discussions.   
The Prairie Band reacted to government pressure by rejecting allotments and 
refusing to leave Kansas.  They summarily presented their resistance to negotiations in a 
statement by one of their tribal chiefs, Shawguee, who informed the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, William P. Dole, that “I was once the undisputed owner of that vast 
region, which lies around the lakes and between the great rivers; I ceded them to thee for 
this paltry reservation in the barren west.  I gave to thee Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Indiana, and thou grudgest me this little spot, on which I am allowed to rest and labor!”  
He insisted that “[t]he President told me, when he assigned me this reservation.  I 
remember it well, he told me that this land should be my last and permanent home.  What 
business had he to tell me to change my abode?  This place is mine: I can leave it or keep 
it as I please.”194   
The tone and language used by Shawguee will sound familiar to those with any 
sort of familiarity with Native American history.  It has a dramatic flair that readers 
expect from great Native American orators.  Undoubtedly, the interpretation and personal 
style of the non-Native scribes altered Shawguee’s words to some degree, however, the 
statement did translate the sentiment the tribal elder hoped to convey and provides insight 
into the tribal elder’s frustrations.   He was tired of the federal government controlling his 
life, he wanted to stay settled in his current home, and he was not willing to talk about a 
                                                 
194 Joseph F. Murphy, Potawatomi of the West: Origins of the Citizen Band (University of Michigan 
Library, 1988) 256-257, as quoted in the Woodstock Letters, loc., 75- 78.  
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new agreement.  Shawguee undoubtedly knew that refusal to negotiate was a risk, but it 
was one he and his followers were willing to take.   
A close reading of the statement, along with hindsight, provides a secondary 
meaning to the President’s words about the Potawatomi people that Shawguee could not 
have understood.  Federal official and individuals involved in Indian affairs in the 
nineteenth century often commented that Native Americans who could not assimilate and 
generally adapt to living alongside non-Indians were doomed to “disappear before the 
tide of civilization.”195  So when the President told Shawguee that Kansas would be his 
“last and permanent home” he could have been promising to never make him move, or 
anticipating the Potawatomi’s inability to adapt.  Regardless of what exactly the President 
meant by his statement, at this point in history the future for the Potawatomi and other 
tribes in Kansas was vulnerable.   
Passionate speeches similar to Shawguee’s, as well as words inspired by anger 
and fear filled letters from Potawatomi of both bands that flooded into the OIA in the 
years and months before the 1861 treaty.  Father Joseph Murphy, a priest of the Order of 
Saint Benedict, suggests in his 1988 history of the Potawatomi that tribal elders became 
so active and eloquent in their orations and letters to the government in the months 
leading up to the treaty because they realized that the tide was turning toward allotment 
and they were trying to salvage something of past treaty obligations to the tribe.
196
  This 
is very likely true; but, one could argue that, after being dismissed or ignored for years, 
                                                 
195 Agent Clarke, 1855, Office of Indian Affairs-Letters Received [hereafter cited as OIA-LR], roll 680.  
Edward S. Curtis, The North American Indian: The Complete Portfolios (Taschen, 1997).  Edward S. 
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the Potawatomi realized they finally had the ear of the United States government and they 
were not going to go quietly down the path to a new Indian policy.   
The Potawatomi understood that if they remained at the Kansas River reservation 
it was possible, or even probable they would face destitution and dispossession again.  
They saw the wagon trains of travelers and settlers pass through their land, and they 
heard traders, emigrants, and Indian agents’ talk of a railroad crossing through their 
home.  The records indicate that in the months before the treaty both bands felt 
increasingly insecure as a result of the government’s threats to make them move again if 
they did not take allotments.  The federal government admitted Kansas to statehood in 
January of 1861 and the Potawatomi who years earlier were forced out of Council Bluffs 
to prepare for Iowa’s statehood remembered that the pressure to remove the Indian 
population grew as the number of white settlers increased.  The message conveyed by 
Indian agents and missionaries in the years just before the 1861 treaty offers another 
explanation as to why the Mission Band chose to sign.  
Some messages were dismal in their predictions for the Potawatomi.  Father 
Schultz, a Jesuit from St. Mary’s wrote in 1859 that there was nothing promising in the 
Potawatomi’s future.  He believed they were destined to be pushed west, where the Sioux 
and the Arapaho would annihilate them, or stay where they were and be reduced to 
begging because of the negative influence of whites.
197
  Not all predictions for the 
Potawatomi were so hopeless.  Many professed that with more assimilation to American 
society the Potawatomi could survive among the white settlers entering the territory.    
Missionaries and the Potawatomi’s Indian agents occasionally mentioned the 
possibility of a new policy of allotment and land ownership in their early years on the 
                                                 
197 Schultz to Beckz, March 1, 1859.  Quoted  in Garraghan, The Jesuits of the Middle United States, 1938, 
680. 
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Kansas reservation.
198
  In the 1840s and 1850s the idea of Indians as private landowners 
was still underdeveloped and most of the reservations had minimal staff.  As a result 
there was correspondence between agents in the field and officials in Washington for 
years before any action was taken.   The OIA wanted to enact the privatization of land 
with a tribal community that felt prepared for the responsibility.  In 1855, the year after 
Kansas organized as a territory and two years after Congress formulated a plan for an 
Indian Territory, the Indian agent for the Potawatomi, who was a strong supporter of 
allotment, began to plead with them in earnest to actively support the allotment of land to 
the tribe.  In that year Potawatomi agent George W. Clarke expressed, in the most explicit 
terms, his hope that the OIA would finally enact allotment when he reported that “their 
only salvation is in a treaty, by which their lands will be run out, sectionized, and each 
individual assigned his own tract.”199  Though favor for an allotment policy was growing 
within the federal government, the OIA did not act on Clarke’s suggestion immediately.   
Dr. Johnston Lykins, a Baptist missionary, suggested that allotment was the only 
means of preventing serious violence and difficulties between the Potawatomi and their 
non-Indian neighbors.  He optimistically insisted that surveyed lands with distinct 
boundaries would deter settlers from crossing them.
200
  Similarly, in 1859, Agent William 
E. Murphy wrote in his Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that “[t]heir 
preservation and permanency on their present reserve can only be effected by citizenizing 
                                                 
198 One of the first mentions of the Potawatomi possibly becoming citizens can be found in a letter from 
November of 1853 from Baptist Missionary Robert Simerwell who worked among the Potawatomi. 
199 RCIA, 1855, 97. 
200 Gilbert J. Garraghan, The Jesuits of the Middle United States, The American Press, 1938, 670.  In 1859 
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, A. M. Robinson wrote to the Commissioner that the harmony between 
the Indians of the Central Superintendency (which included Kansas Territory) was “seriously disturbed” 
and resulted in the death of several Indians and the wounding of a non-Indian.  He claimed that the violence 
was the result of the trespassing of “unprincipled white men upon the property of the Indians” and by “the 
depraved and starving Indian upon the property of the whites.” RCIA, 1859, 112.  
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them, and granting them title in fee simple to the land.”201 His sentiment was echoed by 
A.M. Robinson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs who also wrote in 1859 that 
allotment would be beneficial to “a people whose destiny for the last half century has 
been such that they could not say, to-day, where on earth their homes would be to-
morrow.”202  Whether the OIA officials made these statements out of true concern for the 
preservation of the Potawatomi or were veiled threats is unclear.
203
  What is certain is a 
majority of Potawatomi perceived their lives in Kansas as increasingly unstable. 
A letter written by a Potawatomi, Rufus H. Waterman, to Assistant Commissioner 
Mix in 1859 (the same year that Agent Murphy made the above claim) states:  
 
“…first then what is the policy of the government in regard to reserves…is it to 
sectionize and give each their quota of land?  Or, to move us again to some 
unknown region?  This question is important, as many of us have [made] 
extensive improvements, and are prepared to make much more, such as setting out 
orchards, buildings, barns, etc.  Can we be assured that we will be permitted to 
hold our farms, and not be liable to be sold out as heretofore?”204 
Clearly, the Potawatomi were concerned about the permanence of their homes in Kansas 
and remained cautious.  Kansas was not their ancestral home, but many of the 
Potawatomi did everything they could to make a comfortable existence for their families.  
They wanted to maintain tenure on the reservation, but if they could not, they needed to 
be prepared for whatever course of action the OIA presented to them. 
These circumstances forced both the Mission and Prairie Bands to make a 
decision.  The majority of the Mission Band felt that taking allotments and agreeing to 
                                                 
201 RCIA, 1859, 148. 
202 Ibid., 112. 
203 There are no records indicating that Agent Murphy was set to receive a cut of Potawatomi land once the 
surplus was sold, as there are for other OIA officials, but one cannot know whether or not such a promise 
was made to him since it was not an uncommon practice. 
204 Waterman to Mix, 26 July 1859, enclosed with Robinson to Greenwood, 3 August 1859, OIA-LR, roll 
682. 
 89 
become United States citizens would help them improve their condition or at least save 
them from the uncertainty of another removal.  These individuals lived through a 
tumultuous period in which non-Indian encroachment forced then from their homelands, 
struggled to survive in unfamiliar territory, and interacted daily with non-Indians who 
wanted nothing more than to rid them of their “Indianness.”  They were confident that 
they could be successful farmers because a large percentage of the band already practiced 
agriculture.  For years Indian agents and missionaries lauded the Mission Band for their 
degree of acculturation and assured them of their fitness to live among whites.
205
  
Essentially, the Mission Band had logical reasons to believe that the treaty could improve 
their lives.  They had limited faith that the government would follow through on treaty 
agreements, but they had a great deal of confidence in their abilities to adapt and survive 
if they knew what they were facing.  
Despite decades of interaction with distinct factions of Potawatomi, and 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, government officials still wanted to believe that 
the Potawatomi people were really the Potawatomi Nation – one people with a single 
identity who they could pressure to follow a single, uniform policy.  Even in cases in 
which the agents themselves noted a significant difference in lifestyle and culture 
between communities on the reservation, as they did with the Mission and Prairie Bands, 
they remained committed to the idea of a single treaty.  The rationalization was that the 
more “civilized” Mission Band would carry their Prairie Band kinsmen along on the road 
to assimilation.  If they did not comply the Prairie Band would simply “disappear before 
the tide of civilization.”206  Not surprisingly, the Potawatomi, who never lived as a 
                                                 
205 Murphy, 221-224. 
206 Agent Clarke, 1855, OIA-LR, roll 680.  As previously noted, the notion of Native Americans as a 
vanishing race was a common assertion at this point in history. 
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strongly unified tribe with a single leadership before the interference of government 
agents, did not respond well to persuasion or threats.
207
   
Since the eighteenth century, intratribal disagreements occurred regarding who 
had the authority to speak for others in the tribe and what they could promise.  Leaders 
were rarely willing to make any agreements that had an impact beyond their village or 
region, resulting in the Potawatomi entering into more treaties with the federal 
government than almost any other tribe.
208
  Even those who agreed that a treaty was 
necessary often disagreed about the terms, including the amount of annuities to demand 
and the boundaries of ceded lands.  It is not surprising that tension between opposing 
factions on the reservation and with the OIA reached unprecedented levels in the years 
immediately preceding the 1861 treaty.  
 Factions of Potawatomi on the reservation were pitched in wars of words and 
accusations against one another, and a few turned their scorn on Indian agent William E. 
Murphy.  Indian agents were rarely popular, because they were the representatives of the 
government in the daily lives of the Indians they served; however, the Potawatomi 
sometimes appreciated the efforts agents made on their behalf.  This did not seem to be 
the nature of the relationship between Agent Murphy and a large contingent of the 
Potawatomi in Kansas.
209
  He was in a precarious position of carrying out a largely 
                                                 
207 Several authors who have examined the history of the Potawatomi in Kansas have stressed the 
animosity between the Citizen Band and the Prairie Band.  See Clifton, The Prairie People; H. Craig Miner 
and Williams Unrau, The End of Indian Kansas: A Study in Cultural Revolution, 1854-1871 (University 
Press of Kansas, 1990); Murphy, Potawatomi of the West.  While there is a great deal of documentation of 
tension between the two groups, it is a tension that predicated by specific circumstances.  In almost every 
case members of each band were upset that the federal government was trying to force one of the groups to 
abide by the decision or agreements made by the other.   So the tension was exacerbated, and in some ways, 
created by the constant interference of the federal government.  These Potawatomi saw themselves as 
independent communities and they did not want to follow the rules of another group.    
208 Potawatomi of various villages and bands entered into at least forty-four treaties with the federal 
government between 1789 and 1867.   
209 Agent Murphy did have his supporters.  They sent a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 
1858 giving him their support, more than forty-five tribal members signed it. 
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unpopular policy, among unhappy Indians, at the direction of a Commissioner who was 
no longer willing to wait; his generally condescending opinion of Native Americans did 
not help.  Agent Murphy, other government employees, and individual Potawatomi sent 
correspondence littered with accusations and assurances of innocence to the OIA between 
1859 and 1860.  The Potawatomi accused Murphy of bringing liquor onto the reservation, 
partaking of spirits, harassing widows, wrongfully sending away their wagon maker, and 
many other charges.
210
   
Central to this factional battle was a prominent, yet controversial, figure in 
Potawatomi history, Anthony F. Navarre.  Navarre was of Potawatomi and French 
heritage, educated at the Choctaw Academy in Scott County, Kentucky along with 
several others who became key players in the tribe’s history.  In 1857, after living in Salt 
Lake City among the Mormons for years, Navarre arrived at the reservation in Kansas.  
He was very intelligent and from his earliest days on the reservation was confident in his 
abilities to serve as a representative for his tribe.  He quickly gained popularity on the 
reservation among the Prairie Band for his defiance and assurances that when the 
Mormons defeated the U.S. Army, the Indians would have all of the lands taken from 
them returned.
211
   
Agent Murphy saw Navarre as a nuisance and an obstacle to the advancement of 
the tribe.  In the summer of 1857, he imprisoned Navarre for several days for preaching 
                                                 
210 A.A. Bertrand to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 24 July 1859, OIA-LR, roll 682; G.W. Johnson to 
Honorable A.B. Greenwood, 27 July 1859, OIA-LR, roll 682.   Agent Murphy had a generally 
condescending opinion about the character and intelligence of most Indians, as did most Americans of the 
time.  Many of the Potawatomi he did think intelligent and competent, primarily of mixed-heritage, he 
found to be conniving, self-serving individuals.    
211 Clifton, The Prairie People, 367–368.  Mormon teaching asserts that at least some of the indigenous 
people of the Americas are Lamanites, one of the lost tribes of Israel.  In the nineteenth century there was 
popular fear of a Mormon-Lamanite conspiracy to insight rebellion and war against the United States.  Eric 
A. Eliason, ed., Mormons and Mormonism: An Introduction to an American World Religion (University of 
Illinois Press, 2001), 184.  
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Mormon doctrine and trying to incite rebellion.  Murphy released Navarre with the caveat 
that he leave the Kansas reservation and return to Indiana where his father lived.  He did 
not comply and his relationship with Murphy continued to deteriorate.  Murphy tried to 
convince the OIA of Navarre’s destructive influence by insisting that if he remained 
among the Mormons and never returned to Kansas the entire tribe would have agreed to 
take allotments and signed a treaty years earlier.
212
  The Prairie Band adamantly resisted 
negotiations with the government for years before Navarre’s arrival in Kansas, so 
Murphy’s assertion regarding his adversary’s influence is obviously an exaggeration.  
However, Navarre was a vocal opponent to an allotment treaty and the most 
confrontational individual on the reservation with OIA officials.  
Navarre was not just a rabble rouser.  He understood the value of political 
disobedience and seemed to firmly believe that if he could not obtain redress on an issue 
from the Indian Agent, the next logical step was to go to go over his head to deal with the 
Indian Department directly.
213
  Since his previous attempts to terminate discussions of 
allotment failed, Navarre pursued a new course of action.  In 1860, Navarre invited Lewis 
F. Thomas, an attorney, to the reservation to draft fundamental rules and bylaws for the 
Nation that would ease factional tensions.  One cannot know if Navarre’s efforts at unity 
were genuine (or another means of derailing allotment) or if they would have been 
successful, because Agent Murphy barred the attorney from completing his task and 
ordered him off the reservation.  The attorney ignored the agent’s demand to leave the 
reservation, so Mr. Murphy had Mr. Thomas arrested for intrusion and delivered to the 
court at Ft. Leavenworth.  The judge found Mr. Thomas innocent of all charges and 
                                                 
212 Agent Murphy to Superintendent Robinson, August 22, 1859, OIA-LR, roll 682. 
213 Navarre made many trips on behalf of the Potawatomi Nation and eventually moved to Washington.  
Murphy, Potawatomi of the West, 239.  
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released him with the apologies of the court.
214
  Anthony Navarre did not get the 
constitution or centralized tribal authority he sought by bringing Mr. Thomas onto the 
reservation, but he did make Agent Murphy look foolish and successfully challenged the 
agent’s authority in the process.  
Agent Murphy was not the only one who took issue with Navarre’s assertions of 
authority and obvious position of importance among the anti-allotment Prairie 
Potawatomi.  In 1860, a group of Potawatomi men wrote to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Alfred B. Greenwood, to ensure that the OIA understood that Navarre did not 
represent all Potawatomi.  They asserted that “[our] nation govern[s] themselves by the 
majority, and by custom they have a right to censure and set aside any chief for mal-
administration.  By this right they set aside Wahb-sach [Wab-sai] and Navarre” assuring 
that “this was done by a majority of chiefs and braves of our nation.”215  These tensions 
were a symptom of the unprecedented pressure felt by all parties to conform to the 
government’s expectations and submit to the policy of allotment as a harmonious group.  
Unfortunately for Agent Murphy, the challenge of unifying the Potawatomi under a 
single policy was too great. 
In April of 1861, just a few months before tribal members signed the allotment 
treaty; William W. Ross replaced Agent Murphy.  Ross served as the Potawatomi’s 
Indian Agent for the next three years.  Also in 1861, the Secretary of the Interior 
appointed William P. Dole as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  Dole and Ross were 
integral in advancing the creation of an allotment treaty with the Potawatomi.  They both 
had relationships with railroad companies and did not hesitate to push for the acceptance 
                                                 
214 Lewis F. Thomas to President Buchanan, June 28, 1860, OIA-LR, roll 682. 
215 Five Potawatomi headmen (including J. N. Bourassa) to Commissioner Greenwood, March 14, 1860, 
OIA-LR, roll 682.  The name of the Potawatomi headman Wahb-sach is spelled numerous ways, depending 
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of the railroad-friendly treaty.  To ensure the successful negotiation of a treaty, industry 
representatives promised Commissioner Dole 1,200 acres as a reward for cooperating 
with the negotiations once the federal government opened surplus lands for purchase by 
the railroad.
216
   
Despite his questionable motives, Ross came into office with what seemed to be a 
genuine enthusiasm for working for the OIA that would serve him well for the daunting 
task ahead.  One of the agent’s first communications to the OIA gave a detailed report of 
what he thought the Potawatomi needed to elevate them to the level of civilization he 
believed them capable: allotment and full protection of state courts.  Ross agreed 
wholeheartedly with the department’s notion that the Potawatomi should receive lands in 
severalty.  The Indian Department would not risk putting a person in the position if they 
were not prepared to enthusiastically support the policy.  By 1861 assimilation through 
land ownership, if not widely applied, was a popular idea among activists and politicians.  
A few of his other ideas were more liberal than previously heard from government 
officials working among the Potawatomi.   
For example, Ross argued passionately that Kansas criminal laws should extend 
to the reservation.  He was appalled that the Potawatomi, at present, resolved an injustice 
by “smok[ing] the pipe of peace,” by which matters of dispute were settled and the 
criminal went unpunished.
217
  At the time of Ross’ letter federal laws had jurisdiction on 
                                                 
216 Charles E. Mix, the Chief Clerk in the OIA was also supposed to receive 640 acres.  The notation in a 
document titled “Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western Railroad Stock contracts made for the Company by 
J.C. Stone and Thos. Ewing, Jr. agents for the company to secure the ratification of the Delaware and 
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the reservation.  Making tribal members subject to the laws of the state was a step in the 
process to full assimilation.  He also insisted that surviving wives should have their 
entitlements protected by establishing new estate laws.  Finally, he suggested that the law 
allow Indians to testify in court so that many cases, especially in instances of liquor sales 
on a reservation, could be successfully prosecuted.
218
  By the end of his tenure as an 
agent, in 1864, allotted tribal members did not have the protections of state laws or courts 
and it was clear that assimilation of Native Americans through land ownership and 
citizenship was not progressing as the OIA hoped.  Still, his enthusiasm and belief that 
applying American legal standards would benefit the Potawatomi Nation likely aided his 
efforts to get the allotment treaty signed and ratified.   
One should also consider that the treaty of 1861 was a business transaction.  In 
their account of the devices and objectives of Indian policies to remove Indians from 
Kansas, H. Craig Miner and William E. Unrau make a convincing argument that rather 
than being forced into signing the treaty, or just being too foolish to understand what they 
were signing, it was likely that the Potawatomi who chose to sign the 1861 treaty did so 
because there appeared to be real financial advantages for the tribe as the treaty was 
written.
219
  It is a valid argument that the treaty of 1861 could have allowed the Citizen 
Potawatomi to develop a strong community and possibly even flourish on the Great 
Plains. 
                                                                                                                                                 
organized as a territory or admitted as a state, but as more non-Indian settlers moved into the area a strict 
adherence to state and federal law was expected. 
218 Agent Ross to Commissioner Dole, June 21, 1861, OIA-LR, roll 683.  
219 H. Craig Miner and William E. Unrau, The End of Indian Kansas: A Study in Cultural Revolution, 
1854-1871 (University Press of Kansas, 1990). 
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A LESSON IN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A paradox of the 1861 treaty was the effect it had on the structure of the Citizen 
Band’s government.  Historians and Native Americans often critique allotment 
agreements because the acceptance of U.S. citizenship and the supremacy of U.S. laws 
came at the expense of tribal citizenship and traditional forms of governance.  On paper 
this was true for the treaty of 1861 as well, but in many ways it had the opposite effect.  
As previously noted, the Potawatomi did not have a cultural tradition of rigid hierarchy as 
a tribe.  Leadership developed at the village or regional level, centered on clans and 
religious societies.  Groups of Potawatomi met for general councils on their own, or with 
their Indian Agent, and occasionally sent a list of approved chiefs and headmen.  Even in 
these cases each village or faction could and would only speak for itself.  Instead of 
trying to achieve consensus, the government relied on appointed “government chiefs” 
who rarely had the approval or the best interest of the tribe as a whole in mind when 
signing treaties or making agreements.
220
  As the OIA’s preparation for the treaty of 1861 
advanced it became increasingly necessary for Indian agents and policymakers to have an 
organized representative body for the Potawatomi Nation with whom they could 
negotiate.    
In September of 1861, two months before members of the Potawatomi signed the 
treaty, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William P. Dole ordered Agent Ross to create an 
organization “whereby a written record of their proceedings could be kept, and the wants 
of the tribe made known” as well as to deal with the issues that arose in relation to treaty 
                                                 
220 Ibid., 81–106.; William C. Sturtevant, Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 6: Subarctic: 
Subarctic (Government Printing Office, 1978), 156; MR Peter C. Mancall and James Hart Merrell, 
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negotiations.
221
  The Potawatomi had the same notion.  The year before Commissioner 
Dole’s suggestion, in 1860, they assembled at Cross Creek and appointed a six man 
committee, Madore B. Beaubien, Anthony F. Navarre, and Joseph N. Bourassa to 
represent the Prairie Band and B.H. Bertrand, John Tipton, and Louis Vieux to represent 
the Mission Band and transact business between the Potawatomi Nation and the United 
States government.  During his tenure, from 1857 to the spring of 1861, Agent Murphy 
opposed the organization of such a committee and refused to send a recommendation for 
its approval to the Superintendent in St. Louis.  Agent Ross fell in line with the 
Commissioner’s wishes and oversaw the authorization of the committee soon after his 
appointment in April of 1861.  Ross recommended Joseph N. Bourassa as president.  
Weeks before the ratification of the treaty of 1861 Anthony Navarre resigned his position 
as a representative of the Prairie Band.
222
  The remaining five members of the new 
Business Committee met at St. Mary’s on March 26, 1862 and accepted George L. 
Young as their sixth member.
223
  All three of the men named as representatives for the 
Prairie Band eventually took allotments, so there is reasonable doubt as to whether they 
represented the genuine wishes of the non-sectionizing faction.
224
  The OIA officially 
recognized the Business Committee as an authoritative body on December 3, 1862.  The 
men were to serve two year terms. 
                                                 
221 Agent Ross to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole, 19 January 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684; Murphy, 244.  
After the bands split, the Business Committee continued to be an important and influential body within the 
tribe, particularly for the Citizen Band. 
222 Agent Ross to Commissioner Dole, March 10, 1862, OIA-LR, roll 683. James Clifton claims that 
Navarre was forced out of his position, but an explanation for why Navarre left the Business Committee 
does not exist in the OIA records. Clifton, The Prairie People, 367. 
223 George Young was not a Potawatomi tribal member by blood.  He was a white man who married 
Josette Vieux, sister of Louis Vieux, another Business Committee member.  Evidence of complaints about 
Young’s position of authority, even though he was not a Potawatomi or even an Indian, does not exist in 
the records until the 1880s. 
224 No record of protest was found in the OIA records regarding the Prairie Band’s representative 
appointments. 
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The Business Committee facilitated the delivery of community grievances.  It did 
not replace the Indian Agent in the hierarchy within the Indian Department, but a 
grievance signed by a panel of six elected officials was more difficult to ignore than the 
rant or plea of a disgruntled individual.  The Business Committee had a more sympathetic 
ear for complaints than the agent.  Most requests still filtered through the local Indian 
Agent to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in St. Louis, or in some cases, directly to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C.  The Committee, on the other 
hand, accepted grievances and was not hesitant to circumvent their agent and directly 
approach the Commissioner or the President of the United States.  As previously 
mentioned, government agents and railroad representatives had their own, often 
nefarious, agendas in supporting a business committee and allotment.  Nonetheless, with 
the organization of the Business Committee, the Potawatomi began to take on a structure 
that they never before employed.  It would be years before the Business Committee 
became organized enough to be forceful advocates for the rights of the Potawatomi of 
either band.   
ONE BECOMES TWO 
The Prairie Band’s refusal to negotiate allotments with the OIA was ultimately 
successful.  Pressure from railroad executives and settlers forced the government to move 
ahead with a treaty with the Mission Band, conceding that the Prairie Band could 
continue holding their lands in common.  The government made an agreement with the 
Prairie Band sometime between September, when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
made an unsuccessful visit to Kansas to negotiate a treaty, and the 15
th
 of November 
[1861] when the treaty was signed.
225
  Per the treaty of 1861, the OIA took a census 
                                                 
225 Murphy, 258. 
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indicating who would be on the roll of the Citizen Band and who would be part of the 
Prairie Band.
226
   
Ross conducted the census on May 17, 1862.  There were 2,259 Potawatomi 
reported on the reservation – 648 men, 588 women and 1,023 children.227  Of these, about 
1,400 chose allotment.  While the tribal members who agreed to have their land 
sectionized and allotted in severalty effectively gave up their interest in the portion of the 
reservation allotted to their kinsmen in common, and vice versa, the two groups did not 
completely sever ties.   
The tension between these two communities resulted more from U.S. government 
interference than an organic disunion.  If the two groups of Potawatomi, the Prairie Band 
and the Citizen Band (generally comprised of those removed from Council Bluffs, Iowa 
and the individuals removed from Sugar and Pottawatomie Creek in southern Kansas), 
were left in peace they likely would have cohabitated the Kansas River reservation with 
little strife.  Despite some of their social differences, the two communities shared many 
common cultural practices, traditions, and in many cases were family.  The federal 
government’s unending demands to negotiate new treaties and obtain new concessions 
and land cessions from the Potawatomi in the nineteenth century made that impossible.   
For the next several years the Citizen Band and Prairie Band encountered 
circumstances that forced them to work together, fight one another, and continually 
decide and refine what it meant to be a member of each band.  Issues of money, 
specifically how it was to be distributed and communally spent, bound the two bands 
together.  First, all Potawatomi on the reservation, allottees or not, retained a claim to the 
                                                 
226 I will henceforth refer to the Potawatomi who participated in the allotment process as the Citizen Band 
or Citizen Potawatomi.  Most of these individuals had been members of the Mission Band, but a few were 
from the Prairie Band.  
227 William Elsey Connelly, “The Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Indians” Kansas State Historical Society, 
volume 14, pg. 514.  
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proceeds from the sale of their surplus lands to the railroad.  After the OIA sold the 
property it was the responsibility of the Indian agent to use the recently concluded census 
to make an accurate allocation of the proceeds.  A second money related argument the 
OIA had to address with both bands was the long-standing debate over the payment of 
personal debts of individual tribal members from the collective funds of the Potawatomi 
Nation.  The system widely utilized by traders and Native Americans, referred to as the 
“order system,” allowed individuals to charge goods they needed or wanted from the 
traders on credit to be paid out of the next years’ collective annuity payment or tribal 
funds set aside in an “improvement fund.”228  The process had long been a point of 
contention between certain members of the tribe, the OIA, and the traders who did 
business on the reservation.  Over three hundred Potawatomi petitioned Commissioner 
Dole in 1862 to discontinue the practice of payments from the collective funds.
229
   In a 
separate letter to Commissioner Dole, Secretary of the Interior, John P. Usher, wholly 
agreed with the protests of the complaining Potawatomi and warned that continuing this 
system of trade could lead to violence between tribal members and traders.  Recognizing 
the potential for corruption, he argued that “[n]o people of their intelligence can be 
expected to submit to it.”230 
To emphasize the division of the Potawatomi Nation into two distinct factions, in 
name and in practice, Anthony Navarre wrote to Commissioner Dole asking that the OIA 
not recognize the present business committee as representing the interest of Prairie 
                                                 
228 Clifton, The Prairie People, 367. 
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Band.
231
  The Commissioner was still hoping the Prairie Band would relent and take 
allotments and understood that reconciling the two factions of Potawatomi was not likely 
to occur if one side felt wronged.  As a result, the Commissioner replied that he 
appreciated Navarre’s concerns, but appealed to him and the other Prairie Band members 
that “if you are disatisfied with the present committee, that you re-organize it instead of 
rejecting it entirely.”232  Navarre and the rest of the unsatisfied faction of the Prairie Band 
went a step further.   
In 1862 the Prairie Band created a separate business committee, though the OIA 
did not recognize it.  Abram Burnett served as chair; the remaining committee consisted 
of half a dozen headmen and almost a dozen general members, including Anthony F. 
Navarre and Wab-sai.  In their inaugural meeting the committee resolved that, in the 
future, a majority of the band would elect members of the committee, chiefs, and 
councilors, and that any questions about the tribe as a whole would be submitted to and 
voted on by the entire Prairie Band with the majority decision to be adopted.
233
  Agent 
Ross saw these men as rebellious and spoke out against them.  The OIA never recognized 
the group as legitimate.  His condemnation is not surprising since the committee’s 
proclamation noted that they took action to make a new business committee because they 
were “not able to obtain redress of our grievances from our agent.”234  Regardless of this 
division within the Potawatomi Nation and mistrust of Agent Ross by certain individuals, 
more than eighty tribal members signed the treaty of 1861 and allotments soon began. 
                                                 
231 As previously noted, an explanation for why Navarre quit the Business Committee does not exist in the 
records, but this sentiment suggests that he might have felt like the two others designated to represent the 
interests of the non-sectionizing portion of the tribe did not truly represent the wishes of that community.  
232 Commissioner Dole to Wob Sai and Others, May 8, 1862, OIA-LR, roll 683. 
233 Indian Petition to OIA, 1862, December 7, 1862, OIA, roll 683. 
234 Prairie Band Potawatomi to OIA, 1863-1864, December 3, 1862, OIA-LR, roll 683.  The letter is not 
addressed to anyone specific and the signatures of all the complaining parties are not included. 
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POLITICS IMPEDE PROCESS: DEFINING TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS 
 The two-pronged process of acculturating the Citizen Potawatomi through 
allotment and U.S. citizenship was supposed to be straightforward.  The treaty of 1861 
proposed a specific order of events meant to allow the Citizen Potawatomi to establish a 
source of income and stability before taxation began.  Unfortunately, the actual process 
of allotment was far more complicated and the order of events did not occur as stipulated 
by the treaty.  Also, the treaty was not clear on several issues, including who qualified for 
an allotment or how to handle the special circumstances that inevitably arose.  All parties 
needed to address fundamental questions, including who was considered a member of the 
tribe and who was not, as well as what rights were conferred by tribal membership.   
The proposed first step in the post-treaty process was to survey the land on the 
reservation in the same manner as public lands.  Specific acreage in the northeast corner 
of the former territory were set apart for the Prairie Band’s reduced reservation and the 
remainder was available for the Citizen Band to select as their allotment.  Then, the 
Potawatomi’s agent, William Ross, conducted a census of everyone on the reservation 
and divided them into separate lists by their decision to become allottees or move onto 
the common reservation set aside for the Prairie Band.  The individuals who wanted an 
allotment then chose the plot of land they wanted.  The number of acres they could 
receive was determined by their status within the tribe and their family (i.e. headman, 
chief, head of family, etc.).  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs was then supposed to 
issue the individual a certificate noting the location of his/her plot and stating their 
inability to claim rights to any other allotment or land on the common reservation.  
According to the treaty, the individual land was not to be taxed, levied or sold.  If the 
allottee wanted to sell the land they could only conduct the transaction with the U.S. 
government or another Potawatomi, and they had to have the permission of the President 
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of the United States.  Mechanically, the process promised to be streamlined and fair.  
Unfortunately for the Citizen Band, the reality proved to be full of exceptions and pitfalls, 
and the process of allotment was marred by battles of who qualified for allotments, 
squabbling between the allotting agent and the Potawatomi, and the disregard of the 
proposed order of events by the federal government. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William P. Dole, appointed Edward Wolcott as a 
special Commissioner to manage the process of allotting the Citizen Band, in January of 
1863.
235
  Virtually all early allotments followed the same pattern.  After surveyors 
divided the reservation into plots, the 1,400 tribal members on the allottee census met 
with the agent and selected the parcel they wanted.  The agents allotted the land as 
follows: for each chief, one section (640 acres), each headman, one half-section (320 
acres), heads of the family, one quarter-section (160 acres), and to all others, one-eighth 
of a section, (80 acres).
236
  The special agent and his staff allotted a total of 152,128 acres 
to the Citizen Band and allocated 77,358 acres to the Prairie Band.
237
 
According to Mr. Wolcott’s statements, even the straightforward cases took a 
great deal of time because most of the allotting had to be done on the ground, since “this 
tribe is more than ordinarily intelligent, know the value of land and select personally 
every tract.”  The nature of the process required him to travel about the large reservation 
visiting each site proposed by a Potawatomi to be his/her future allotment.
238
  For some 
Potawatomi the question of where they would take their allotment was simple.  Those 
                                                 
235 Edward Wolcott to Commissioner Dole, January 16, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684.  Mr. Wolcott submitted a 
list of completed allotments to the Secretary of the Interior on November 10, 1863 and it was approved 
December 12, 1863. 
236 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:824–825. 
237 Clifton, The Prairie People, 351. 
238 Edward Wolcott to Commissioner Dole, May 10, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684.  This statement suggests that 
Mr. Wolcott generally believed Native Americans to be of inferior intelligence and have little or no 
understanding of the value of their land.   
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who settled, built homes, and improved parcels of land naturally chose plots that 
incorporated their current homes.  Joseph Lafromboise, Madore B. Beaubien, as well as 
several Ogees and Kennedys all settled around an area of the reservation known as Silver 
Lake in the 1840s and 1850s.  As heads of households, they took allotments there and 
chose conjoining or nearby parcels for their wives and children.
239
  Others settled closer 
to St. Mary’s mission to allow their children to attend school and be close to home.240  
Since the ultimate goal of allotment was to make successful farmers out of Indians, 
agents considered improvements and an adequate portion of timber “as far as 
practicable.”241  Those who had not made extensive improvements also followed a 
general pattern of choosing land with good sources of timber and water, near their 
kinsmen. 
Much to the dread of the executives for the Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western 
Railroad, the Potawatomi chose the most coveted land in the reservation for their 
allotments.  Tribal members overwhelmingly selected land along the rivers and streams 
where most of the available timber was located and along the railroad’s planned right-of-
way.
242
  The railroad hoped to open the lands they did not use for the track for resale to 
settlers and for commercial development.  With the most valuable plots of land taken up 
by 152,128 acres of Potawatomi personal allotments, the railroad feared they would not 
be able to make a substantial profit.  Even though their railroad line would have to 
                                                 
239 Emma Cones Richerter “A History of Silver Lake, Kansas.” Manuscript, 1910, Kansas State Historical 
Society.  Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family.  Stremlau examines how Cherokee families adapted to 
private land ownership by incorporating elements of the allotment system that was meant to assimilate 
them into their existing social and cultural practices as well as traditional family structures.  
240 Gilbert Joseph Garraghan, Jesuits of the Middle United States, First Edition (Loyola Press, 1984), 501–
529.   
241 Kappler, Kappler’s Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties, 824–825. 
242 Unlike several other tribes in Kansas, the Potawatomi did not sign a right-of-way treaty with the 
railroads in the 1850s. 
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deviate from the planned path to avoid the Potawatomi’s reservation, the LP&W Railroad 
forfeited their right to purchase the surplus land.
243
       
While some allotment cases were straightforward, Mr. Wolcott and Agent Ross 
encountered dozens of cases that fell within gray areas, not clearly addressed in the 
treaty.  Undecided legal issues from the past were now more pressing.  The first of these 
questions was, who should be counted as tribal members and receive benefits and who 
should not?  Past treaties generally set aside a specific amount of annuity payments and 
acres given to the tribe as a whole.  The Commissioner left details of money and land 
distribution to the agent and the leaders of said tribe.  The signing of the 1861 treaty 
opened surplus lands for sale to railroads and settlers, with the proceeds to be divided 
among the individual members of the tribe.  So, unlike the treaties in the past, there was a 
clear interest on the part of the federal government and individual tribal members to make 
sure only qualified individuals received an allotment.
244
  Most of the special allotment 
cases that emerged from the treaty of 1861 involved one of two issues:  white spouses of 
Indian allottees and Potawatomi who did not live on the reservation at the time of 
allotment.
245
  As they did with U.S./Indian relations generally; attitudes toward race 
impacted allotment at the tribal level and on a more personal and individual level.   
The allotment process forced tribal members and the OIA to confront the issue of 
rights and privileges for non-Indians living on the reservation.  Issues of non-Indian 
spouses drawing annuity monies and other tribal benefits were a source of long-standing 
                                                 
243 Gates, Fifty Million Acres, 131–132. 
244 Article 5 of the 1861treaty set up the conditions for sale of the Potawatomi’s surplus land to the 
Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western Railroad for $1.25 an acre.  The treaty set firm building deadlines that 
the railroad had to meet or the contract would be nullified and the company would have to forfeit all 
payments.  Kappler, Kappler’s Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties, 824–825.    
245 Mr. Wolcott to Commissioner Dole, April 19, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684.  In this letter he also asked 
about Potawatomi who had dual membership in the Shawnee Nation and who should be considered a 
“headman,” but those situations were rare and were generally decided on a case by case basis. 
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debate within the Nation.  The addition of physical property into the argument 
exacerbated the conflicts.  The Potawatomi were divided on the question in 1863 when 
the OIA had to make the decision whether they would receive allotments or not.
246
   
These non-Indian individuals usually fell into two categories:  those who married 
into the tribe, and thus had claims to membership, and those who worked for or had lived 
among the tribe for years, but were still technically squatters.   For the latter, the question 
was whether to allow them to stay and become allottees if they had a probable claim, or 
to evict them from the reservation all together.
247
  Unlike the cases of non-resident 
Potawatomi, the petitioners in question were not tribal members by blood, so the 
argument for their “rights” was far more complex.  Multiple agents wrote letters to the 
Office of Indian Affairs asking for guidance regarding these individuals, or to inform the 
Commissioner that they had expelled certain men.  Selling whiskey to the Potawatomi, 
illegally cutting and selling timber from the reservation, or some other act of debauchery 
was usually the cited reason.   
In the cases of non-Indian spouses the particulars of the relationship and the 
reputation and behavior of the claimant was often a deciding factor.
248
  In the beginning 
of 1863, when agents made the bulk of allotments, there were roughly eighty non-Indians 
who married into the tribe residing on the reservation.  Most were men, but there were a 
few women of non-Indian blood married to tribal members.  Some couples married years 
earlier, while others made their union after the treaty of 1861.  There was great concern 
                                                 
246 A council of over thirty Potawatomi sent a letter to Commissioner Dole in 1863 asking if they would 
have any say in deciding the question of allotting land to white men who had married members of the 
Potawatomi Nation.  Potawatomi Council to Commissioner Dole, undated letter, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684. 
247 Some could make claims because they had lived with, but not married a Potawatomi woman for years. 
248 The questions surrounding the validity of Potawatomi/non-Indian marriages were contrary to national 
debates over inter-racial marriages.  Instead of challenging the rights of non-whites to receive the same 
protections as their white spouse, it was the non-Indian spouse who was at risk of losing their rights.  For 
more on the history of miscegenation laws in the United States see Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: 
Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010). 
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that white men entered into some of the marriages with less-than-honorable intentions.  
The Commissioner tried to appease both sides by ordering that only those who had 
“abandoned his own people, cast his lot with the tribe, reside among the Indians, have 
been ‘adopted’ by them, and have ceased to exercise his rights as a citizen” be allotted.249  
Mr. Wolcott responded that, with the exception of “adoption,” everyone in question met 
those conditions because of the remoteness of the reservation.  He further commented 
that the Potawatomi adopted only a few people “with the appropriate Indian ceremonies.”  
In the end, the OIA decided on a case-by-case basis, with most claimants receiving an 
allotment.
250
   
There were a few cases in which deaths in the family resulted in the non-Indian 
spouse being the only remaining claimant.  Most of these widows and widowers 
continued to live on the reservation they called home for years.  Agent Ross reported one 
case in which the non-Indian widow of a tribal member moved herself and her children in 
with the non-Indian widower of a Potawatomi, so that they “formed a family in which 
neither of the parents is Indian,” but the children were.251  In general, Agent Ross favored 
allotting lands to individuals such as these who had Potawatomi children, and thus a 
vested interest in the success of the tribe.  He often made positive arguments for white 
men who intermarried with the tribe if they formed their union before the allotment 
treaty.  He argued that they were mostly “very worthy and well disposed men” whose 
                                                 
249 Even though the tribal members who took allotments would eventually become U.S. citizens, to prove 
that they were eligible to receive allotments the non-Indian spouses of tribal members had to prove that 
they had abandoned the rights of citizenship with which they were born. 
250 Mr. Wolcott and Agent Ross to Commissioner Dole, May 7, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684.   
251 Ibid. 
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influence had been positive on the Citizen Band, raising them to the position of one of the 
most intelligent, industrious and honest of all Indian tribes.
252
 
The decision to allot these people or not became more complicated when the case 
involved a Potawatomi woman married to a white man, because the rights of women as 
head of households was not clearly defined in the treaty of 1861.
253
  On May 28, 1863, 
David F. Easton, a white man married to Lucy (Bertrand) Easton, a Potawatomi woman, 
wrote Commissioner Dole complaining that Mr. Wolcott refused to give his wife an 
allotment of 160 acres (the amount allocated to heads of families), “for the reason that 
she has no children.”  He wanted to know if this was the proper course of action, since, 
children or not, his wife was the head of their family.
254
  Whether Easton actually 
considered his wife the “head of family” is questionable – it is possible he was simply 
trying to make an argument for a larger plot of land that could have some legal backing.  
His sentiment does reflect the broader opinion of most Potawatomi and those married 
into the tribe that women were full citizens of the tribe, just like men, and should be able 
to claim full allotments as heads of families.
255
 
Other white men were not as loyal to their Potawatomi wives, and as a result their 
claims to land were more complicated.  A particularly complicated case is the 
relationship triangle of Mr. Sidney W. Smith, a non-Indian, who married Margaret 
(Ogee) Weld, a Potawatomi, and had a child.  At an unspecified date Mr. Smith 
                                                 
252 Agent Ross to Commissioner Dole, 1863-1864, roll 684.  As previously noted, George L. Young, a 
non-tribal member married to a Potawatomi woman, was chosen to represent the Citizen Band on the 1862 
Business Committee. 
253 As noted in the previous chapter, the Homestead Act of 1862 allowed women to claim plots of land on 
their own.  
254 The issue here is obviously a disagreement about the subjective term “family.”  Are a husband and wife 
considered a family, or must there be children as well? 
255 Potawatomi society was traditionally patrilineal, but women always had a strong role in society.  
Women’s marks appear on some of the treaties the Potawatomi signed with the United States. Kappler, 
Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:457–458, 470–471, 824–828. 
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abandoned his wife to live with a Mrs. Nancy McLane, a widowed Potawatomi.  Mr. 
Smith had a number of children with Mrs. McLane, but eventually abandoned her to 
return to his wife.  He then left his wife for a second time and returned to Mrs. McLane, 
with whom he was living at the time of allotment.  Because of the circumstances of 
abandonment, Mrs. Smith (Margaret Weld) claimed to be the rightful head of her family, 
to which Agent Ross and Mr. Wolcott agreed – she received 160 acres as the head of 
household.
256
  Similarly, Mrs. McLane refused to recognize Mr. Smith as a member of 
her household.
257
  She also received 160 acres as the head of her family.  Seeing as “there 
seemed to be no place for Mr. Smith as a member of the tribe” Wolcott did not allot him 
at that time.
258
  After years of petitioning the OIA, Mr. Smith eventually received an 
allotment in 1867.  The Sidney Smith case has more drama and intrigue than most, but it 
does clearly demonstrate the serious questions raised by the exclusion of women from 
Article III of the 1861 treaty and the need for clarification of language regarding gender 
roles, privileges, and categorization of individuals on the reservation. 
Another key question the Potawatomi and their allotting agents faced was what to 
do about giving allotments to Potawatomi whose name appeared on the census, but were 
not living on the reservation at the time of allotment to make their selection.  Mr. Wolcott 
and Agent Ross’ first inclination was to deny the claim because the individual could 
obviously not personally put the land to use (i.e. farm or improve it).  This decision did 
not please a number of the Citizen Band.  The case of Richard Bertrand, prominent in 
correspondence from the Potawatomi Agency during the allotment years, illustrates 
several of the issues involved in these instances.   
                                                 
256 She had two children with her first husband, Hiram Weld, who died in 1855 as well as the child she had 
with Sidney Smith. 
257 One assumes that Sidney Smith and Nancy McLane were not on amiable terms at this point. 
258 Mr. Wolcott to Commissioner Dole, June 11, 1864, OIA-LR, roll 684.  
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In 1863, Mrs. Adlaide Bertrand petitioned Agent Ross and Mr. Wolcott on behalf 
of her son Richard to allow him to authorize, in writing, someone to make his selection 
for him.  Mrs. Bertrand argued that she and her husband, Lawrence J. Bertrand, were 
promised that upon moving west they would “share in all the benefits accruing to the 
Indians.”259  Mr. Bertrand’s death forced his son Richard to leave for California in an 
attempt to better the condition of the family.  Richard and his mother repeatedly insisted 
that he considered Kansas his home and intended to return.  Mrs. Bertrand’s argument for 
allowing her son to have an allotment, despite the fact that he had not lived on the 
reservation for many years, was that rejecting his claim for a plot would deny him “from 
sharing in the privileges of his nation.”260  The OIA decided to do nothing about non-
resident Potawatomi until they returned to the reservation.  Enlistment in the United 
States Army during the Civil War delayed Richard Bertrand’s return, but he did 
eventually come back to the reservation in Kansas.  After years of petitioning the OIA 
finally approved Richard Bertrand for an eighty acre allotment in the summer of 1866.
261
 
The Bertrand case is fascinating because Richard participated in national events 
occurring at the time, like the gold rush and economic boom in California and the Civil 
War.  It also illustrates the shortfalls of the treaty language.  Mrs. Bertrand’s 
correspondence with the OIA and her Indian agent demonstrate that she had clear ideas 
about the inherent rights of tribal membership for both her and her family – she never 
stopped pushing for them.  The government planned for allotment to lead to the 
dissolution of the tribe.  Instead, the process forced clarification on questions of tribal 
                                                 
259 Commissioner William P. Dole to Commissioner Charles E. Mix, 1863-1864, OIA-LR, roll 684.  Her 
initial petition to Mr. Wolcott and Agent Ross had been denied.  Her letters also suggest that persuasion as 
well as force was used to ensure that as many Indians as possible vacated their former homelands. 
260 Mrs. Adelaide Bertrand to Commissioner Dole, 1863-1864, OIA-LR, roll 684. 
261 Commissioner Dennis N. Cooley to Superintendent Murphy, June 20, 1866, OIA-LR, roll 686. 
 111 
membership and rights promised to the Potawatomi Nation, as well as indicating that the 
federal government considered Indians and land to be connected, even in the face of 
dispossession.  Mrs. Bertrand’s successful appeal for her son’s land as a “privilege of his 
nation” only further complicated the supposed dissolution of the tribe.  Bertrand’s case is 
the most prominent in the records, but several other Potawatomi who did not reside on 
the reservation at the time filed applications for land allotments and they all made the 
argument that it was their privilege and right as a tribal member.   
Article III contained the provisions that had the largest impact on the lives of each 
individual who chose to join the Citizen Band; it stipulated the conditions for conveying 
fee-simple titles to the allotted lands and U.S. citizenship.
262
  The article specified that 
only males who were the head of their household and allottees could submit a request to 
the President to receive a fee-simple patent.  Before making this request the individual 
had to appear in the district court of Kansas and take the same oath of allegiance required 
by all naturalized aliens and show proof that they were “sufficiently intelligent,” had 
“adopted the habits of civilized life,” and had supported themselves for at least five years.  
If the man met all of these conditions he received his portion of the monies held in trust 
for the tribe by the federal government and the proceeds from the sale of the land under 
the provisions of the 1861 treaty.  After he made his oath, proved his worthiness, and 
received his payment, the man ceased to be a member of the Potawatomi Nation and 
became a United States citizen.
263
   
In the spring of 1866, recognizing the need to expand the provisions of Article III 
to more members of the tribe, the Potawatomi insisted on an amendment that changed the 
                                                 
262 A fee-simple title grants out-right ownership of land to the title holder, including the right to sell or 
lease the land if they so choose. 
263 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:824–825. 
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language to secure the rights to fee-simple ownership of allotments for Potawatomi 
women and males who were not heads of their family.  The original article designated 
that “as it please[d] the President of United States”: 
 
Any adults, being males and heads of families, who may be allottees under the 
provisions of the foregoing article, are sufficiently intelligent and prudent to 
control their affairs and interests, he may, at the request of such persons, cause the 
lands severally held by them to be conveyed to them by patent in fee-simple, with 
power of alienation.
264
 
The 1866 amendment dictated the extension of the beneficial provisions of the 1861 
treaty to all adult members of the tribe, without distinction of sex or whether the 
individuals were heads of household.
265
  The modification of treaty language opened the 
possibility for women and men who were not heads of a family to acquire patents to their 
allotments and become United States citizens.  The amendment allowed the treaty 
guidelines to more accurately reflect Potawatomi social norms.  Women and younger 
men who earned the respect of their community had always been allowed to voice their 
opinions in councils, play an active role in community decision making, and sign 
treaties.
266
  The measure was also supported by the Potawatomi’s Indian Agent, Luther 
Palmer, who reported in 1866 that “[m]any of the most competent persons of the tribe are 
of this class of adults, male and female, but not heads of families.”267   
It took years for the special agent and the OIA to process all of the allotment 
claims with extenuating circumstances.  Most of the issues were resolved by 1866 and the 
OIA made final allotments.  Soon after, members of the Citizen Band began to get 
                                                 
264 Ibid., II:825.. Italics added. 
265 Ibid., II:916. 
266 Women had roles of authority in the clan system of the Potawatomi and female village leaders signed 
four separate treaties in 1836.  Ibid., II:457–458, 470–471. 
267 RCIA, 1866, 264. 
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approval for U.S. citizenship.
268
  The promised benefits of citizenship convinced the 
Citizen Band and OIA officials that the treaty, in its original form, would be good for 
tribal members.  As noted in the previous chapter, it is unclear what either group 
expected from the Potawatomi’s promised status as U.S. citizens.  There was virtually no 
precedent for Native American citizenship to build upon.
269
  If they became United States 
citizens were the Citizen Potawatomi also considered citizens of the state of Kansas?  
Would governing bodies allow the Indians who were new U.S. citizens to vote in state 
and national elections?  Could they sue (either other Indians or non-Indians) for alleged 
grievances?  The treaty addressed none of these details.  The Citizen Band eventually 
faced each of these scenarios after they became citizens.   
The records do indicate what some tribal members hoped citizenship would 
provide.  In 1865 Citizen Potawatomi and Business Committee member George L. 
Young petitioned Commissioner Dole to convey patent so that he could become a U.S. 
citizen and taxpayer.  He pled with the Commissioner “You sir place yourself in my 
position you consider yourself an American.  And would like all the rights of one.  And 
suppose (as I have done) that you went to vote for A. Lincoln and your vote refused 
because for some you were not a qualified voter.  You are an Indian in the eyes of the 
                                                 
268 From 1864 to 1869 hundreds of Citizen Potawatomi appeared before the judge of the U.S. District 
Court in Topeka to take their oath of citizenship and receive their naturalization certificate.   
269 “Business Committee to Business Committee on Indian Affairs,” n.d., manuscripts, Kansas State 
Historical Society. The treaty of 1861 proposed an order of events that was intended to result in full 
assimilation and self-sufficiency for the Citizen Potawatomi.  The Citizen Band, likewise, adopted a 
uniform mode of procedure for the process of receiving a patent for the land and applying for citizenship.  
After one was assigned a particular plot as their allotment the Business Committee made the application for 
patent to the OIA which was endorsed by the Indian Agent.  To streamline the process the individual’s 
naturalization papers usually accompanied the application.  
Frank Pommershiem discusses the inconsistencies and difficulties of what he calls Native Americans’ 
“tripartite” citizenship – tribal, state, and national.  Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, 
Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, Reprint (Oxford University Press, USA, 2012), 155–181. 
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law.  Would you not sir try all means in your power to obtain the right to vote.”270  
Young’s concerns were a representation of the larger desires of many Citizen Band 
members.  Young was not Indian by blood, but because he was married into, and 
accepted as a member of the tribe, officials at the polling station treated him like one.  
For most, being an “Indian in the eyes of the law” meant total disenfranchisement.  If 
they were going to have their lives shaped by the actions of politicians and laws on the 
state and federal level Native Americans wanted the same basic rights, voice, and 
protections afforded to other citizens.
271
  
FAILURE OR FRESH START?  
In reality, the 1861 treaty provided neither the security nor basic rights for which 
the Citizen Band hoped.  Additionally, it did not achieve the federal government’s goal of 
assimilating the Citizen Potawatomi.  By 1867 a majority of those who accepted 
allotment and citizenship were dispossessed of their land and nearly destitute.  A number 
of factors contributed to their downfall, including the unclear process of reaching their 
new status and a lack of safeguards written into the legislation.  Most detrimental were 
the taxes required of the Citizen Potawatomi because the state of Kansas began taxation 
in contradiction to the terms of the treaty and many of the Potawatomi did not understand 
the system.   
The federal government ignored the treaty article that allowed for the provision of 
farm implements and other supplies before levying taxes.  The Citizen Potawatomi were 
                                                 
270 George L. Young to Commissioner Dole, February 19, 1864, OIA-LR, roll 684.  George L. Young was 
not Potawatomi by blood.  Upon his marriage to Josette Vieux, Young effectually gave up the rights of a 
U.S. citizen to become eligible for the benefits granted the Potawatomi Nation.  Mr. Wolcott and Agent 
Ross to Commissioner Dole, May 7, 1863, OIA-LR, roll 684. 
271 Nothing was specifically mentioned about women wanting the right to vote, but women were allowed 
to sign treaties and had at least some say in tribal affairs, so the concept of political participation by women 
was not foreign to them. 
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taxed almost immediately upon choosing an allotment and before they were given money 
for supplies.
272
  Unable to pay these taxes, these difficult circumstances forced many 
individuals to sell their acreage to either the railroads or white settlers who were eager to 
buy the land at a reduced price.
273
  In his monthly report Agent Palmer lamented that the 
Citizen Band desperately needed the promised funds to buy supplies and provisions to 
improve their land.  Without the money, he argued “the receiving of patents only lays 
them liable to be regarded by the state authorities as already citizens and to be harrassed 
by assessors and collectors of taxes without having the necessary means to improve their 
land and to raise the wherewith to support their families and pay their taxes.”274  That 
year Commissioner Cooley addressed the issue of Potawatomi taxation before they were 
citizens by arguing that “courts sustained the right of the State to tax lands which had 
been patented to Indians, whether they had become citizens or not…”275  Essentially, 
once a member of the Citizen Band received their patent for their land, state authorities 
considered them liable for the taxes on said property, even if they were not yet eligible 
for any of the protections provided to citizens.   
For most of the Citizen Potawatomi the burden of taxation began in 1865 or 1866 
when they received their patent.  They did not receive their share of the collective funds 
due the tribe and the profits from the sale of their “surplus land” to buy supplies and 
equipment essential for farming until two years later.  In November of 1868 the first 
group of Citizen Band members received their portion of the monies due the tribe from 
                                                 
272 Article 7 of the 1861 treaty provided that the interest on the tribe’s improvement fund would be spent 
on machines and implements to assist the Potawatomi in their farming efforts. Kappler, Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties, II:824–825. 
273 Later allotment agreements, including the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 would include a trust 
period in which the U.S. government held the patent for a given period of time so the allottee could not sell 
their land.  This was not the case with the Treaty of 1861. 
274 Agent Palmer to Commissioner Cooley, November 1, 1866, OIA-LR, roll 686. 
275 Commissioner Dennis N. Cooley, 1866, OIA-LR, roll 686. 
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past treaty agreements.  They were each issued bank notes for $610.59.
276
  It was too late 
to save the allotments of most tribal members.  After a seven year delay, in the summer 
of 1868, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad Company finally negotiated to buy 
all of the unallotted land for one dollar an acre.
277
  These dire circumstances forced many 
members of the Citizen Band to sell their land for less than it was worth to survive.   
The thirty year period from the 1830s through the 1860s thrust drastic and often 
traumatic change on the Potawatomi in Kansas.  They endured multiple forced removals, 
disease outbreaks, harsh weather with too little food, and the near total domination of 
every aspect of their lives by government officials and missionaries.  As a result of their 
troubling circumstances in Kansas, in the 1870s, many members of the Citizen Band 
made a decision that they hoped would benefit their families.  They decided to leave 
Kansas and take up residence on a new reservation in Indian Territory.
278
  Unlike several 
of the removals from the Great Lakes, the Potawatomi did not enter into the treaty that 
arranged this move because of trickery or coercion.  Militiamen did not round up the 
Potawatomi and force them to leave their homes at the end of a bayonet as they were with 
the Trail of Death.  Instead, the 1867 treaty and resulting move was the product of a 
discouraging combination of broken promises, bad conditions, poor choices, and a 
resolve to try something new in hopes of a better life.  The circumstances may have been 
different from previous removals, but the tribal members who made the move to Indian 
Territory had similar fears and questions as their parents and grandparents, removed a 
generation earlier.  They had no idea what to expect but all hoped the most of this 
backhanded opportunity. 
                                                 
276 U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Potawatomi Agency, Receipt book, November 14, 1868. 
277 Kappler, 970-974. 
278 The details of the 1867 treaty will be examined in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Citizen Potawatomi did not choose to accept allotments and citizenship, as 
set forth in the treaty of 1861, in a political, cultural, social or economic vacuum.  They 
felt the anxiety of living in a country on the verge of a civil war, they understood that the 
flood of emigrants and settlers in their region would likely continue to grow, and they 
realized there was very little chance they were would ever rid themselves of the 
omnipotent Office of Indian Affairs.  The demands of non-Indian settlers and the 
expansion of the railroad greatly reduced all tribal land holdings in Kansas.  By choosing 
to take allotments and U.S. citizenship the Citizen Potawatomi hoped to attain more 
control over their lives by acquiring fee-simple titles and United States citizenship, both 
of which promised to extend the same protections of state and federal laws that applied to 
the non-Indian settlers swarming around them.  
The years following the 1861 treaty reveal that the Citizen Potawatomi were in a 
precarious position.  For generations the federal government and the Indian Department 
worked to fit the Potawatomi, and all Native Americans, into dichotomies: enemy or ally, 
primitive or civilized, ward or citizen.  They shaped (and reshaped) Indian policies with 
the intent of pushing Native Americans away from their own cultures and lifeways to 
become more acceptable and compatible with American society.  The agreement between 
the Citizen Potawatomi and the OIA set forth in the treaty of 1861 lacked definition, clear 
direction, and failed to account for the many pitfalls these “pioneers” of Native American 
landownership and U.S. citizenship would encounter.
279
  Neither the OIA nor the Citizen 
Potawatomi had a plan for the indistinct status of “quasi-citizens” the Citizen Potawatomi 
took on as a result of the 1861 treaty. 
                                                 
279 Edmunds, “Indians as Pioneers: Potawatomis on the Frontier.” 
 118 
In the process of applying the treaty the OIA and the Citizen Potawatomi were 
obliged to mutually define tribal membership, delineate the rights of women within the 
tribe and determine what it meant to be a member of the Citizen Potawatomi band and a 
United States citizen.  The OIA did not give tribal members the option to formally 
negotiating these details before the treaty, and because they were among the first tribes to 
enter into a treaty with the conditions of allotment and citizenship, there was very little 
precedent to guide them.  A process of trial and error decided the finer points of how the 
Citizen Potawatomi would arrive at fee-simple titles and full enfranchisement as U.S. 
citizens.  As a result, the first decade after the treaty was incredibly challenging for the 
group and by the late 1860s many Citizen Potawatomi were closer to destitution than 
success as small farmers.  
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the Citizen Potawatomi continued to live 
in a condition with uncertain and undefined rights for several decades.  In the twenty 
years after they moved to Indian Territory tribal members organized politically and 
individuals learned to petition for their rights more effectively.  The Citizen Potawatomi 
survived as individuals and as a tribe on the challenging terrain and in the often lawless 
conditions of Indian Territory.   
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Chapter 4:  Forever Until Tuesday:   
Allotment and the End of Indian Territory 
On the morning of Tuesday, September 22, 1891, more than twenty thousand 
anxious settlers, all “armed like a walking arsenal,” gathered on foot, horseback, and with 
wagons at a predetermined starting line, awaiting the sound of the bugle that could 
change their lives.280  Each one of these individuals hoped to be lucky enough to claim 
one of the seven thousand available one hundred and sixty acre plots, carved out of the 
“surplus” lands of the recently allotted Citizen Potawatomi, Iowa, and Sac and Fox 
reservations.  The Citizen Potawatomi, some of whom travelled to the starting line to 
watch the action, saw thousands of acres of land that the federal government pledged 
would be for the “exclusive use and occupancy” of their tribal members pass from the 
tribe to the hands of non-Indian settlers in one day.281  This contest for recently 
relinquished Indian lands was one of seven land runs that occurred in Indian and 
Oklahoma Territories between 1889 and 1895.282   
How did events in Indian Territory evolve to the point of organizing a mob of 
would-be homesteaders to race for land that, just over a year before, was part of 
reservations that treaties with Indian tribes promised to be Native Americans’ exclusive 
homes forever?  Since the organization of Kansas and Nebraska into official territories in 
1854, Indian Territory was the designated province for more than two-dozen tribes 
removed from their ancestral homes to make way for the progression of American culture 
and society through non-Indian settlement.  As late as 1866, the federal government 
                                                 
280 Hamilton S. Wicks, “The Opening of Oklahoma,” The Cosmopolitan 7, no. 5 (September 1889): 461.  
Wicks’ account is in reference to the land run on April 22, 1889, but it is relevant because all of the land 
runs were organized to operate in the same way.  
281 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:970. 
282 Berlin B. Chapman, “The Pottawatomi and Absentee Shawnee Reservation,” The Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 24, no. 3 (1946): 293–305.   
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arranged several land cession treaties with existing tribes in the area to accommodate 
more Indian peoples; there was obviously still a commitment to the notion that Indian 
Territory should be exclusively for Native Americans.   
Yet, twenty years later Congress passed the Dawes Act, the most significant and 
widely applied piece of land reform legislation to ever influence Indian land tenure.283  
Three years following the Dawes Act, a flurry of legislation emerged from Congress that 
destroyed the structure of tribal governments, imposed federal laws on the region, 
organized Oklahoma as a an official U.S. Territory, and opened millions of acres of land 
to non-Indian settlement.  These laws brought Indians and non-Indians side by side as 
reluctant neighbors and marked the abandonment of half a century of Indian policy 
intended to keep them apart through removal and the establishment of reservations.  This 
relatively rapid change in circumstances was the result of Congress’ adoption of 
assimilation policies and legislative accommodations for land-hungry settlers who 
desired Indian lands.  
This chapter will scrutinize all of these developments and analyze how they 
shaped the lives of the Native Americans in the region.  It will also explain how Indian 
Territory’s unique history and qualities, along with the great number of distinct tribes 
residing in its boundaries, meant that implementation of broad Indian policies, and other 
federal mandates, met with a series of important challenges from Indians, white settlers, 
and the powerful interests who wanted Indian lands.  In many ways, the dispossession of 
Indian lands fell into a time worn pattern: whites wanted Indian lands and sought to take 
them.  As in Kansas, legislative efforts in Indian Territory both strengthened the idea of 
Indian citizenship and eroded Indian lands.  Examining the application and repercussions 
                                                 
283 Bruce E. Johansen, The Encyclopedia of Native American Legal Tradition (Greenwood, 1998), 14. 
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of select pieces of assimilation and land reform legislation, that were applied in rapid 
succession, will allow the reader to appreciate the varied responses of the Citizen 
Potawatomi and other tribes in the territory to these laws that will be explored more fully 
in the final chapter of this dissertation.  Though Indian Territory was created to be a last 
home for Native Americans, in practice it was a temporary home, and followed a familiar 
pattern of action designed to facilitate the dispossession of land and accelerate the 
process of transfer to non-Indian settlers. 
INDIAN TERRITORY 
The Indian Territory that remained after the organization of Kansas and Nebraska 
into official territories was either the ancestral home or range of several tribes, including 
the Caddo, Wichita, Kiowa, Apache, and Osage.  These tribes spoke distinct dialects 
from Siouan, Athabaskan, and Caddoan language stock.  Their lives were largely dictated 
by the climate and geography of the plains.  The weather was often extreme, with cold 
winters and scorching summers, and the land was flat and prone to unpredictable levels 
of precipitation.284  The areas of the Great Plains that the U.S. designated Indian Territory 
in 1854 contained about seventy thousand square miles and encompassed most of 
modern-day Oklahoma.285  An article written at the turn of the twentieth century 
described the land as “teeming with buffalo, deer, turkey and other game,” and the 
author, C. H. Fitch, lauded the region’s “timber for fuel” and “grass for horses.”  He did 
grant that in the summers, when the weather is hot, “the country presents a different 
                                                 
284 Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., Encyclopedia of North American Indians: Native American History, Culture, 
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appearance, not so attractive.”286  Still, Fitch recognized how valuable the land had once 
been for the Indian nations that lived in the area.   
In the 1830s and 1840s most of Indian Territory was divided between the 
Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole.  Each of these tribes experienced 
long, harsh, and often devastating removals from their ancestral homes in the southeast 
between 1832 and 1846.287  Popular sentiment in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century touted that the land between Arkansas and the Rocky Mountains was a “barren 
waste,” so it was an appropriate location for these displaced tribes.288  After arriving in 
Indian Territory the status of the Five Nations among Native Americans differed from 
other Indian tribes in the region.  Each of these tribes had a distinct tribal constitution that 
provided for the establishment of executive leadership, a legislative body, and a separate 
court system that created and carried out laws that were separate from those of the federal 
government and surrounding states.289  The creation of a three-branch government, in the 
spirit of the United States, led many contemporaries and academics to refer to the nations 
                                                 
286 C.H. Fitch, “The Five Civilized Tribes: Indian Territory,” Journal of American Geographical Society of 
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as the Five Civilized Tribes who stood in stark contrast to other supposedly “non-
civilized” Indians on the plains.290   
The unique national character of the Five Nations garnered a great deal of 
attention from nineteenth-century newspapers and journals, and inspired myriad works of 
scholarship by academics of the era and beyond.291  The number of works dedicated to 
these tribal entities could lead to the misconception that understanding the history of the 
Five Nations is to know the history of Indian Territory – and for almost thirty years, from 
the late 1830s to the mid-1860s there is some truth to this suggestion.  The Five Nations 
controlled more than fourteen million combined acres of land and had the largest 
populations in the territory.292  In reality, however, the history of Indian Territory is more 
diverse than a cursory assessment of this scholarship would lead one to believe.  The state 
of Oklahoma is presently home to thirty-eight federally recognized tribes, and most of 
these nations were established in their new homes in Indian Territory by 1889.293  As 
early as 1855, the federal government persuaded the Choctaw and Chickasaw to lease 
their lands in the western section of Indian Territory to create reservations for other 
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tribes.  These lands eventually became home to the Wichita, Kiowa, Comanche, Apache, 
Cheyenne, and Arapaho.294  All of these tribes were indigenous to the region, so the result 
was their confinement to a delineated reservation, but with few changes in their physical 
surroundings.  In the 1860s and 1870s, there was an influx of tribes that previously 
resided in Kansas.  Several of these tribes, including the Citizen Potawatomi, experienced 
multiple removals in the decades before they finally arrived in Indian Territory.  The new 
reservations for the tribes coming from Kansas were made up of lands captured as a 
punitive response against the Five Nations who joined the confederacy during the Civil 
War.  The aftermath of the conflict drastically changed the allocation of lands in Indian 
Territory. 
The Five Nations all came from ancestral homelands that lay within the states that 
formed the Confederacy during the Civil War.  Even though they were removed from the 
American southeast almost three decades prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, their 
communities still bore the markings of their time in a slave society and tribes felt it was 
in their best interest to support the Confederacy.295  All of the Five Nations, as well as 
several other tribes in Indian Territory, signed treaties of “Friendship and Alliance” with 
the Confederate States of America.296   
After the end of the Civil War, Congress took up the issue of what to do with 
lands in Indian Territory and even debated the feasibility of providing acreage to 
freedmen there.  Legislation passed during the conflict authorized the federal government 
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to seize and sell property of individuals who supported the Confederacy.297  In the case of 
non-Indians, President Johnson ruled that the law only applied during wartime.298  
Government authorities did not deem land seizures and redistribution as a valid option for 
Americans who rebelled against the United States, but while other confederates 
maintained their property once the conflict ended, the same was not true among the Five 
Nations.  In Indian Territory a policy of land reform was vigorously enforced, and Native 
Americans who sympathized with the Confederacy lost some of their landholdings as a 
result.  Perhaps the government rationalized that it could both punish its former enemies 
and engage in a suitable form of redistribution by taking property from one group of 
Indians and giving it to another.  
More than one tribe lost lands as a result of such actions. The future Citizen 
Potawatomi reservation, for instance, was comprised of an area seized from the Seminole 
and the Creek Nations after their defeat in the Civil War.  On March 21, 1866, the 
Seminole Nation entered into a cession treaty in which they were forced to cede a large 
portion of their reservation to the federal government “[i]n compliance with the desire of 
the United States to locate other Indians and freedmen thereon” as part of their penalty 
for their disloyalty to the United States.299  The Seminole received a token payment of 
15¢ per acre.300  Creek lands were ceded by a similar treaty on June 14, 1866, they 
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received 30¢ per acre.301  The following year, in 1867, the federal government negotiated 
a treaty with the Seneca, Shawnee, and Quapaw to sell portions of their land in Indian 
Territory as a means of “rebuilding their houses, re-opening their farms, and supporting 
their families” because of the destruction to their property resulting from the Civil War in 
Indian Territory.  Their ceded lands became the home of the Wyandotte, Ottawa, Peoria, 
Kaskaskia, Wea, and Piankeshaw who were moved out of Kansas.302     
Foreshadowing the experience of the Citizen Potawatomi in the 1870s, the 
Delaware agreed to a treaty in 1866 which called for their removal from Kansas to Indian 
Territory.303 Unlike prior removal efforts, this one was not funded by the federal 
government and it fell to each Delaware family to provide their funds to pay for the 
journey.  Some families traveled to Indian Territory alone and others in groups.  The 
more affluent among them could afford to complete the relocation in one trip and quickly 
established their homes.  The poorer Delaware had to make the move in multiple months, 
usually only bringing what they could move with one wagon.  It was a slow and labored 
process.304  The Delaware treaty was one of the first to stipulate that individuals pay for 
their own moves, but it was not the last.  Each tribe that was relocated to Indian Territory 
arrived there under unique circumstances and brought with them the emotional scars and 
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lessons of their interactions with the federal government.  This is why it is important to 
examine how different groups obtained land parcels in Indian Territory and moved there.  
It helps one to understand what the term “Indian Territory” actually implied in form and 
in function.   
AN ILL-DEFINED, VIOLENT, AND VALUABLE TERRITORY 
Despite its moniker, “Indian Territory” was never actually organized as a 
territory.  Unlike many other regions of the West that were quickly organized as 
territories and ushered into statehood as soon as their population level made it possible, 
the federal government never established a plan for a political organization or a natural 
path to statehood in “Indian Territory.”  The area was never intended to become anything 
more than a place to put Native Americans who were removed from their homes to make 
land available for non-Indians.  Observers from the period strikingly referred to the 
territory as “the dumping-ground for remnants of tribes” and another noted that “it is 
simply a remain.”  It seems reasonable to conclude that the Federal Government wanted 
its “Indian problem” to fade into the recesses of the American landscape and the 
supposedly “barren” territory that would become Oklahoma seemed the ideal place for 
this to happen.305  Such ideas had an immediate effect on the people who lived there.  
The federal government’s dismissive attitude about the region led to a relatively 
laissez faire approach to law and order in Indian Territory.  For decades, authority and 
responsibility to enforce justice and keep peace in Indian Territory was left to the tribes.  
Treaties with the Five Nations allowed them to set up courts to protect and punish their 
own tribal members.  Most of the other tribes in the area, including the Citizen 
Potawatomi, had a council or business committee that settled disputes, with the 
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occasional support of their Indian agent.  To aid in curbing the lawlessness and to help 
maintain social order on the reservations, Congress authorized funds to create a corps of 
Indian policemen in 1878.306  The federal government paid these Indian men, gave them 
rations, and provided clothing in return for their work patrolling their reservations.307 
None of these methods of justice had authority over non-Indians who saw Indian 
Territory as a haven, specifically because it lay outside of most jurisdictions.308   
Local histories of Pottawatomie County, which encompasses the former Citizen 
Potawatomi reservation, claim that famous outlaws like Jesse James, the Younger 
brothers, and Sam and Belle Starr all used the area as a hideout and rendezvous point.309  
In 1879, the agent for the Sac and Fox reported that the Potawatomi and Kickapoo 
reservations were infested with gangs of outlaws.  He protested that more than one 
hundred outlaws were hiding out in the region “committing murder and robbery on 
defenseless citizens of both places” as well as running off their stock.310  For example, in 
the spring of 1876 an outlaw attacked Joshua E. Clardy, a Citizen Potawatomi merchant, 
in an attempt to rob his store.  The two men struggled over the assailant’s knife.  Clardy 
was injured in the fight and the attacker was ultimately killed.311  A few years later, on 
Christmas morning, 1891, Peter Anderson, one of the first Citizen Potawatomi to move to 
Indian Territory, was shot and killed by outlaws that he was pursuing as part of a 
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posse.312  The absence of effective law and law enforcement made Indian Territory a safe 
haven for both violent criminals and those who were prone to more minor illegal 
offenses, as there were few lawmen, no judge, and no jury.  These conditions were the 
inspiration for a common saying in the late nineteenth century that “there is no Sunday 
west of St. Louis and no God west of Ft. Smith.”   
In an attempt to remedy the lack of legal options for prosecution of non-Indians in 
Indian Territory, in 1887, Congress passed legislation that organized all of the territories 
west of Missouri and Arkansas into a judicial district attached to the district court at Ft. 
Smith, Arkansas.313  This meant that anyone who violated a federal law, and was not 
subject to a tribal court or other method of justice (i.e. a member of an Indian nation), 
could be taken to Ft. Smith for trial.314  Federal offenses continued to be heard outside of 
Indian Territory until 1889 when Congress established federal courts in Muskogee, 
Ardmore, and South McAlester. The jurisdiction of these courts was expanded in 1890 to 
include all misdemeanor offenses, even if they occurred between Indians and non-
Indians.  On paper, there was now some organization to oversee order and justice for 
everyone in Indian Territory, whether they were there legally or not.  The creation of a 
system of justice to punish individuals in a location they were never supposed to inhabit 
suggests that the government had abandoned the notion of a territory exclusively 
inhabited by Indians.  Despite Congress’ efforts to curb lawlessness, the creation of a 
court at Ft. Smith was still not enough to resolve the problem.  To counter the violence of 
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the region the Army had to eventually send a number of troops under the command of 
Major Davis from Ft. Sill to suppress the crime.315   
While non-Indian criminals used the land as a hideout, the average U. S. [non-
Indian] citizen and other more powerful corporate entities were beginning to rationalize a 
crime of another sort; the taking of more Indian land.  In their minds it was a victimless 
crime because popular sentiment of the time dismissed Native Americans as lazy 
individuals with no desire to capitalize on their holdings at best, and a subhuman remnant 
of a forgotten era at worst.316  In either case, the harrowing process of stripping 
indigenous peoples of their lands began anew in Indian Territory. 
THE DISSOLUTION OF AN INDIAN TERRITORY: LEGISLATING ASSIMILATION AND AN 
END TO INDIAN LAND TENURE 
Non-Indian’s desire for tribal lands was as strong in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century as it had been in the areas east of the Mississippi River that pre-dated 
the Indian removals of the 1830s.  The population west of the Mississippi River exploded 
after the Civil War, rising from seven to eleven million in the 1870s and almost all of 
those people wanted their own land.317  Many people were interested in seeing Indian 
Territory, some of the last “unimproved,” arable lands in the United States, thrown open 
to non-Indian settlement by the federal government.  Using the past as precedent, Indians 
had good reason to believe that politicians would forsake them.   
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As in the Old Northwest and other territories that became states, the most 
persistent and influential force pushing for the opening of Indian land was the will of the 
American public.  Hopeful farmers and businessmen looked on the acres in the territory 
as a land of promise. C.H. Fitch, writing at the turn of the twentieth century explained the 
American perception of a right to this land, stating, “It is impossible to keep the average 
American out of any place where, in his estimation, he can by energy and pluck add to 
his capital in developing the resources of a country.”  Even Indians supposedly realized 
the seemingly undeniable outcome of such desires. According to Fitch, “that a change 
must come was apparent to the most enlightened of the Indians.”318   
While Fitch may have been channeling his own desires as much of those of 
“average” settlers, it was not just the undeveloped nature of this land that drove 
thousands of individuals to leave cities and farms around the country and risk competing 
for property through a land run.  Fitch, and the Indians who inhabited the territory, 
realized that the underlying sentiment of such expressions was simply that the Indians did 
not deserve to own as much land as they did.  Historian David M. Wrobel explores the 
perception in late nineteenth-century American society that freely available land no 
longer existed, causing “frontier anxiety.”319  This fear, coupled with jealousy over land 
holdings, created a mentality that allowed non-Indians to rationalize the push to open 
those lands so that they could make proper use of them.320  As Wrobel noted, “numerous 
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Americans perceived that the frontier had closed, and acted on their perceptions.”321  
Commentary of the time, as it had in previous generations, insisted that the indigenous 
inhabitants of Indian Territory were “veritable land barons” who were “among the richest 
landed aristocrats on the globe.”322  For the average landless American brought up on 
rhetoric lauding the importance of the frontier to American democracy and the value of 
the yeoman farmer, this was a source of resentment.323 
While non-Indian settlers could “squat” on the land they wished to inhabit, 
permission to legally sanction non-Indian settlement in Indian Territory had to come from 
Congress.  In the 1880s and 1890s a series of laws were passed, like the Dawes Act and 
the Oklahoma Organic Act, which would make it possible.  Yet the actual possession of 
such land was driven as much, if not more, by a raw desire for ownership as it was the 
legal sanctioning of its settlement.  A journalist for Atlantic Monthly wrote of the non-
Indian anticipation of settling Indian Territory in 1879 noting that, “[y]eliding to the 
human impulse which causes them to crave what is beyond their reach, men have stood 
upon the boundary line and cast longing glances over to the Indian Eden…leaving stakes 
behind them, driven with the hope that Congress might speed the day when the territorial 
land would become government homesteads.”324  Rather than by force or coercion, 
federal officials worked to avoid public backlash against the absurd idea that Indians had 
amassed great amounts of property without earning them. 
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In the face of this public sentiment and genuine land hunger, in the 1870s and 
1880s the assimilationist practices became the official direction of U.S. Indian policy.  
Convinced reformers were certain it was the only way to avoid total annihilation of the 
Indian race.  If Indians did not simply disappear,  reform-minded politicians and social 
advocates, like the “Friends of the Indian” hoped to use federally mandated legislation to 
end Native American cultural practices that they viewed as destructive to the progress of 
the race.325  Moreover, the U.S. began to outlaw tribal governance and self-determination 
in order to eradicate tribal cultures and sovereignty.  The rationale for the assimilationist 
policies of private land ownership and compulsory U.S. citizenship was simple:  they 
would allow, if not force, Native Americans to become self-sufficient participants in 
American society – and, conveniently, the overall plan would require that they occupied 
much less land than they currently inhabited. 
From 1887 to 1891 Congress passed numerous pieces of groundbreaking 
legislation that rapidly brought an end to the concept of Indian Territory as a home where 
Native Americans could live by the rules and standards of their own nations, instead of 
being forced to conform to the non-Indian way of life.  In these years Congress passed 
several seminal pieces of legislation that forced significant changes to the lives of the 
Native Americans living in Indian Territory.  These included the Dawes Act, the Springer 
Amendment, the creation of the Cherokee Commission, and the Oklahoma Organic Act.  
However, the genesis of those actions was rooted in an 1871 decision to stop 
making treaties with tribes.  This began a new phase of Indian policy.  The dissolution of 
the treaty making process was achieved by a rider that was attached to a standard OIA 
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appropriations bill that was designed to allow the department to continue funding existing 
annuity agreements.  The rider mandated the end of treating with tribes by stipulating that 
“hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty.”326  The adoption of the bill did not nullify treaties 
made with tribes in the past, but in refusing to recognize the independence of tribes as 
separate nations the rider did adversely affect the ideal of tribal sovereignty.  The change 
meant that the President no longer had the luxury of negotiating treaties directly with the 
tribes, so the process became a larger legislative issue that was impacted by 
Congressional actors and agendas.327  Next, a powerful group of constituents pressured 
their representatives to open Indian lands to settlement.  The sentiment that non-Indians 
should be allowed to move into Indian Territory reached its zenith in the 1880s, and the 
political machine accelerated the opening of those lands by an unprecedented amount.  
Indian policy, yet again, became a vehicle to enact change that favored non-Indians.   
The monumental piece of legislation of this new era that shaped Native American 
land tenure was the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act, passed by Congress in 1887.  The 
act was named for Senator Henry L. Dawes, the principal congressional sponsor for the 
legislation.  Dawes was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and a 
regular attendee at the Lake Mohonk Conference for the Friends of the Indian.328  Like 
the allotment treaties the Citizen Potawatomi and other tribes entered into in the 1860s, 
the legislation of the 1880s authorized the federal government to survey tribal lands with 
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the intention of dividing them into plots that would then be allotted to individual Indians 
in severalty.  With the end of treaty making, Congress passed the Dawes Act to grant 
themselves the jurisdiction to extend allotment to many tribes, without having to 
negotiate specifics with each nation.   
The Dawes Act, however, had an added safeguard that the allotment treaties of 
the 1860s did not include.  It was stipulated that the federal government would hold tribal 
lands in trust for twenty-five years before such lands could be sold to outsiders.329  The 
high likelihood of tribal members being swindled out of their property, or selling at 
below market value when they needed money, was a lesson the federal government 
learned from the difficulties experienced by the Citizen Potawatomi and other tribes 
allotted in Kansas twenty-five years earlier.  Yet, just as the federal government believe 
they had corrected the problem, so too had settlers who simply circumvented the twenty-
five year trust period imposed by the Dawes Act, many non-Indian settlers simply leased 
large tracts of Native American land. 
The assimilationist goal of the law was to end communal land holdings, turn 
Indians into farmers, and dissolve the tenants of tribal governance by making Native 
Americans citizens, thereby obligated to follow the laws of the United States.330  
Individuals who accepted land allotments in severalty under the Dawes Act, lived apart 
from their tribe, and “adopted the habits of civilized life” were made U.S. citizens.331 All 
allottees under the act were “subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or 
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Territory in which they may reside.”332  Forty-seven million acres of land were allotted 
through the Dawes Act.   
The Indian Appropriations Act of March 2, 1889 was a formulaic piece of 
legislation that had sweeping repercussions for the Native Americans in Indian Territory 
and throughout the country.  There were two key elements of this act, the creation of the 
Cherokee Commission and the Springer Amendment.  Section XIV of the act provided 
for establishing the Cherokee (or Jerome) Commission.  The Commission’s mandate was 
to acquire the unoccupied lands of the Cherokee Outlet and the “surplus” lands of several 
other tribes in Indian Territory.  During the four year term of the Commission, from 1889 
to 1893, they arranged eleven cession agreements with nineteen different Oklahoma 
tribes to purchase more than fifteen million acres of land.333  Almost all of the land 
acquired by the Commission was made available to non-Indian settlers by 1900 and was 
vital in the effort to create the state of Oklahoma. 
The Springer Amendment, also attached to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1889, 
was a key piece of legislation for the would-be farmers who wanted to see Indian 
Territory opened to non-Indian settlement and annexed as a territory.  The amendment, 
named for its author, Congressman William Springer of Illinois, opened the almost two 
million acres known as the Unassigned Lands that lay west of the Citizen Potawatomi 
reservation to non-Indian settlers under the rules of the Homestead Act.334  President 
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Benjamin Harrison then issued a proclamation that set the date of April 22, 1889 for 
settlers to make legal entry into that territory and claim land.   
THE LAND RUNS AND THE OPENING OF INDIAN TERRITORY  
The chosen method of distribution was a land run.  The federal government’s 
decision to open the land of this region which, from its inception, lay outside the norm, 
was vividly described by Hamilton S. Wicks, a participant of the first land run.  He awed 
that “[a] city established and populated in half a day, in a remote region of the country 
and many miles distant from the nearest civilized community, is a marvel that could have 
been possible in no age but our own, and in no land except the United States.”335  For the 
non-Indian settlers who hoped to claim a homestead through the land run, the event was a 
fantastic opportunity and marked a beginning full of promise. For the Native Americans 
that were moved to these lands and told to create homes for themselves and their families, 
this was another reminder that the federal government would always accommodate the 
wishes of land-hungry Americans over the promises made to tribes. 
In the weeks before the late April run, government surveyors divided the area of 
the Unassigned Lands into townsites and one hundred and sixty acre homestead plots.  
On that spring day in 1889 more than fifty thousand people “seized with the Oklahoma 
fever” showed up to claim a piece of land in this “new Eldorado.”336  At high noon a 
bugle blast signaled the start of the race and “wagons and carriages and buggies and 
prairie schooners and a whole congregation of curious equipages joined in this 
unparalleled race, where every starter was bound to win a prize – the ‘Realization Stakes’ 
of home and prosperity.”337  Hamilton S. Wicks joined the land run in hopes of claiming 
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a townsite plot where he could establish a business.  He ultimately staked his claim on 
what became a main thoroughfare of Guthrie (the first capital of Oklahoma.)  He 
recounted the furious effort to create a tent by standing his folding cot on its end and 
draping it with blankets.  This effort made his claim “unjumpable because of substantial 
improvements.”  Because the Springer Amendment made no provisions for a code of law 
or regulations for local governments, the only existing authority in the region was that of 
the tribes, along with the vague and grossly inadequate systems of law that regulated 
unorganized territories.338  For months the bustling new towns and scattered homesteads 
were on the verge of lawless chaos; regular disputes erupted legitimacy of land claims.   
By April 23, 1889, the day after the land run, the settlement that would be Guthrie 
was a city of ten thousand people and five hundred tent dwellings.339  This was the first of 
seven land runs in the territory, and they all unfolded in a very similar fashion.340  The 
remaining land runs were made possible by the cession agreements the Cherokee 
Commission negotiated with various tribes in Indian Territory.  On September 22, 1891, 
the “surplus” lands on the Potawatomi, Iowa, and Sac and Fox reservations were opened.  
On that day more than twenty thousand people rushed to claim one of the seven thousand 
available one hundred and sixty acre parcels.341  The tracts immediately came under the 
administrative control of Oklahoma Territory.342    
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The federal government acted rashly with the opening of the Unassigned Lands in 
1889, because there was not a territorial government, nor was one in the planning stages.  
This was remedied on May 2, 1890, when Congress passed the Oklahoma Organic Act.  
The law officially created two distinct regions, Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory, 
out of the previously unorganized Indian Territory.343  It established the structure for a 
basic government, including a territorial governor and three district court judges, who 
were appointed by the President.  The residents of the territory were to elect a bi-cameral 
legislature and a territorial representative to Congress.344  The act also extended civil and 
criminal laws from surrounding states.  Arkansas courts had jurisdiction in Indian 
Territory and the laws of Nebraska applied to Oklahoma Territory until the territory 
adopted a code of law.345 In an attempt to encourage Native Americans to accept land 
allotments, the Organic Act also stipulated that “Indians who become citizens of the 
United States under the provisions of the act do not forfeit or lose any rights or privileges 
that they enjoy or are entitled to as members of the tribe or nation who which they 
belong.”346 
Although it was different from Indian Territory by name, both the Oklahoma and 
Indian Territories contained Indian reservations.  Indian Territory encompassed all of the 
Five Nations and several smaller tribes in the northeast corner of the future state of 
Oklahoma.  Oklahoma Territory consisted of all of the Unassigned Lands in the west, the 
Cherokee Outlet, and the reservations of several other tribes, including the Citizen 
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Potawatomi.  The border between the two territories ran along the Citizen Potawatomi’s 
eastern and southern borders. 
CONCLUSION 
The land in Indian Territory was methodically sectioned off and distributed to 
individuals at the cost of their tribal affiliation.  The remainder was regulated and 
organized into a patchwork of ever-expanding, white-friendly settlements. Ultimately, the 
Citizen Potawatomi and other tribes of Indian Territory found themselves in a sadly 
ironic situation.  The insatiable American appetite for expansion enveloped the Indians of 
Indian Territory in the very state removal was supposed to avoid, stripping them of their 
homeland, culture, and sovereignty while still forcing them to exist in close quarters with 
other non-Indians.   
During this period and the years following, the Citizen Potawatomi learned, by 
necessity, how to use the federal system to fight for their treaty-guaranteed rights.  They 
diligently petitioned the OIA regarding their rights to have ownership and command over 
their reservation lands.  What began as simple questioning evolved into the utilization of 
shrewd tactics aimed at forcing the federal government to recognize the legitimacy of 
their claims.  
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Chapter 5:  Starting Over in Indian Territory:   
The Citizen Potawatomi’s Struggle to Realize their Rights 
In 1889, Citizen Potawatomi tribal member, Mary (Anderson) Bourbonnais wrote 
a letter of petition to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan.  In the letter she 
demanded that the Citizen Potawatomi receive rights equal to those of the Absentee 
Shawnee when selecting allotment plots on the reservation the two tribes jointly 
occupied.  Bourbonnais was among the first Citizen Potawatomi to move to Indian 
Territory from their reservation in Kansas in 1872.  Her family and other members of the 
tribe wanted the right to claim land in the most desirable section of their reservation, the 
arable lands north of the Little River.  At the time of the letter, the Absentee Shawnee 
were allowed to choose lands in that section, while the Citizen Potawatomi were 
relegated to the less fertile land in the southern half.  Bourbonnais went on to accuse the 
allotting agent, N.S. Porter, of granting land on the Citizen Potawatomi reservation to 
Cherokee, Creek, Mexicans, and “state negroes,” but refusing to give tracts to “old 
Pottawatomie settlers.”347  Believing that Indians had to understand the treaties and laws 
that governed their lives, Bourbonnais demanded to know by what law, and under what 
authority, the agent was making the questioned allotments.348
 
  
Always a passionate supporter of the rights of Citizen Potawatomi women and 
their children, she argued that Citizen Potawatomi children should receive allotments of 
more than forty acres each since they would need the land to support families one day.  
To persuade the Commissioner to grant her requests, Bourbonnais asked Commissioner 
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Morgan to do what was honorable “before man and our God” and ended the letter by 
begging him to “right a wrong for helpless women and children.”349   
Mary Bourbonnais was far from “helpless.”  She was one of many tribal members 
who were outspoken advocates for the rights of the tribe in the late nineteenth century.350  
By 1889, when this letter was written, the Citizen Potawatomi in Indian Territory 
understood that they would have to fight to receive the rights to which they were entitled, 
or to attain redress for any of their concerns.  This particular petition addresses many of 
the fears and issues that the Citizen Potawatomi faced during their first two decades in 
Indian Territory.  The period from tribal members’ earliest arrivals in 1872, until their 
reservation was opened to non-Indian settlement through a land run in 1891, was a trying 
time.  These years were filled with confusion and frustration for the Citizen Potawatomi, 
because of uncertainty and unclear directions from the OIA; ultimately resulting in 
unprecedented political activism to see their right recognized by the federal government.     
The Citizen Potawatomi’s legal status as Indians who were U.S. citizens was still 
uncommon.351  Some federal officials questioned their right to move to Indian Territory, 
much less claim land there.  This liminal status as “quasi-citizens” also meant that the 
Citizen Potawatomi were not assigned to an Indian agency, the primary conduit for 
complaints or concerns, for the first five years in the territory.352  To further complicate 
the matter, because of the federal government’s failure to work out all of the details over 
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land tenure in the new reservation in Indian Territory, the Citizen Potawatomi became 
embroiled in a legal and social struggle with the Absentee Shawnee over land that 
persisted for more than a century beyond the scope of this study.353  Despite the challenge 
to obtain fertile land and make a place for themselves among existing tribes in the area, 
the Citizen Potawatomi managed to establish a strong community in Indian Territory. 
This chapter will explore all of these topics:  the Citizen Potawatomi’s efforts to 
define, and in some cases manipulate, their legal status; the tribe’s insistence on attaining 
equal property rights for women of the tribe, and their legal struggle to secure the most 
favorable land terms possible.  In 1867 the Citizen Potawatomi were dispossessed 
members of a legally dissolved tribe who had no clear rights afforded to them as either 
Native Americans or U.S. citizens.  By 1891 the Citizen Potawatomi were an organized 
Indian tribe whose members still had technical, if not applicable U.S. citizenship that they 
utilized to claim the most favorable allotment conditions possible.  This transition did not 
take place without significant effort. 
LEAVING KANSAS: A GRADUAL MIGRATION TO A NEW HOMELAND 
By the end of the 1860s, most of the officials in the OIA realized that their grand 
social experiment of assimilation through private land ownership and U.S. citizenship 
was largely a failure among the Citizen Potawatomi.  Making a Native American a 
landowner and citizen in name did not translate into the individual’s success or 
assimilation as a farmer in practice.  The federal government’s efforts were not a total 
loss, however, because their attempts to acculturate Indians often delivered the political 
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and economic results desired by non-Indians, regardless of the Native American’s 
success.  Kansas was a thriving young state and railroad companies and non-Indian 
settlers took possession of a significant amount of the Potawatomi’s former land 
holdings.  A small percentage of the Citizen Potawatomi succeeded as independent 
farmers and businessmen and thrived in their new conditions.  Far more, however, were 
quickly engulfed by adverse conditions and outside pressures from non-Indian settlers 
and corporate interests who desired their land and wanted them out of Kansas.   
Different opinions existed about why many of the Citizen Potawatomi did not 
flourish under allotment and U.S. citizenship.  The Potawatomi’s agent, Luther Palmer, 
initially saw no fault on his part, or in the actions and inaction of the federal government, 
when he reported on their condition in 1866.  He solely blamed the Citizen Potawatomi 
who failed to become successful farmers in Kansas for their own plight, declaring that 
they were in a condition of landlessness and poverty because as soon as they came into 
possession of money, or property that they could sell they spent everything they had 
buying items for their pleasure.  Palmer further opined that the average Potawatomi was 
doomed for failure because he “never seem[ed] to reflect that his means may become 
exhausted until his last dollar is gone.”  The agent offered no further explanation for this 
supposed behavior on the part of the Citizen Potawatomi, beyond his assertion that 
“[i]mprovidence is the peculiar characteristic of the real Indian.”354  In his opinion it was 
the Citizen Potawatomi’s innate “Indian-ness” that doomed them to a life of poverty and 
want.355 
                                                 
354 RCIA, 1866, 264.  
355 For more on preconceived notions and stereotypes about Native Americans, see Philip J. Deloria, 
Indians in Unexpected Places (University Press of Kansas, 2006) and Paige Raibmon, Authentic Indians: 
Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast (Duke University Press Books, 
2005).  The term “Indian-ness” is common in the historiography of Native American history.  A thorough 
definition of “Indian-ness” is given in the introduction to Francis Paul Prucha, Americanizing the American 
Indian: Writings by the “Friends of the Indian,” 1880-1900 (Harvard University Press, 1973) 7-8, in which 
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The Indian Agent who succeeded Luther Palmer in 1869, Joel H. Morris, was less 
disparaging of the Citizen Potawatomi’s character.  He acknowledged that some Citizen 
Potawatomi were “proving themselves worthy of the high trust reposed in them by the 
Government by earnestly devoting their energies to building thrifty, happy homes.”  Yet, 
many of the Citizen Potawatomi were desperate to move to Indian Territory after the 
failure of the assimilation policies of allotment and U.S. citizenship, “finding that in their 
individual cases it was premature.”356  The sentiment that the Citizen Potawatomi were 
simply ill-prepared was echoed four year later when the Potawatomi’s new agent, M.H. 
Newlin, asserted that the Prairie Band made a wise choice by not taking on U.S. 
citizenship, claiming that Native Americans, like the Citizen Potawatomi “should not be 
clothed with such privileges until they have reached a stage of civilization fitting them for 
the responsibilities attending the privileges.”357  In short, Newlin believed that the 
Potawatomi had not earned enough to justify their citizenship. 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Enoch Hoag, was not so quick to judge the 
Citizen Potawatomi for their poverty.  He commented that, while a few of the 
Potawatomi who took allotments and citizenship prospered, a far larger number had 
“retrograded into intemperance and poverty.”  He recognized the almost impossible 
conditions they faced and shifted some of the blame to non-Indian settlers and the federal 
government that allowed them to move into Kansas by warning that “the policy of 
allowing Indians to become citizens in the midst of white people is ruinous” and 
suggested that the policy should no longer be pursued because dishonest white men 
                                                                                                                                                 
he states, “All [reform policies] were aimed to destroy Indian-ness, in whatever form it persisted.  The aim 
was to do away with tribalism, with communal ownership of land, with the segregation of the Indians on 
reservations,…segregated from the association with good white citizens, with Indian cultural patters, with 
native languages, with Indian religious rites and practices – in short, with anything that deviated from the 
norms of civilization practiced and proclaimed by the white reformers themselves.” 
356 RCIA, 1870, 275-276 
357 RCIA, 1874, 217.  
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“cling to [Indians] like leeches, until they have possessed themselves of all their 
property.”358  Even agent Palmer, the most critical of all of the agents who served the 
Potawatomi in the 1860s, seemed to have had a change of opinion about the Citizen 
Potawatomi’s role in their desperate condition by the end of his tenure.  In 1869 he 
directly chastised the federal government, reporting that “I have no doubt if the 
stipulations of the treaty had been strictly observed on the part of the government, we 
would have had among the Pottowatomies to-day some as independent farmers and as 
good citizens as we have in the State.”359  Palmer thus drew attention to the OIA’s failure 
to follow its own safeguards and its responsibility for the dire conditions facing large 
numbers of the Citizen Potawatomi. 
There was a sentiment of culpability on the part of the federal government behind 
most of these statements.  When only a few Citizen Potawatomi managed to succeed 
government officials blamed the Potawatomi’s inherent “Indian-ness” for those who 
failed to make the transition to agriculturalists.   Such rationalization made it easy to 
ignore the mismanagement of the assimilation effort by the federal government, and the 
onslaught of corporations and non-Indian settlers pushing for access to Citizen 
Potawatomi land.  The Citizen Potawatomi were pressured into a legal arrangement of 
landownership and U.S. citizenship. Safeguards, like delayed taxation and conditional 
U.S. citizenship based on personal and financial success, were intended to make the 
process a gradual one and supposedly took into consideration an individual’s 
preparedness.  The officials who worked for the OIA knowingly ignored those 
                                                 
358 RCIA, 1870, 460. 
359 RCIA, 1869, 373. 
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safeguards.360  Regardless of who was to blame, a large percentage of the Citizen 
Potawatomi ended up in a general state of landlessness, despair, and poverty by the late 
1860s.   
These forlorn Citizen Potawatomi refused to succumb to their circumstances and 
chose to avail themselves of a clause in the 1861 allotment and citizenship treaty that 
allowed them to buy a new reservation in Indian Territory and move away from 
Kansas.361  The article stipulated that it was the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to 
appraise and sell any available lands that were assigned to a band of Potawatomi “if at 
any time hereafter any band or bands of the Pottawatomie Nation shall desire to remove 
from the homes provided for them in this treaty.”362  Any proceeds from the sale of 
Potawatomi lands in Kansas were meant to be used to purchase new lands for those 
individuals.     
Ironically, OIA officials included the article as an “escape clause” for the Prairie 
Band because they assumed (and hoped) the band would yield to the pressures of living 
among non-Indians and “disappear before the tide of civilization,” opening more land for 
settlement.363  The government’s logic behind having an exit strategy in place was that it 
would save the Citizen Potawatomi from being tethered to their less “civilized” kinsmen 
and allow them to succeed in close proximity to non-Indian society.364  It likely never 
                                                 
360 Even if individuals within the OIA had a change of heart and found fault with the department, the OIA 
returned to the assertion that the Citizen Potawatomi brought failure and landlessness on themselves when 
it served to vindicate the OIA actions. 
361 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:827. 
362 Ibid., 972-973. 
363 Agent Clarke, 1855, OIA-LR, roll 680.   
364 Murphy, Potawatomi of the West, 252–253.  The inclusion of this clause is evidence of the federal 
government’s commitment the notion that Native Americans who refused to adopt assimilation policies 
would never survive living among non-Indians.  
The Wyandot and Delaware tribes in Kansas entered into treaties with the United State that were similar to 
the Potawatomi’s 1861 treaty.  In those cases the factions of the tribe who became U.S. citizens stayed in 
Kansas and the non-citizen were removed to Indian Territory. 
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occurred to the drafters of the treaty of 1861 that the Citizen Potawatomi, who had 
largely accommodated and even sought out the federal government’s assimilation efforts, 
would be the ones who wanted to escape. 
GETTING ESTABLISHED IN A NEW HOME  
The provisions for the Citizen Potawatomi’s move to Indian Territory were 
stipulated in a treaty signed on February 27, 1867.  Signatories and the OIA agreed that a 
delegation of Citizen Potawatomi would accompany the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
to Indian Territory and select a tract of land, not exceeding thirty miles square.  The 
treaty stipulated that they would buy the reservation with the proceeds from selling their 
“surplus” lands in Kansas at one dollar per acre to the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe 
Railroad (after the Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western Railroad forfeited their right to 
purchase the land.)365   The treaty included a stipulation that the reservation “shall never 
be included within the jurisdiction of any State or Territory, unless an Indian Territory 
shall be organized.”366 
In the two years following the 1867 treaty, the Potawatomi Indian agent, with the 
assistance of the Business Committee, was obligated to create a census of who planned to 
sell their private lands (if they had not already) and move to Indian Territory and those 
who wanted to stay in Kansas and become U.S. citizens.367  The first Citizen Potawatomi 
did not become citizens until the following year, 1868, so it was not obvious at the 
drafting of this treaty that all of the Citizen Potawatomi, even those who planned to move 
to Indian Territory, would take U.S. citizenship.  Once the agent submitted the census to 
                                                 
365 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:970.  The Prairie Band were to receive their “pro rata” 
shares of the proceeds since they did not intend to move and could make no use of the new reservation. 
366 Ibid., II:971. 
367 U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Potawatomi Agency, Receipt book, November 14, 1868.   
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the OIA all restrictions on the sale and alienation of the Citizen Potawatomi’s land in 
Kansas were lifted.368  
A strict reading of the 1867 treaty brings to question the Citizen Potawatomi’s 
legal eligibility to become signatories and take advantage of the option to move.  As 
previously mentioned, the escape clause was included for the Prairie Band, who refused 
to accept the conditions of the treaty of 1861.  So, there was no mention or clarification 
as to whether the Citizen Potawatomi could be subject to the clause.  Article I of the 1867 
treaty stipulated that the tract would be patented to the “Pottawatomie Nation,” the name 
given to the combined bands when they moved onto the Kansas River reservation in 
1846.369  All of the Citizen Potawatomi that acquired the status of U.S. citizens in 1868, 
and those that took it later, were no longer legally members of an Indian nation because 
the 1861 treat specifically stated that those who took U.S. citizenship would “cease to be 
members of said tribe.”370  Therefore, their acceptance of U.S. citizenship was directly 
correlated to their supposed forfeiture of tribal citizenship. 
The OIA and the Potawatomi’s agents did not anticipate that so many of the 
Citizen Potawatomi would avail themselves of the opportunity to become U.S. citizens so 
quickly.  The path to citizenship laid out in the 1861 treaty was supposed to be a lengthy 
process that would protect those who were not ready for the encumbrances of citizenship.  
Article III of the 1861 treaty dictated that the President could grant U.S. citizenship to 
individuals who proved to a court that they were “sufficiently intelligent and prudent to 
control their affairs and interests, that they have adopted the habits of civilized life, and 
have been able to support, for at least five years, themselves and families.”  To fulfill 
                                                 
368 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:972. 
369 Ibid., II:970.   
370 Ibid., II:825.   
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their obligation of proof, the individual had to “appear in open court in the district court 
of the United States for the district of Kansas, and make the same proof and take the same 
oath of allegiance as is provided by law for the naturalization of aliens.”371  Thus, 
alienated members of an Indian nation could supposedly become un-alienated American 
citizens in charge of their own land as well as their own legal and financial affairs. 
By 1866 several hundred tribal members had gone through the process of 
naturalization and received the patent to their land.  The Potawatomi’s agent, Luther 
Palmer, reported that many more would make application for citizenship that fall, and 
that there were several tribal members who were “entirely competent to manage their 
own affairs.”372  Agent Palmer actively encouraged these individuals to pursue U.S. 
citizenship.  Federal officials did not expect, despite their tribal designation, all Citizen 
Potawatomi would, in short order, become U.S. citizens.  Yet for many Citizen 
Potawatomi, the promise of a cash payment upon accepting U.S. citizenship was great, 
and they persistently pursued their right to U.S. citizenship without the encouragement of 
their agent.373   
Even after all of the tribal members completed these prerequisite tasks for 
removal, there was no mass exodus of Citizen Potawatomi from Kansas.  Unlike previous 
removal the Potawatomi endured, the 1867 treaty agreement did not fund the relocation 
to Indian Territory.  Despite the pressure they were under from non-Indian settlers, the 
federal government, officials from the state of Kansas, or the deplorable condition of 
their lives on the reservation, the move was voluntary and to be paid for privately.  Many 
                                                 
371 Ibid. 
372 RCIA, 1866, 264.   
373 As noted in chapter 3, each Citizen Potawatomi who became a U.S. citizen was eligible for their share 
of the monies owed the tribe.  This came out to a direct payment of just over $600 per person.  U.S. Office 
of Indian Affairs, Potawatomi Agency, Receipt book, November 14, 1868.  
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of the families were too poor to finance such a move and did not receive the same annuity 
monies as other Native Americans (because of their quasi-citizen status).  The reality was 
that the poverty that made life on the Kansas reservation difficult also prevented most 
Citizen Potawatomi from moving to their new reservation to start over. 
To complicate matters of citizenship and intertribal politics, many of the destitute 
Citizen Potawatomi moved onto the reduced acreage of the Prairie Band reservation or 
onto the property of their extended family until they could procure the funds to make yet 
another move to yet another designated Indian Territory.  Joseph N. Bourassa, a Citizen 
Potawatomi, reported the tribal members’ deplorable condition in a plea to the Prairie 
Band Potawatomi’s Indian agent in 1875 in which he wrote that: 
 
…a majority of the sectionizing Indians are in extreme want.  Nothing to feed 
their families, no money and no land…and many of them wish and intend to 
move South as soon as they can raise the means…as they see they can no longer 
live in Kansas. …The Indians are suffering extremely…It is enough to make any 
human being cry to witness the suffering there is in many of the families at 
present.  They have no aid from the whites of the State, nor from the general 
government….374 
Joseph N. Bourassa served as an interpreter for many Potawatomi treaties and was 
well respected in the Citizen Potawatomi community in Kansas.  He and several other 
affluent Citizen Potawatomi decided to stay in Kansas to farm their land and operate 
flourishing businesses.375  Bourassa’s words, therefore, were not self-serving; he was 
petitioning on behalf of his tribe.   
                                                 
374 J.N. Bourassa to Agent M.H. Newlin, March 10, 1875, OIA-LR, roll 692.  The agent was technically 
only assigned to the Prairie Band in 1875, because the Citizen Potawatomi took U.S. citizenship and were 
not supposed to be part of an Indian tribe anymore. 
375 Joseph Napoleon Bourassa was one of the wealthier Citizen Potawatomi who chose to stay in Kansas.  
He died near Rossville, KS in 1877.  Bourassa, Joseph N. Collection, “The Death of ‘Bourassa the 
Interpreter,’” Citizen Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center Archives, Shawnee, OK. 
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Despite the difference in official status between the two groups, the OIA made 
little distinction between those who were Citizen Potawatomi or Prairie Potawatomi on 
the census.  If an individual was willing to move away from Kansas they were included, 
and OIA officials hoped that all of the Potawatomi who found it “difficult to manage 
their affairs and sustain themselves in contact with whites” would choose to “throw up 
their allotments and follow their friends to their new homes.”376  Given that structures 
were in place that made it difficult for Indians to make the transition to surviving as small 
farmers, it seems a powerful cohort of politicians, corporate agents and residents of 
Kansas wanted almost all Indians to leave the state.377 
This systematic dispossession of Indians from their land took a psychological toll 
on the Potawatomi. Luther Palmer, the Potawatomi’s Indian agent, reported in 1868 that 
in the months following the negotiation of the treaty of 1867, some of the Citizen 
Potawatomi became “restive” and “f[e]ll into vicious and dissipated habits, as a result of 
the state of uncertainty” since they had determined to move to Indian Territory.378  The 
Citizen Potawatomi were not sure when they would move, but with the knowledge that 
their time in Kansas was limited, most of these individuals (the few who could afford to 
do so) did not attempt to put crops in the ground or further improve their living 
conditions.  The rest were living in temporary homes on the Prairie Band’s reservation.  
All were in a state of limbo and growing restless.  A few members of the Citizen Band 
rallied and tried to better their situation. 
                                                 
376 RCIA, 1866, 264. 
377 There are a few people listed as Prairie Band on the names of the Potawatomi on the reservation in 
Indian Territory in 1887.  They were all spouses of Citizen Potawatomi.  Census Rolls Collection, Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center Archives, “1887 Citizen Band Land Allotment Roll.” 
378 RCIA, 1868, 264.  In this same letter Agent Palmer reported that many of the Prairie Potawatomi were 
desirous to acquire a new reservation in Indian Territory so that they could move away from Kansas.  
Almost every Prairie Potawatomi stayed in Kansas, so Palmer’s claim likely reflects his personal hopes or 
his desire to appease his superiors in the OIA. 
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In the winter 1868 a group of Citizen Potawatomi made a failed attempt to travel 
to Indian Territory to select a new reservation.  The water was too high and roads were 
impassable.  The Prairie Band, as a whole, still refused to remove from Kansas, but the 
Superintendent hoped that “when their brethren of the citizen class remove they will be 
induced to follow.”379  The following winter, in 1869, another party of Citizen 
Potawatomi traveled to Indian Territory and selected a tract of land that became the site 
of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.380  They chose a section of land that encompassed 
thirty square miles from the north fork of the Canadian River to the south fork.  The 
eastward flowing Little River, which was little more than a creek, divided the reservation 
almost evenly in half.  The land lay just west of the Seminole reservation and had an 
eastern boundary at the Indian Meridian.381  Once the Citizen Potawatomi selected land 
for the new reservation they could begin the process of settling their affairs in Kansas and 
relocating to the Indian Territory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
379 RCIA, 1869, 358. 
380 The selection of the plot was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on November 9, 1870.  Agent 
Joel H. Morris to Superintendent of Indian Affairs Enoch Hoag, September 1, 1870; S. Doc. No. 64, 51
st
 
Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. (1891), 3.   
381 The Indian Meridian is a survey line that runs twelve miles west of the 97
th
 Meridian.  It was 
established as a survey line in the 1866 treaties with the Choctaw and Chickasaw. Berlin B. Chapman, 
“Indian Meridian, Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office for the Year 1871,” 1967, 
Research Division, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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Figure 3: Sac and Fox Agency in Indian Territory, 1879 (Annual Report to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1879.) 
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The earliest families to make the journey to their new reserve arrived in Indian 
Territory in 1872.  Since they paid for the move themselves, these families were among 
the more affluent Potawatomi families who were able to move from Kansas and included 
members of the Anderson, Melot, Clardy, Pettifer, Bergeron, and Toupin families.382  An 
Anderson family history notes that the Citizen Potawatomi brothers, John and Pete 
Anderson, had land holding in Kansas valued at $2,000.  Records don’t indicate whether 
the brothers sold their allotments in Kansas, or lost them through fraud.383  Yet, the fact 
that they were able to finance their emigration to Indian Territory suggests that they sold 
at least a portion of their land and that the sale of land generated enough money that the 
two men and their families were able to afford the journey from Kansas to Indian 
Territory.  They were not alone.  
Fourteen wagons filled with supplies and eager, yet anxious, Citizen Potawatomi 
set out for their new homes in Indian Territory with little idea about what they would 
encounter and how they would succeed in supporting their families.384  The obvious 
challenges of living in a state that was hostile to its Indian population, like Kansas was, 
induced some to move.  It also motivated them to stick together in their new homes. Most 
of these earliest arrivals settled together in a small community they called Pleasant Prairie 
                                                 
382 Some prosperous families, like those of Joseph Napoleon Bourassa and Lewis Vieux, chose to stay in 
Kansas where they had established homes, farms and businesses.  Others, like those listed above, chose to 
move to Indian Territory as soon as they could to take advantage of the opportunities they believed could 
be available on their new reservation.  The availability of capital allowed these families to choose which 
scenario was best for them.  For the less affluent Citizen Potawatomi the decision to stay in Kansas or 
move south was often determined by what they could manage financially. 
383 Anderson Collection, Citizen Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center Archives, Documents 
Hist131. 
384 Charles W. Mooney, Localized History of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma to 1907, 1971, 6, 44.  
Seven families made the initial move together.  The Bergeron and Toupin family names are sometimes 
spelled Burjon and Toupain respectively.   
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near the center of the reservation.385  By the end of the year the population of the budding 
community was a mere twenty-eight people.386  It was not immediately obvious to these 
early emigrants or to the hundreds of Citizen Potawatomi who followed in their wake that 
they would soon face fierce challenges to their land tenure, their individual rights, and 
even their identity as Native Americans, though given their past experiences, many could 
have guessed that the transition to a new land would not be an easy one. Their first major 
challenge would be a fight to determine their rights as members of two separate 
populations: the US and their tribal nation.  
POTAWATOMI CITIZENS? 
The first obstacle they faced had to do with their legal status.  In his 1871 report 
to the Superintendent, the Potawatomi’s Indian Agent in Kansas, J.H. Morris, noted that 
the Citizen Potawatomi received notice from the OIA that, “being citizens of the United 
States,” they were not legally eligible to enter into the treaty of 1867 and could not avail 
themselves of the option to move to the new reservation in Indian Territory because the 
land “should never be sold to any but Indians.”387  This was a stunning development for 
the Citizen Potawatomi and their agent since the Senate ratified the treaty of 1867 and 
proclaimed it legal in the summer of 1868.  At that time, the agent went on to give his 
opinion that the Citizen Potawatomi who wanted to move south should be reassured that 
they could claim and settle the land.  He reiterated his opinion that he still considered 
them Indians and thought the OIA should too by asserting that “these Indians are looking 
                                                 
385 Ibid., 44. 
386 Anderson Collection, Citizen Potawatomi Nation Cultural Heritage Center Archives, Documents 
Hist132.  The town was known as Pleasant Prairie until 1881, when the name changed to Wagoza. 
387 RCIA, 1871, 496.  A Senate report on the proceedings, submitted in 1891, states that the Secretary of 
the Interior made the declaration regarding the Citizen Potawatomi’s ineligibility on March 16, 1872. S. 
Doc. No. 64, 51
st
 Cong. 2
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 Sess. (1891), 3.    
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forward with anxiety to see this question settled.”388  In short, at least this agent believed 
that the Potawatomi had not given up their identity as Indians even as they became 
American citizens. 
Morris’ report, and his forceful rebuttal to the Superintendent, calls attention to 
the lack of clarity, and drastically varying opinions, within the OIA about the Citizen 
Potawatomi’s legal status.  Some of this contradiction can be explained as a natural result 
of the confusion that accompanies a transition from one administration to the next.  New 
presidents, Secretaries of the Interior, Commissioners of Indian Affairs, and other 
officials in control of the nation’s Indian policy came into office with own their 
interpretation of relationships with Native Americans and individual tribes.  
A contradictory approach to the Citizen Potawatomi’s citizenship status 
dominated their existence in Indian Territory until the end of the 1880s.389  The federal 
government’s ability to ignore or enforce the Citizen Potawatomi’s U.S. citizenship is 
evidence that an individual’s legal personhood does not always safeguard their actual 
equality in society nor does it assure their civil liberties.  It was in these years that it 
became apparent that government agents and other non-Indians found it almost 
impossible to accept the idea that Indians could be members of two separate political 
bodies.    
When it was more convenient for them, the federal government was willing to 
disregard the Citizen Potawatomi’s U.S. citizenship, which was contingent on their 
“ceasing to be members” of their tribe.390  Organizing the Citizen Potawatomi’s move out 
                                                 
388 RCIA, 1871, 496.  Italics added.  By March 3, 1871, all 1,518 Citizen Potawatomi had become U.S. 
citizens.  Peter R. Hacker, “Confusion and Conflict: A Study of Atypical Responses to Nineteenth Century 
Federal Indian Policies by the Citizen Band Potawatomis,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 
13, no. 1 (1989): 83. 
389 For a critique of the politics of tribal recognition and ideologies that dictate cultural authenticity see 
Barker, Native Acts. 
390 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:825. 
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of Kansas and onto a reservation in Indian Territory required the use of the “escape 
clause” in the treaty of 1861, as well as a new treaty to stipulate the terms of their 
removal.  Only Indians could be subject to, or enter into, treaty agreements with the 
federal government; so, the OIA chose to recognize the Citizen Potawatomi as Native 
Americans to make both of these scenarios possible.   
The decision did not come without its detractors.  The Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs reported to the Secretary of the Interior in 1872, just after a few dozen Citizen 
Potawatomi moved to their reservation, that the Citizen Potawatomi were living on the 
land in Indian Territory “without any authority of law for such residence, or any color of 
title to the soil.”  He argued the Citizen Potawatomi had no rights to their reservation 
because they were United States citizens and “the provisions for such a reservation to the 
tribe failed as a matter of course.”391   
Denying the Citizen Potawatomi’s eligibility to make use of the “escape clause” 
in the treaty of 1861 and negotiate the treaty of 1867 proved to be short lived.  Despite 
the protest of the Commissioner and others who did not think the Citizen Potawatomi 
deserved a second chance in Indian Territory, the 1867 treaty was upheld and they began 
to migrate south.  The Citizen Potawatomi’s struggle to realize the rights they were 
eligible to receive by treaties and other laws did not end with this episode.  When 
recognizing the Citizen Potawatomi as Native Americans was not in the federal 
government’s best interest, they often insisted that the Citizen Potawatomi were no 
longer eligible for the rights and privileges of other Indians.  There is perhaps no better 
example of this than what occurred to the Citizen Potawatomi once they left Kansas.  
This reversal of opinion occurred once the Citizen Potawatomi were out of Kansas.  The 
                                                 
391 RCIA, 1872, 89.  Italics original to source.  The Commissioner also argued that the Absentee Shawnee 
had no rights to the reservation, but it was not due to a question of their status as Indians, it was because 
they did not have a treaty assigning them to that tract.   
 159 
OIA wanted to categorize the emigrant Indians as U.S. citizens again so they could refuse 
to assign them to an agency, provide them with monetary assistance, and access to 
benefits like government schools.  OIA officials who blamed the Citizen Potawatomi for 
their general lack of success in Kansas argued that they did not deserve further assistance 
from the federal government because they were given the opportunity to become land 
owners and U.S. citizens in Kansas and they “squandered their substance and returned as 
Indians dependent upon the bounty of the Government.”392   
In 1876, Citizen Potawatomi tribal member George L. Young petitioned the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to give aid to the Citizen Potawatomi.  Young stated that 
non-Indians in Kansas, whose primary aim was to take property, surrounded the Citizen 
Potawatomi.  He claimed that “we were soon stripped of all that we had received in the 
way of head money and land and left almost in a state of destitution and intemperance.”  
According to Young, the Citizen Potawatomi moved south to Indian Territory to get 
away from those negative influences and attempt to create a home for their families.  He 
plead with the Commissioner, “[w]e are poor – in fact, all we have left is our will to do, 
and the Great Spirit being with us, we feel we are once more men and women.  Now, Sir, 
such being our present condition, cannot you persuade the Government to assist us in this 
our honest undertaking?”393  Young’s argument is clear, in his opinion the Citizen 
Potawatomi had done everything that the government had asked of them and still ended 
up dispossessed of their land in Kansas and were living in a state of near poverty in 
Indian Territory.  Moreover, he referenced the Great Spirit, not a Christian God, in his 
                                                 
392 RCIA, 1876, xxv.  Regardless of the opinions of OIA officials about the Citizen Potawatomi’s 
worthiness for federal assistance, the reality was that they were in just as much need as most of their 
neighbors in Indian Territory. 
393 George L. Young to CIA, J.Q. Smith, 6 November 1876, OIA-LR, roll 692.  George Young signed as 
Secretary, thus it can be assumed that he is writing on behalf of the Business Committee.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, Young was not a tribal member by blood; he married into the tribe and served on the Business 
Committee. 
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letter perhaps to emphasize that the Potawatomi had not yet been completely assimilated. 
Young’s petition suggests that some Citizen Potawatomi thought that the federal 
government was going to have to assist the Citizen Potawatomi in their honorable 
endeavors if they wanted them to have any chance of survival.   
From 1873 to 1877 there is little information about the Citizen Potawatomi 
recorded with the OIA because they received almost no aid, they were not assigned to an 
agency and therefore had no Indian agent.  It was ultimately the persistent petitions of 
men on the Business Committee, like George Young, and other concerned tribal members 
that demanded acknowledgment of the band’s rights that led to the Citizen Potawatomi 
receiving $2,500 in 1875 for a school.394  In 1877 the OIA finally attached the Citizen 
Potawatomi to the Sac and Fox Agency under the supervision of Levi Woodard. 
 
He 
reported that about two hundred and fifty Citizen Potawatomi resided on the reservation, 
three years later that number was three hundred.395  By assigning them to an Indian 
agency the OIA was acknowledging the Citizen Potawatomi’s political status as a Native 
American tribe.  
DISPUTED LAND 
Besides the ongoing battle with the federal government over their dual legal status 
as U.S. citizens and Indians, for their first twenty years in Indian Territory the Citizen 
Potawatomi were also embroiled in an ongoing conflict with the Absentee Shawnee over 
land.  The Citizen Potawatomi could not have known it at the time, but their land 
selection laid the foundation for generations of conflict and bitter feuding between 
themselves and the Absentee Shawnee, who resided within the boundaries of the new 
                                                 
394 In 1875, John H. Pickering, agent at the Sac & Fox Agency, was given the funds to build a school for 
the Citizen Potawatomi on their reservation.  RCIA, 1875, 287.   
395 RCIA, 1877, 105.  Murphy, 306. 
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Potawatomi reservation.396  Both tribes had strong claims to the land and were 
determined to see their rights protected and property shielded from encroachment by 
outsiders, whether other Indians or non-Indians.   
The Citizen Potawatomi had a ratified treaty that gave them the right to claim a 
reservation and established an agreement for them to pay for that land.  The treaty of 
1867 stated that the Citizen Potawatomi could choose “a suitable location for their people 
without interfering with the locations made for other Indians” and assured that the 
reservation would be set aside for the “exclusive use and occupancy” of the Citizen 
Potawatomi.397  An official from the OIA accompanied them when they chose the 
technically unclaimed plot that the Absentee Shawnee occupied and it was approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior.  The Citizen Potawatomi could not have walked the entire 
576,000 acres of land that would comprise their reservation, and there is no evidence the 
Citizen Potawatomi had any idea that another tribe occupied the land they chose at the 
time of their selection.  Until 1866 the land legally belonged to the Seminole and Creek 
tribes, and it was given to the Citizen Potawatomi by the terms of the treaty of 1867, so 
the Absentee Shawnee had no documentation to support their occupation of the land.  
The fact that the OIA allowed the Citizen Potawatomi to choose this plot meant that the 
Absentee Shawnee did not meet the minimum requirement to delineate that land as a 
“location made for other Indians.”398  The factor that had the most influence in the federal 
government finding the Citizen Potawatomi’s claim in Indian Territory valid was their 
present occupation of highly sought after land in Kansas.  The federal government and 
                                                 
396 In 1870 Superintendent Enoch Hoag warned that tract selected by the Citizen Potawatomi was already 
the home to the Absentee Shawnee, but nothing was done to prevent conflict over the territory.  RCIA, 
1870, 260. 
397 Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II:970. 
398 Ibid. 
 162 
non-Indian residents of the state were eager to rid the area of its Indian population.  As 
far as the OIA was concerned, the details of land ownership between the two tribes could 
be finalized after the Citizen Potawatomi arrived in Indian Territory. In this case, the 
status of the Potawatomi was yet again ambiguously defined for the advantage of outside 
interests. 
The Absentee Shawnee occupied and improved the tract selected by the Citizen 
Potawatomi from 1836 to the 1860s.  During the Civil War the Absentee Shawnee were 
forced to flee north because of their support for the Union, abandoning their land and 
improvements.399  After the war ended they returned to their homes in Indian Territory 
and negotiated a treaty with the federal government to have the tract assigned to them as 
a permanent reservation.  Assuming they would soon hold title to the land, the Absentee 
Shawnee reoccupied their antebellum tracts and began repairing and making further 
improvements, including tilling land and planting crops.  The Senate never ratified the 
treaty granting the land to them, however, opening the door for the Citizen Potawatomi to 
select the legally unassigned lands as their reservation in 1869.400  The Absentee 
Shawnee complained bitterly to their Indian agents, who reported the tribe’s 
dissatisfaction in their submissions for the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs throughout the 1880s.  
The Absentee Shawnee’s primary argument for the validity of their claim on the 
land between the north and south forks of the Canadian River was their occupation of the 
land for almost four decades prior to the Citizen Potawatomi’s arrival, with the exception 
                                                 
399 Hacker, “Confusion and Conflict: A Study of Atypical Responses to Nineteenth Century Federal Indian 
Policies by the Citizen Band Potawatomis,” 83. 
400 Ibid.  No one told the Citizen Potawatomi that the land was occupied when they visited in 1869 to make 
their selection, though Superintendent Enoch Hoag did warn that tract selected by the Citizen Potawatomi 
was already the home to the Absentee Shawnee in the 1870 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs.  RCIA, 1870, 255. 
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of a few years during the war.  Also, the federal government set aside the land in Indian 
Territory for the relocation of Indians and (unlike the Citizen Potawatomi) the Absentee 
Shawnee’s legal status as Indians was not in question at any time.  Despite the logic 
behind the Absentee Shawnee’s assertion that the land they lived on belonged to them, 
the substance and legal validity of the Citizen Potawatomi’s claim could not be ignored.   
There was no simple solution to this problem.  The Citizen Potawatomi were not 
eager to find another reservation, and as a result of decades of the federal government’s 
removal policies, there was no area in Indian Territory that was vacant of an Indian 
population.  A similar dilemma of contested land claims was likely to arise no matter 
where the OIA proposed to move them.  In an attempt to rectify the conflict between the 
Citizen Potawatomi and the Absentee Shawnee, the Secretary of the Interior, Columbus 
Delano, urged Congress to enact legislation that would allow both tribes to reside on the 
land.401   
In response, on May 23, 1872, Congress passed a law titled, “Act to Provide 
Homes for the Pottawatomie and Absentee Shawnee Indians in Indian Territory.”402  In 
theory, this act solved the most glaring issues facing each tribe’s claim.  It created a legal 
path to ownership for the Absentee Shawnee who lived on and improved the land without 
title for decades.  It quieted any concerns about the Citizen Potawatomi’s ability to have a 
reservation in Indian Territory because of their legal status as United States citizens by 
designating that the Citizen Potawatomi “shall neither acquire nor exercise under the laws 
of the United States any rights or privileges in said Indian Territory, other than those 
                                                 
401 Delano to Blaine, March 15, 1872, House Executive Document no. 203, 3-4, cited in Ibid., 83–84. 
402 Act to Provide Homes for the Pottawatomie and Absentee Shawnee Indians in Indian Territory, Statutes 
at Large 17, sec. 206,  159 (1871-1873). 
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enjoyed by members of the Indian tribes lawfully residing therein.”403  It further 
diminished the Citizen Potawatomi’s status as U.S. citizens by providing that “[u]ntil 
otherwise provided by law such tracts shall be exempt from levy, taxation, or sale.”404  
The Citizen Potawatomi were now Native Americans who were technically U.S. citizens, 
but were not subject to taxation.405  Though the act clarified some of the more 
troublesome legal questions about each tribe’s land tenure, it did not remedy the conflict 
and tension between the two communities.  
The Absentee Shawnee were upset over what they felt were severe guidelines and 
restrictions they faced under the Act of 1872.  The provisions of the law only allowed 
them to claim allotments that were a fraction of the size of those allowed for the Citizen 
Potawatomi.  It stipulated that any Citizen Potawatomi head of family, or adult over the 
age of twenty-one, could purchase up to one-quarter section (160 acres) of land as their 
allotment and minors could purchase up to eighty acres.  Absentee Shawnee children 
were only eligible for twenty acres and adults a maximum of eighty acres.  This 
discrepancy in the acreage allocation between the two tribes was likely the result of the 
treaty of 1867 dictating the Citizen Potawatomi’s allotment conditions.  The Absentee 
Shawnee had no prior allotment agreement.  Also, the Citizen Potawatomi had to pay for 
their allotments and the Absentee Shawnee did not.406  The Absentee Shawnee also had 
                                                 
403 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. IV (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1929), 947. 
404 Ibid.  
405 The Citizen Potawatomi had all taken oaths of citizenship and had naturalization papers on file with the 
federal government.  So, any reversal of their U.S. citizenship was cursory at best.  Moreover, the Citizen 
Potawatomi still professed to be U.S. citizens and used their status as such to push for their rights over the 
next several decades. 
406 S. Doc. No. 64, 51
st
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. (1891), 2.  The rationale behind making the Citizen Potawatomi 
purchase their allotments, but not requiring the same from the Absentee Shawnee is not addressed in the 
correspondence of the OIA.  Federal officials were likely just following standard procedure.  It was not a 
common practice to make Native Americans purchase the land they lived on, and the Citizen Potawatomi 
did not have to purchase their first allotments in Kansas.  So, it was most certainly the Citizen 
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the added obligation of proving their residency on the reservation for three years and a 
requirement to have made “substantial improvements” on the plot to ensure they received 
their selected tract.407  The Citizen Potawatomi had neither of these burdens.  They 
received allotments of one hundred and sixty acres for all adults just a decade before in 
Kansas and they had a treaty permitting them to live on the reservation in Indian 
Territory.  So, it is plausible that the Citizen Potawatomi received more favorable 
allotment terms because they had the experience to negotiate for them or the OIA 
believed that they would not accept anything less. 
The Absentee Shawnee were also concerned that the Act of 1872 did not delineate 
a clear boundary between the lands the two groups could claim.  Most of the Absentee 
Shawnee settled in the northeastern portion of the reservation, near the fertile flood plains 
of the north fork of the Canadian River.  They hoped to own the entire northern section as 
a reservation in common, so they did not want the OIA to allow the Citizen Potawatomi 
to make any land selections there.  In 1887, the acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
reported that his office had recommended the creation of an official reservation division 
on several occasions, but a line never resulted.408
 
 The option of isolating a section for the 
Absentee Shawnee was not a legally viable option for the OIA, because the Citizen 
Potawatomi’s 1867 treaty called for a thirty-square-mile reservation.  To fulfill this 
obligation to the Citizen Potawatomi there could not be a legal boundary across the center 
of the tract.  The OIA believed that the lack of a binding separation between the two 
tribes was a detail that could be addressed by urging the Citizen Potawatomi who moved 
                                                                                                                                                 
Potawatomi’s agreement to pay under the terms of the treaty of 1867 that created the separate allotment 
terms for the two tribes. 
407 Ibid.  
408 Ibid., 4, 9.  Commissioner Atkins reported later that year that he believed the mixing of the two tribes 
would be “advantageous” for the Absentee Shawnee.  
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to Indian Territory to settle in the southern portion of the reservation.409  The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs even stated that “while there is no authority of law” for 
an official division of the land, it was always the “declared intention of this office” that 
members of each tribe select their allotments in distinct portions of the reservation.410
 
 
The OIA eventually learned that their intention for the Citizen Potawatomi to settle in the 
southern section of the reservation without the authority of the law was not effective. 
   Again, uncertainty took its toll. Throughout the 1880s, the Sac and Fox agents 
filled reports to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with commentary about the 
detrimental effect the uncertainty of land rights had on farming and further development 
by both tribes.  The expense and risk deterred many Citizen Potawatomi who were still in 
Kansas (and who were poor anyway) from undertaking a move to Indian Territory in the 
1870s without certainty that they would be able to claim the land they desired.  For 
almost a century these individuals and their ancestors experienced the fear and frustration 
of seeing virtually every treaty they entered into with the federal government broken; so 
the Citizen Potawatomi were understandably hesitant to trust promises that they would be 
allowed to settle. 
The frustrations of both tribes are understandable.  The Citizen Potawatomi had a 
ratified treaty that granted them a thirty-square-mile reservation in Indian Territory and 
they were led to believe that they were purchasing a reservation that would belong to 
them alone.  They took on the personal expense to move their families from Kansas to 
this new land in Indian Territory with the promise that they could live there forever.  
Furthermore, the Act of 1872 clearly laid out the terms of allotment for this group, and it 
                                                 
409 In later years the allotting agent was given orders to allot the Citizen Potawatomi in the south and the 
Absentee Shawnee in the north.  The Citizen Potawatomi quickly challenged the authority of this order.   
410 S. Doc. No. 64, 51
st
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. (1891), 4.   
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did not include any limitations about location.  The Absentee Shawnee, contrarily, 
outnumbered the Citizen Potawatomi almost two-to-one in 1872 and had decades of 
occupancy on the land.  They had never taken government aid and were also legally 
allowed to claim personal plots of land per the specifications of the Act of 1872.   
Neither tribe did anything outside of the law to call their right to claim personal 
plots of land into question.  It was the failure of the federal government that made the 
allotment experience for the Citizen Potawatomi and Absentee Shawnee so convoluted 
and confusing, making any efforts to improve the land a risk on the part of the individual 
Indian.  Unlike the white settlers who seemed to have little regard for the Indians on 
whose land they settled, the Potawatomi were more circumspect. The OIA made matters 
worse. They could have avoided subjecting the tribes to years of frustration and hardship 
if they had made an effort to find a long-term solution to the land claims of both tribes 
from the beginning and remained consistent, but they did not.   
After Congress passed the Act of 1872, federal officials urged members of both 
tribes to choose their allotments.  The majority of Absentee Shawnee did not want to take 
allotments in severalty, instead requesting that the portion of the Potawatomi’s 
reservation that lay north of Little River (where the vast majority of the Absentee 
Shawnee lived) be given to them as a separate reservation held in common.  Their 
aversion only partially lay in a reluctance to abandon the cultural tradition of common 
land ownership.  The main cause for their opposition to allotment was the presence of the 
Citizen Potawatomi on the same reservation.  As long as the federal government did not 
issue land in severalty there was a chance that it would create a permanent division 
between the two tribes.411  Adding to their resistance was the stipulation in the act of May 
                                                 
411 Ibid., 3.   
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23, 1872 requiring that allottees be of pure or mixed Absentee Shawnee blood.  A certain 
portion of the individuals living among the Absentee Shawnee were from other tribes, 
and would therefore not be eligible for land.  They reasoned that if they held the 
reservation lands in common this would not be an issue.412  Despite their reluctance, in 
November of 1875, the allotting agent convinced 327 Absentee Shawnee to claim the 
land they already occupied as their allotment; 131 Citizen Potawatomi also chose 
allotments at this time.413  The ineptitude and vacillation of the federal government 
produced delays of several years before attempts were made to issue titles for the plots 
chosen by the Citizen Potawatomi and Absentee Shawnee in 1875.   
The OIA’s indecision about the Citizen Potawatomi’s legal status was the primary 
obstruction to the issue of titles for their land.  In January of 1884 to April of 1885, the 
OIA issued eleven titles, with the cost of $193.60 reimbursed to the federal government.  
The Secretary of the Interior denied the rest, stating that, “the nation had become extinct 
by reason of all its members being made citizens.”414  In the case of the Absentee 
Shawnee, the impediment was a record keeping error.  The allotment agent did not 
correctly classify allottees in the original register, so a new register had to be created.  In 
the intervening years, the Absentee Shawnee, who were initially hesitant to take 
allotments, resolved to prevent the federal government’s allotment efforts.  In an attempt 
to pressure the federal government into letting them take their land in common, when 
special allotting agent Townsend visited the Absentee Shawnee in 1883 to issue titles to 
                                                 
412 RCIA, 1884, 95. 
413 RCIA, 1886, 143.  Murphy, 306.  It took some time to attain an allotment, so it can be assumed that the 
population in 1875 was above 131.  Twelve of these allotments were granted to John and Peter Anderson 
and their families.  This family would later become involved in a law suit to have the titles to their plots 
issued to them.  S. Doc. No. 64, 51
st
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. (1891), 17.   
414 Ibid., 6, 8.  No more details about why those eleven titles were granted, but there was a note in the 
instructions for allotting agent N.S. Porter that “should any questions arise regarding the eleven allottees 
who have received their certificates, it will be considered hereafter.”   
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the lands they claimed in 1875, they refused to accept.415  OIA officials blamed the 
Absentee Shawnee’s refusal to take titles to their allotments in 1883 after their initial 
acceptance of the idea in 1875 as “the influence of the chiefs and the superstitions of 
some of the non-progressive Indian.”416  
The trouble between the Citizen Potawatomi and Absentee Shawnee over land 
division and settlements simmered for years, but conflict between the two tribes over land 
did not begin, in earnest, until 1883.  In that year the agent reported that, in recent years, 
some of the Citizen Potawatomi who originally settled in the southern portion of the 
reservation, below the Little River, migrated north and took land among the Absentee 
Shawnee.  The Absentee Shawnee were upset because they believed that there was a 
division, even if it was simply implied, between the tribes at the Little River that bisected 
the reservation.  The Citizen Potawatomi, accurately, argued that a definitive line 
between the two groups was never established and claimed they left their lands in the 
southern portion of the reservation because the plots in the north were a better quality for 
agriculture.  They also reasoned that the federal government was not going to support the 
Absentee Shawnee’s claims that they owned the northern lands since the federal 
government never issued certificates of ownership to the Absentee Shawnee due to the 
tribe’s refusal to take their land in severalty.417   
The Citizen Potawatomi had learned many painful lessons about the uncertainty 
of one’s land tenure over the decades.  The parents and grandparents of these individuals 
were of the generation that was pushed out of their ancestral homelands in the Great 
Lakes.  Many of these individuals had lived on at least three different reservations in their 
                                                 
415 Ibid., 2.   
416 Ibid.  
417 RCIA, 1886, 143.  Hacker, “Confusion and Conflict: A Study of Atypical Responses to Nineteenth 
Century Federal Indian Policies by the Citizen Band Potawatomis,” 87. 
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life, each one promised to their tribe for eternity.  So, when the Absentee Shawnee 
refused to accept titles for their land the Citizen Potawatomi moved north onto the more 
arable lands.  They had learned to act in their self-interest, regardless of the tensions it 
might cause with another Indian nation.418   
ORGANIZING TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE TRIBE:  DAWES ACT 
VS. ACT OF 1872 
The messy struggles for personal rights or land claims did not wholly consume 
life in Indian Territory; in many ways it was very similar to that of other communities 
trying to become established on the American frontier.  The average Citizen Potawatomi 
who moved onto the prairie lands of the Great Plains spent most of their days working to 
establish a means to support their family and to create a new life.  Reports from their 
agents note that throughout the late 1870s and the 1880s the number of Citizen 
Potawatomi moving to the reservation steadily increased and they progressively brought 
more land under cultivation and developed herds of livestock.419  Like every person who 
made a living from the land, some years were prosperous and others brought hardship 
through extenuating circumstances like drought or crop failure.   
When tribal members in Indian Territory did need to confront the federal 
government about their rights they eventually turned to the familiar political structure of 
a Business Committee, like the one that the tribe created in Kansas to negotiate and carry 
out the treaty of 1861.  From 1872 until the Citizen Potawatomi were assigned to the Sac 
and Fox Agency in 1877 there are few records for the tribe, so the details of how the 
                                                 
418 Though neither study extends into the 1870s, this behavior on the part of the Citizen Potawatomi 
supports and further complicates the assertions of R. David Edmunds and John Bowes that the Potawatomi 
were pioneers.  Decades after removal from their homeland the Potawatomi are pioneers by those scholars’ 
definitions, but now they are also appropriating the actions of non-Indian settlers who forced their will by 
moving onto lands that they desired before there was a clear legal authority for them to do so.    
419 RCIA, 1877, 106; RCIA, 1880, 92; RCIA, 1881, 102; RCIA, 1882, 87; RCIA, 1883, 86; RCIA, 1884, 
95. 
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Business Committee was reorganized in Indian Territory are unclear.  A few letters, 
composed on behalf of the tribe and containing several signatures, were sent to the OIA 
in the early 1880s.  None of these letters claimed to be from the Business Committee, 
however, so there was likely not a formally organized body at this point.  Several of the 
members of the Citizen Potawatomi’s original Business Committee, including Joseph 
Napoleon Bourassa and Lewis Vieux, did not choose to move to Indian Territory.  As a 
result, a new group of Citizen Potawatomi tribal members stepped into leadership roles.  
The first mention of an official Business Committee in Indian Territory was in 1887.420  
The following year the Sac and Fox Indian agent lamented that none of the tribes in his 
agency had adopted the rules governing the court of Indian offenses, but offered that the 
Citizen Potawatomi at least had a Business Committee to decide cases of dispute between 
tribal members.421
 
  
The few academic works that discuss the Citizen Potawatomi’s history from the 
last half of the nineteenth century are highly critical of the Business Committee.  
Historians Craig Miner and William E. Unrau called the establishment of the original 
Business Committee in Kansas “chief-making at its best,” and described the men as “a 
conniving cadre of Potawatomi leaders” and accused them of being part of “the emerging 
Potawatomi ring.”422  Ethnohistorian and anthropologist James A. Clifton declared that 
the committee was “little more than a rubber-stamp group doing the bidding of their 
agent.”423  The primary accusation directed at members of the Business Committee, by 
both contemporary OIA officials and academics analyzing their actions, was that they 
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were self-interested men who used their position in the tribe for personal gain.  It is easy 
to criticize these men if one assumes that tribal leaders are supposed to be one-
dimensional, altruistic figures who were only concerned with selfless promotion of the 
tribe.  Upon closer examination, it is easy to see that the members of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Business Committee, and other leaders, were more complicated than their 
portrayal as conniving, self-interested agents of the government.  
The members of the Business Committee were generally well-educated men who 
could effectively argue for the rights of the Citizen Potawatomi under specific legislation, 
because they were often present and represented the interests of the tribe when that 
legislation was drafted.  Yet, like other sub-sections of American society, many of them 
did engage in corrupt activities and took every opportunity to advance their personal 
interests.  Unlike other segments of American society, however, what was most 
beneficial to the individual committee members usually aligned with the best interest of 
the tribe as a whole.  Furthermore, men like John Anderson, Alexander B. Peltier, 
Anthony Navarre, and other leaders diligently fought and petitioned to see that the rights 
of the entire tribe, as well as those of individual members, were protected and clearly 
defined, regardless of their personal benefit.424   
Three key, and interrelated, issues dominated the work of the Business Committee 
and the correspondence from concerned tribal members to the OIA from the late 1880s 
through the early 1890s.  First, the Citizen Potawatomi wrote dozens of letters each year 
to various officials in the OIA demanding that they have a say in whether the Act of 1872 
or the Dawes Act of 1887 took precedent as the proper allotment law that would be 
applied to their community.  Secondly, they passionately argued that Citizen Potawatomi 
                                                 
424 Anthony Navarre no longer served as a member of the Business Committee in Indian Territory, but he 
did regularly petition for the rights of the tribe. 
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women should receive allotment rights that were equal to male tribal members.  Finally, 
members of the Business Committee and concerned tribal members insisted that they 
needed to have the final determination in who was considered a member of their tribe and 
whether each individual was eligible for an allotment or not.  While this might 
concentrate power in the hands of the Business Committee, it took it out of the hands of 
the federal government. 
The primary event that caused the Citizen Potawatomi to become so insistent and 
organized in their demands for more control over their affairs in the late 1880s was 
Congress’ passage of the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887.  The Dawes Act 
was the federal government’s first major attempt to end the Native American practice of 
communal land ownership, to dissolve tribal governments, and to encourage individual 
Indians to live on and improve private property like non-Indians.425  One could argue that 
the Potawatomi were used as a model.  In 1887, the Commissioner named N.S. Porter as 
special allotting agent for the Citizen Potawatomi and the Absentee Shawnee to carry out 
the general terms of the Dawes Act.426
 
  
Instead of aiding the progress of allotting the Citizen Potawatomi’s reservation 
and bringing it under cultivation, the Dawes Act served to, yet again, complicate land 
ownership among the Potawatomi.  The Citizen Potawatomi and Absentee Shawnee 
already had legal guidelines for allotment in place.  The only thing inhibiting the 
conveyance of titles for those allotments was the OIA’s internal conflict over the Citizen 
Potawatomi’s legal status and the Absentee Shawnee’s refusal to participate in the earlier 
                                                 
425 The General Allotment Act popularly became known as the Dawes Act because of Senator Henry L. 
Dawes, the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs.  Dawes urged Congress to uphold its treaty 
obligations to tribes and advocated for individual Indians to receive allotments large enough to survive as 
farmers and stock raisers.  Fixico, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 89–90.    
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program.  The passage of new allotment legislation brought up the natural question – 
which allotment law took precedence, the Act of 1872 or the Dawes Act?   
It was during this controversy over which act would dictate the terms of their 
allotment that the Citizen Potawatomi skillfully argued for dual legal rights as Indians 
and U.S. citizens. The Absentee Shawnee generally preferred the Dawes Act, because it 
gave them the right to choose larger allotment plots than the Act of 1872, at no cost.  Still 
generally opposed to any allotment efforts until a clear dividing line was established 
between them and the Citizen Potawatomi, they did not eagerly pursue allotments under 
this act.  Many Citizen Potawatomi, however, favored the Act of 1872 because, though 
the Dawes Act allowed them to claim land for free, under the Act of 1872 any adult over 
the age of twenty-one, including married women and single people, could purchase 160 
acres.  Though it should be noted that this was not universally the case; many Citizen 
Potawatomi preferred the Dawes Act. 
In December of 1887, Anthony F. Navarre wrote a letter to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, J.D.C. Atkins, in which he argues that the more agreeable conditions of 
the Act of 1872 should be applied to the Citizen Band rather than the Dawes Act.  The 
Act of 1872 allowed for the allotment of land to “each head of a family, and to each other 
member twenty-one years of age, not more than one-quarter section.”427  This included 
women who were heads of their households and even unmarried adult women.  Under the 
Dawes Act only heads of households could receive allotments.  The Dawes Act did not 
explicitly state that only males could be heads of households, but the members of the 
Citizen Potawatomi recalled the trouble they faced when they took allotments in Kansas 
and provisions were not made for women to receive land as the head of their household.  
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Many Citizen Potawatomi women were married to non-Indians, so it was important that 
their rights be equal to those of Citizen Potawatomi men.428   
Therefore, under the Act of 1872, the Citizen Potawatomi were entitled to a 
greater amount of acreage and there were no restrictions that only heads of households 
could claim the full acreage for adults.  In light of these differences Navarre protested 
that: 
 
The Pottawatomie Citizens’ Band are citizens of the United States; hence the law 
of February, 1887, is not applicable to that band, but only to Indians in ‘tribal 
relations’ and other Indians not citizens of the United States. 
Therefore, in behalf of my people I appeal earnestly for your decision at once 
upon the question as to the quantity of acres of land we are entitled to, and as to 
the right to select anywhere within the said tract the allotments of our lands.429 
By invoking the band’s U.S. citizenship and pointing out that they did not fall 
under heading of Indians in “tribal relations,” Navarre used the terminology the 
government had used as it made excuses to dispossess the Potawatomi of their land in 
order to argue for the collective rights of his tribe.  Navarre claimed that the Citizen 
Potawatomi had the rights of both United States citizens and of other Native Americans.  
Just as the federal government could choose to recognize or ignore the Citizen 
Potawatomi’s U.S. citizenship as it benefitted their cause, the Citizen Potawatomi could 
also invoke their rights as U.S. citizens and Native Americans interchangeably as it suited 
their needs.   
Yet, the Citizen Potawatomi were not content to live with this ambiguity and 
continued to press for recognition of their rights.  An estimate from May of 1887 puts the 
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number of tribal members on the reservation in Indian Territory at 306 individuals.430
  
According to a letter from Commissioner Atkins there were supposedly an additional one 
thousand Citizen Potawatomi residing in Kansas who would not move to Indian Territory 
unless they were assured that they could take their allotments anywhere within the 
reservation.431  This included the fertile lands north of the Little River that were claimed 
by the Absentee Shawnee.432
 
  
The increasing political aptitude of the Citizen Potawatomi is made even more 
evident by their lack of reliance on their Indian agent or the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to decide these important questions.  In November of 1887, A.B. Peltier, Baptiste 
Pambogo, Stephen Nehahonquot, and Joseph Moose, all members of the Business 
Committee, bypassed their agent and wrote a letter directly to President Grover 
Cleveland to present their argument for the more favorable conditions of the Act of 1872 
to be put into place.433  They ignored the pressure to recognize traditional Anglo-
American gender roles by pointing out that the Dawes Act excluded women of the tribe 
from taking allotments as heads of households.  They also reinforced their assertion that 
the terms of the treaty of 1867 stipulated that the Citizen Potawatomi had the right to 
select their allotments from anywhere within the thirty-mile-square tract.  They expressly 
demanded that they be given the rights accorded to them as citizens and as Indians by 
past treaties.434
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Throughout 1888 and 1889 the offices of the OIA and the Department of the 
Interior were flooded with letters from Citizen Potawatomi tribal members.  The first 
letters simply inquired as to why the Citizen Potawatomi could not make allotment 
selections north of the Little River, where the better farm land lay.  Later, the Citizen 
Potawatomi writing letters became more forceful, insisting that they be allowed to make 
such selections.  Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T.J. Morgan, reported to the Secretary 
of the Interior in December of 1889 that N.S. Porter, the Citizen Potawatomi’s allotment 
agent, complained of an increased determination on the part of the Citizen Potawatomi to 
disregard his instructions to take land south of the Little River.  He bemoaned to his 
superiors that “they are daily annoying him by demanding land on North Fork, and 
stating that they propose to take it wherever they desire, regardless of instructions or 
law.”435  This was a lesson the Citizen Potawatomi learned from the non-Indian squatters 
who repeatedly moved onto their lands and were eventually backed by the federal 
government. 
The Citizen Potawatomi’s protests were often met with contempt.  The frustration 
of some OIA officials toward the Citizen Potawatomi’s demands for the rights given to 
them by past treaties was expressed using the familiar argument that they were given a 
chance to succeed and failed, when Commissioner J.D.C Atkins protested in December 
of 1887 that: 
 
I do not see that these Indians have any cause for complaint.  They were allotted 
lands in Kansas, made citizens of the United States, and paid their pro rata share 
of the funds of the tribe.  After they had sold their allotted lands and wasted their 
substance in riotous living there were allowed to select a tract of land in the 
Indian Territory, upon which other Indians had been living prosperously and 
contentedly for more than 30 years.  Within the tract they were allowed the 
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privileges of purchasing from the Government a certain quantity of land each at 
the cost price of the same.  In 15 years but eleven members have availed 
themselves of this privilege.436 
The Commissioner’s assertion that only eleven Citizen Potawatomi “availed 
themselves” of the opportunity to take allotments blatantly omits information that was 
pertinent to this case.  The federal government denied titles to over one hundred and 
thirty tribal members who attempted to take allotments in 1875.  At the time of the 
Commissioner’s report, Agent Porter was in the process of making 315 allotments under 
the terms of the Dawes Act.437  The Commissioner’s tone of both frustration and 
annoyance suggests that whenever the Citizen Potawatomi displeased the OIA, officials 
would fall back onto a baseless argument about the Citizen Potawatomi’s failed 
opportunities to assimilate.  He did not acknowledge the role the OIA’s contradictory and 
detrimental policies played in the scenario. 
After meeting resistance to their petitions, and later their demands, for permission 
to take allotments under the Act of 1872 on any part of the reservation, a few Citizen 
Potawatomi changed their tactics.  In the summer of 1889, John and Peter Anderson hired 
an attorney, D.A. McKnight, to assist them in their struggle to claim the land they lived 
on and improved in the northern section of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.  In their 
petition the brothers insisted that they had the right to choose the amount of land allowed 
by the Act of 1872, but under the terms of the Dawes Act that authorize them to take the 
land at no cost.  If this was not granted, they professed that they should be allowed land 
allotments under both acts, since they were both valid.  Their attorney, D.A. McKnight, 
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filed a supporting brief pointing out that the Dawes Act did not include a “clause 
repealing former acts, and repeal by implication are never allowed, unless there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the two acts.”438  The following winter McKnight filed 
applications with the OIA for the brothers and their families to take their allotment 
selections north of the Little River and by the terms of the treaty of 1872.  Two weeks 
later, he filed for an allotment title in the name of Julia Anderson, Peter Anderson’s 
deceased wife, for the lands allotted to her in 1875.439  While they didn’t receive land 
under each allotment act, the Potawatomi did achieve what they wanted most: control. 
By acting together and persistently presenting their petitions to the federal 
government the Citizen Potawatomi were able achieve their goal.  On July 11, 1890, 
President Benjamin Harrison approved a recommendation by Secretary of the Interior 
John H. Noble requesting that “authority be granted to the Citizen Pottawatomie Indians 
to elect whether they will take allotments under the act of 1872 or 1887.”440  The 
Anderson brothers received titles to the lands they lived on north of the Little River.  It 
was an important victory and set an important precedent.441   
Even before the passage of the Dawes Act, which spurred a flurry of political 
action on the part of the Citizen Potawatomi, several Citizen Potawatomi were 
demanding that the tribe have ultimate say over tribal membership, not the allotting 
agent.  On May 9, 1883, a group of Citizen Potawatomi men wrote a letter to Major J.V. 
Carter, the Sac & Fox agent, contending that Special Agent Townsend was allowing all 
white men who were married to Citizen Potawatomi women to enroll as members of the 
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tribe despite the band’s “unanimous protest” and the fact that the Act of 1872 gave the 
Citizen Potawatomi full discretionary rights to designate “who shall be members of the 
Citizen Band of Pottawatomies.”442  They also recalled that in the 1861 treaty, non-
Indians became members of the tribe “by an act of our council and not by marriage,” and 
only then did the non-Indian spouses receive land and annuities like any other member of 
the band.443 
These efforts only increased after the Dawes Act.  In September of 1889, David 
Laughton, who wrote several letters demanding he be allowed to live north of the Little 
River, also penned a letter criticizing the allotting agent for allotting non-Indian men with 
Indian wives before enrolled tribal members.  He insists that the agent was acting under 
the command of a Commissioner who “has never seen an indian previous to his election 
to said office.”444  That same year, Alex B. Peltier, the Chairman of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Business Committee, wrote to the Secretary of the Interior that Agent Porter 
was allotting land to individuals who had “not a shadow of a right” and claiming that they 
were “frauds.”  Peltier argued that “we know our people,” therefore, any person who was 
not clearly eligible for an allotment should have to prove their eligibility before the 
Business Committee instead of OIA officials.445  These petitions suggest that the Citizen 
Potawatomi had their own ideas about citizenship. While officials in the OIA failed to 
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commit to the Citizen Potawatomi’s U.S. citizenship, it was more important to these 
individuals to regulate and define who could achieve a culturally-based citizenship.  
Some people associated with the tribe did not understand the cultural importance 
of the Citizen Potawatomi having ultimate control over who had rights as tribal members.  
W.H. Weld was a non-Indian man married to Catherine (Countryman) Monroe, a 
Potawatomi woman.  In 1887 she left W.H. Weld and later that year Agent Porter allotted 
all of the buildings and most of the land they lived on to Catherine and named her as head 
of the family.  Weld argued that he was always considered the head of their family and 
that Catherine claimed that he must pay her rent if he wants to stay on the property.  
Weld insisted that Agent Porter “knew I was a citizen of the nation,” and warned that if 
the agent continued to support Potawatomi women who wanted to dispossess their non-
Indian husbands one “might infer that a man of white blood has no rights here to be 
respected.”446  His glib assertion was now legally true. 
PREPARING INDIAN TERRITORY FOR NON-INDIAN SETTLEMENT  
The years of fighting for the right to choose allotments where they wanted, as 
well as determining their dual legal rights as Native Americans and U.S. citizens 
prepared the Citizen Potawatomi for the negotiations they faced with the federal 
government to open their land to non-Indian settlement.  The passage of the Dawes Act 
paved the way for the opening of the “surplus lands” of Indian Territory, just like the 
allotment treaties in Kansas.  In this case, the federal government decided to make the 
land available through a land run.  Participants would gather at a predetermined location 
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and, by the firing of a pistol, race to claim an available piece of land.  After the OIA and 
individual tribes found solutions to most of the difficulties and specific issues, the OIA 
quickly worked to allot land to each Indian.  Once the allotments were complete the OIA 
arranged a survey of the remaining lands and divided them into plots.  
The general Indian-hating character of these emigrants might have been a burden 
on the tribes in Indian Territory and the OIA, but the sheer number of non-Indians was 
also a legal nightmare.  Agents reported, in 1880, that six thousand non-Indians were 
reported to be living in the area without permit or legal right, ten years later an estimated 
one hundred and forty thousand non-Indians were settled there.  Of this number forty-
eight thousand were laborers employed by Indians, twenty-six thousand were employees 
of the federal government or a corporation operating in Indian Territory, two thousand 
were categorized as travelers, and at least sixty-four thousand were intruders with no 
explanation for why they were in the region.447 
The Cherokee (or Jerome) Commission visited the tribes of the Sac and Fox 
Agency in May and June of 1889.  They negotiated to purchase the lands of the Citizen 
Potawatomi and Absentee Shawnee for over a week in the middle of June.  The 
Commissioners sought to determine whatever rights the Citizen Potawatomi and 
Absentee Shawnee might have to their reservations.  According to historian William 
Thomas Hagan, the Commissioners approached the negotiations with the attitude that 
both tribes had only limited title to their land.448  The talks were temporarily complicated 
by the Citizen Potawatomi’s assertion that they had purchased their land, a claim the 
Commission initially denied.  After consulting officials in Washington, D.C., the 
Commissioners were told not to pursue the argument and do whatever was necessary to 
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make the land deal.  The Commissioners also included a statement in the agreement that 
both tribes had to be allotted under the Dawes Act from then on, since it would give less 
land to the Indians and reserve more for non-Indian settlers.449   
Much to the Commissioners distress, the Citizen Potawatomi had an attorney 
present at all of the negotiations.  It was likely their foresight to bring legal counsel that 
provided for the inclusion of a statement in the agreement that the Citizen Potawatomi 
could sue for the $119,790.75 they originally paid for the reservation.450  The 
Commissioners were eventually able to acquire 325,000 acres at a rate of sixty-nine cents 
per acre after fourteen hundred acres were set aside for the Citizen Potawatomi and six 
hundred and fifty for the Absentee Shawnee.  For their cessions the Citizen Potawatomi 
were paid $160,000 and the Absentee Shawnee $65,000.  These payments were made to 
individual tribal members as per capita payments.451  The Citizen Potawatomi Business 
Committee agreed to the arrangement with the Cherokee Commission and it was 
endorsed by seventy-five signatures of tribal members.  
In 1890 the Potawatomi’s Indian agent reported that since the departure of the 
Cherokee Commission “boomers and sooners” infested the reservation.452  These 
landless, non-Indians migrated throughout the reservation living out of wagons and 
camping.  They were a nuisance to the Potawatomi because they cut timber and took 
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other resources needed for survival without permission.  The Potawatomi’s agent, Samuel 
L. Patrick, was more concerned about the detrimental effect these individuals could have 
on the opening of surplus lands in the land run.  He complained that unless the military 
worked to evict the intruders “their numbers in hiding will be sufficient to occupy, and 
will so do, a large portion of choice land.”  He noted that the Potawatomi reservation was 
“especially infested with this class of riff-raff whites.”453   
At the conclusion of the Jerome Commission’s work it was decreed by the 
Secretary of the Interior on February 26, 1891, that any non-Indian living in Indian 
Territory were doing so unlawfully and should immediately leave from the area or they 
would be disqualified from claiming land when the surplus acres were opened to non-
Indian settlement later that year.  Many of the non-Indians living and working on the 
reservations within the Sac & Fox Agency left the reservations at that time so they would 
not impair their homestead qualifications.454   
On September 22, 1891 more than three hundred thousand acres of surplus land 
on what used to be the Citizen Potawatomi reservation was opened to the land run.  
Family histories record that some of the Citizen Potawatomi rode over to the starting line 
of the race to watch the commotion.455  In one afternoon they would watch hundreds of 
thousands of the acres they fought the Absentee Shawnee to claim disappear into the 
hands of non-Indian settlers.  It was not the first time the federal government reneged on 
a land agreement they made with the Citizen Potawatomi, but it was the first time they 
saw the agreement dissolved in such a literal and dramatic fashion.   
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CONCLUSION 
When the straggling groups of Citizen Potawatomi left Kansas for their new 
reservation in Indian Territory, none knew what to expect.  These individuals, along with 
their parents and grandparents, were told on several previous occasions that once they 
moved just a little farther away from non-Indian society they would be left to themselves 
on land that would belong to them forever.  These promises always proved false.  So, the 
Citizen Potawatomi understood that their lives in Indian Territory were not going to be 
without trials and tribulations.  None of them, however, could have anticipated the 
decades-long battles they would have to wage to see the rights to which they were 
entitled realized.   
The Citizen Potawatomi’s “quasi-citizen” legal status left them vulnerable to 
accusations from federal officials who questioned their right to claim land in Indian 
Territory and exacerbated the struggle they had with the Absentee Shawnee over land 
rights on the reservation. Yet, it also provided them with both the resolve and rights to 
fight for their land against the Absentee Shawnee and when the federal government 
attempted to impose the Dawes Act upon them.  With years of relentless petitions and a 
honed competence to understand the benefits of their unclear legal status, the Citizen 
Potawatomi overcame these challenges and established a strong community in Indian 
Territory.  By the late 1880s, Mary Bourbonnais and other tribal members were able to 
articulate their arguments, cite pertinent legislation, and effectively fight for their 
individual and collective rights.   
 
 
 
 
 186 
Conclusion 
When the men and women who became the Citizen Potawatomi arrived at their 
agency on the Kansas River on November 15, 1861 to sign their allotment and citizenship 
treaty, they understood they were enacting sweeping changes for their community.  In the 
three previous decades the Potawatomi had survived multiple removals to make way for 
hopeful settlers and enthusiastic entrepreneurs, hungry to seize the opportunity for new 
beginnings and success by participating in the rapid expansion of developing territories in 
the United States.  Each time they moved they hoped it was far enough to be out of the 
reach of non-Indian land hunger, but it was never to be.     
In the 1860s, federal officials began to accept that removing Indians to Kansas 
and other regions west of the Mississippi River did not solve the “Indian problem.”  The 
real problem with Indians was that they did not live by the dominant tenants of American 
society and they controlled vast amounts of land.  To remedy this situation the OIA 
slowly transitioned from a national Indian policy of removal and reservations, to one of 
assimilation through land ownership and U.S. citizenship.  Negotiating treaties and 
enacting legislation to acculturate Native Americans forced large reserves owned by the 
tribes in common to be carved up into individual plots and obligated the Indians to cede 
control of huge tracts of land.  Each treaty and law considered in this dissertation, from 
Potawatomi-specific agreements to the pieces of legislation with a broader reach, is 
evidence of the federal government’s concerted efforts to use assimilation and land 
reform to dispossess Native Americans of their land base.   
By signing the treaty of 1861 the Citizen Potawatomi abandoned their traditional 
relationship with the federal government and set down a new path with the hope that 
taking allotments and U.S. citizenship would afford them the luxury of resisting removal 
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and grant them some control over their destiny.  This project examined how the Citizen 
Potawatomi responded to the federal government’s assimilation and land policies of the 
1860s through the 1890s, using federal laws and treaties, like the allotment and 
citizenship treaty of 1861, as the guideposts.  This socio-legal approach allows this 
narrative to fall within a broad history of Indian policy in the nineteenth century while 
acknowledging the imbalanced, but not completely one-sided power relationship between 
the Citizen Potawatomi and the federal relationship between the federal government and 
the Citizen Potawatomi to remain true.  As successful as the Citizen Potawatomi were at 
arguing for final say over the details of how these arrangements were carried out on the 
reservations, they were still at the mercy of Indian policy and all of their actions to secure 
or gain their rights were reactionary.   
This project builds on the earlier scholarship of historians Brad D.E. Jarvis and 
Emily Greenwald who explored similar situations with the Brothertown Indians in the 
1830s and the Nez Perce in the 1880s to show that the creation and intention of these 
laws and treaties only tell half of the story.
456
  In these native communities, like the 
Citizen Potawatomi, Native Americans did not always respond the way federal officials 
hoped.  Sometimes these Indians vehemently resisted the laws and other times they 
accepted, or even welcomed, the federal government’s assimilation efforts.  The Citizen 
Potawatomi believed that accommodating federal officials’ requests could provide them 
with some security from further removal – they were wrong.   
The Citizen Potawatomi endured a decades-long struggle to realize the rights 
afforded to them by past treaties.  After their dispossession, destitution, and near 
extinction as a band, in the 1870s and 1880s members of the Citizen Potawatomi made a 
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fourth and final move to Indian Territory.  Here they showed their resolve to be 
recognized as citizens of the U.S. and citizens of their tribe, privileged to the expressed 
rights of both groups. 
In Kansas members of the Citizen Potawatomi embodied and adopted certain 
aspects of American culture to secure their land base and protect themselves from further 
removal.  They realized that the government would still exploit them for their land by 
only selectively recognizing their rights.  Years later, when they lived in Indian Territory, 
they used the weaknesses of the federal government’s policies to their favor and they 
asserted more authority over how those policies were applied to them by manipulating 
their unclear status as both Native Americans and U.S. citizens.   
The Citizen Potawatomi’s resolve to use their hybrid status as Indian-citizens 
proved essential as allotment became the official Indian policy of the federal government 
with the Dawes Act of 1887.  They were able to use their knowledge of the legislation to 
argue that they were still Native Americans, and therefore eligible for allotments under 
the Dawes Act and for their right to take allotments under whichever allotment act was 
best for individual tribal members.  Hundreds of allotments were made to the Citizen 
Potawatomi, and per Article V of the act, hundreds of thousands of acres of “surplus 
lands” were sold to the government at a reduced rate and opened to non-Indian settlers 
with the land run of September 22, 1891.
457
  In many ways, however, the Citizen 
Potawatomi fared better than many other tribes who resisted early allotment efforts and 
were eventually forced into private land ownership with the passing of the Dawes Act, or 
even later by the work of the Jerome Commission in 1889.
458 
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ultimately found some degree of security that they had been looking for in their 
permanent home in Indian Territory. 
There are still questions about the Citizen Potawatomi response to Indian policy 
that need to be addressed by further research.  Did the forced allotment of the Prairie 
Band of Potawatomi under the Dawes Act adversely impact the Citizen Potawatomi who 
remained in Kansas?  There are also many questions left to explore that will lead to a 
better understanding of how political changes in Oklahoma and Indian Territories shaped 
Citizen Potawatomi history.  For example, how did Oklahoma statehood in 1907 impact 
the Citizen Potawatomi and their tribal political organization of a business committee?  
Also, the study can be extended chronologically to examine how the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, which superseded the Dawes Act and provided for adoption 
of tribal constitutions, shaped the modern structure of the Citizen Potawatomi tribe. 
This analysis of the native response to federal assimilation and land policies only 
considers the actions of the Citizen Potawatomi, but Congress enacted legislation for 
many tribes removed to the West and applied some policies, like the Dawes Act, to 
dozens of tribes.  Did other tribes respond in ways that were similar to the Citizen 
Potawatomi, or did they adapt their own methods of accommodation and resistance?  
Additionally, there is room to explore the impact of land policies on other groups, like 
freedmen, who moved to Indian Territory after the Civil War. 
While the subject of native responses to federal Indian policies calls for more 
research, this study reveals that the Citizen Potawatomi did not wholly accept the 
stipulations of these treaties and laws as they were handed down.  Tribal members hoped 
that they could use adaptation to federal assimilation policies as a tool to secure their 
homes and land base, and they learned a painful lesson when those efforts failed.  By 
1891, the Citizen Potawatomi applied those lessons and were able to secure land 
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allotments under conditions that were the most favorable for individuals in their 
community.  They may have lost the war to live by their own cultural standards, away 
from the presence and interference of non-Indian peoples and governments, but they did 
win a few key battles that allowed them to make the most out of the difficult situation.  It 
was a tempered victory.   
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